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Abstract 
While human-animal relations have always been part of human cultures the public zoo is a 
relatively recent phenomenon that reflects very specific elements of Western cultures’ 
modern ideas about, and relationships with, nonhuman animals. By becoming such a familiar 
part of popular culture the zoo naturalises these ideas as well as certain modes of looking at 
and interacting with animals. In this thesis I argue that as literary works contemporary novels 
provide a valuable defamiliarisation of zoos which encourages the re-examination of the 
human attitudes and practices that inform our treatment of nonhuman animals. Through my 
analysis of J.M. Ledgard’s novel Giraffe, Diane Hammond’s Hannah’s Dream, Lydia 
Millet’s How The Dead Dream, Valerie Martin’s The Great Divorce and Ben Dolnick’s 
Zoology I explore the inherently anthropocentric social construction of nonhuman animals in 
human discourses and the way the novels conform to or subvert these processes. I 
demonstrate that nonhuman animal characters are constructed through a process of 
identification which involves naming, recognising the existence of their emotions and 
mediating their nonhuman forms of communication. Anthropocentric tendencies both aid and 
hinder this identification, for example the human valuing of sight over the other senses that 
sees eyes become important literary symbols and the gaze a crucial part of interaction and 
attributing meaning. Gaze and observation are also fundamental to the concept of the zoo 
where human treatment of nonhuman animals is represented in visual terms in the 
relationship between powerful spectator and disempowered object. Drawing on texts from 
multiple disciplines I argue that the anthropocentric nature of socially constructed nonhuman 
animals in human discourses means that any study of these animals is actually concerned 
with the human ideologies and processes that create them; as a site of captivity that markets 
wildness and freedom the paradoxical nature of the zoo provides the literary setting for an 
exploration of these themes.  
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Introduction 
 
         Over the past century zoos have become a pervasive part of Western societies; present 
in television shows, children’s books, films and product advertisements the concept of 
nonhuman animal captivity is a normal and familiar one for most people and the zoo visit a 
popular recreation activity. In response to changing public attitudes to nonhuman animals and 
the natural environment zoos have had to reposition or rebrand themselves over the years and 
today maintain their status in society by identifying themselves as modern-day conservation 
arks. This thesis aims to investigate contemporary representations of, and ideas about, the 
captivity of nonhuman animals by analysing five recent novels set in and around zoos or 
animal collections. These texts (hereafter referred to as “zoo novels”) are Giraffe (2007) by 
J.M. Ledgard, Hannah’s Dream (2008) by Diane Hammond, How The Dead Dream (2009) 
by Lydia Millet, The Great Divorce (first published in 1993) by Valerie Martin and Zoology 
(2007) by Ben Dolnick. My approach to these novels will take the form of poststructuralist 
contextual analysis based on the belief that although fictional, works of literature are 
historically contingent and by understanding their socio-cultural context a reader may more 
fully understand the meanings of the text. For example if, as Graham Allen notes, a novelist 
uses a word like “God” or “justice” or (with more particular significance to the novels 
discussed here) “natural” or “artificial”, these words do not have “clear and stable meanings” 
but rather “they embody society’s dialogic conflict over the meaning of words” (Allen, 36). 
Consequently such texts remain “thoroughly connected to on-going cultural and social 
processes” (36).  
In writing this thesis I adhere to the view of “culture” associated with contemporary 
cultural criticism, which insists that any one culture, for example that of contemporary North 
America, actually comprises “a set of interactive cultures, alive and changing, rather than 
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static and monolithic” (Murfin & Ray, 66, emphasis in original). In accordance with this 
belief my thesis adopts the theory of intertextuality proposed by Julia Kristeva that “any 
given work” must be viewed “as part of larger fabric of literary discourse” (Murfin & Ray, 
176), but expands the scope of this concept to include the discourse of many forms of culture 
by including, for example, scientific, feminist, historical, pop culture and journalistic texts as 
well as literary texts in its discussions. This approach is an intrinsic part of the 
interdisciplinary field of Human-Animal Studies (HAS); as Margo DeMello notes, in HAS, 
“we study the interactions between humans and other animals, wherever and whenever we 
find them” (5). In taking this approach I follow the example set by critics such as Randy 
Malamud, who, in his book Reading Zoos, describes his approach to exploring the 
representation of zoos in literature:  
A valuable confluence links my postmodern scholarly approach - which 
asserts that the boundaries between literary culture, popular culture, and 
nature are highly permeable - and scientific sensibilities that challenge 
positivist received ideas about how people and animals relate to each 
other. ... Humanists, I think, can explore and expose the conditions of the 
world we live in, while scientists can work to repair the damage this 
exploration will reveal.  
(36-7)  
The realisation that boundaries between different fields of study are “highly permeable” is an 
important one because only with the various evidences provided by these different discourses 
can we begin to understand the way in which, for humans, nonhuman animals are “socially 
constructed” (DeMello, 10). As Margo DeMello explains: 
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On one level, animals surely exist in nature. However, once they are 
incorporated into human social worlds they are assigned to human 
categories, often based on their use to humans, and it is these categories 
(lab animal, pet, [zoo animal,] and livestock) that shape not only how the 
animals are seen but also how they are used and treated. … Moreover, 
these classifications are not neutral—they are politically charged in that 
they serve to benefit some (humans, some animals) at the expense of 
others (other animals). 
(DeMello, 10) 
In this sense nonhuman animals themselves are intertextual subjects in human discourse; as 
Adrian Franklin notes, “[a]nimals convey meanings and values that are culturally specific; in 
viewing animals we cannot escape the cultural context in which that observation takes place” 
(62). The novels examined in this thesis were all published in the US or UK in the last two 
decades, a time when Western ideas of both humanity and animality were undergoing radical 
change. Franklin observes that twentieth century Western modernisation was categorised by a 
sanguine belief in human progress in which nonhuman animals figured mostly as resources 
and “the despoliation of nature, ethical uncertainties in dealing with animals, pollution and so 
on ... were seen as the inevitable, regrettable compromise” in achieving a fair and prosperous 
human society (3, 54). However the post-war period saw a growing disenchantment with the 
ideals of modernism and the decades after the collapse of the modernity project in the 1970s 
were “characterized by greed, loss, instability and change,” until by the end of the century “a 
generalized misanthropy ha[d] set in” (55, 3). In the ensuing confusion of postmodernism 
nonhuman animals were increasingly seen as fellow victims of humans’ greedy and 
destructive tendencies. “The speed with which habitats were being destroyed, species were 
becoming extinct and populations endangered by pollution” were identified with processes of 
“human destructiveness and ascendancy over animals” (55).  As Chapter Three of this thesis 
will show, zoos were not unaffected by these changing attitudes and were forced to adapt in 
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light of the public’s more sympathetic view of nonhuman animals. It is from this climate of 
misanthropy that the zoo novels examined here were written. 
Because they necessarily contain elements of or reactions to the culture in which they 
are written, novels could be said to show us a reflection of ourselves. As Marcus Bullock 
notes, “Walter Benjamin defines that special quality of any serious work of art, which he 
calls its ‘aura’, as our ‘investing it with the capacity to return our gaze’” (Bullock, 101, citing 
Benjamin, 188). Although Benjamin may not have included all novels in his account of 
“serious work[s] of art”, a good novel will show us a reflection of a part of ourselves; our 
identity, beliefs, morals, or assumptions about what is true. For this reason as we read a zoo 
novel we may experience different layers of reflected meaning. We are aware of the captive 
animals and their otherness; subsequently we are also aware of our own identity, which is 
also that of the novel’s human characters, as human captors. However the animals in the 
novel, both human and nonhuman, are constructed by a human author, as are any interactions 
between the two and the locations where it takes place; therefore we may also see in the 
novel’s “aura” not the animal gazing back at us but the gaze of the human construction itself.  
This special perspective afforded by novels is a lot more accessible than other texts 
purporting to educate about nonhuman animals. As Malamud points out, the language literary 
writers use is “immensely more interesting” than that used by zoo authorities to “identify 
and ... contextualize animals” (Reading, 10).  Rather than conveying abstract information the 
function of literary language is to encourage a response in the reader, for example through the 
evocation of empathy or the defamiliarisation of naturalised concepts or behaviours. 
“Defamiliarisation”, a concept attributed to Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky, proposes 
that “perception becomes automatic once it has become habitual” (Hawthorn, 68); in other 
words, that which is familiar is no longer noticed. Literary writing is an important antithesis 
to this “habitualization” (68), as Keith Oatley observes: “a principal function of literature is 
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to make the familiar strange, so that one’s attention is drawn to it, so that one notices it” 
(Oatley, 74). In this way literary writing may add interest by complicating accounts of 
human-animal relationships. 
In an interview about his latest novel author of Giraffe J.M. Ledgard, who works as an 
African correspondent for The Economist, was asked “[w]hat can you accomplish writing 
fiction that you can’t accomplish in journalism?” Ledgard’s answer to this question 
demonstrates his awareness of literature as medium which can inform and be informed by its 
wider cultural context.  
Perspective. Who are we as a species? What is our relationship to each 
other? These are not questions for the news desk. Journalism is 
fascinated with the moment, and with things which are breaking. 
Literature looks at the whole. It can be cosmic. I steer closer to non-
fiction than some novelists, but I believe literature has a power to inform 
and endure beyond journalism.  
(Ledgard, “Q&A”) 
Journalism, while influenced by contemporary political and social context, strives to give a 
factual account of a single moment in time, free, as Ledgard goes on to note, from “your ego, 
or at least your adjectives.” Literature, however, encapsulates an historical, cultural moment; 
as Ledgard explains, “in literature, the ‘I am’ is very large” (Q&A). Literary authors are able 
to (consciously or subconsciously) draw on a wide range of sources, including journalism;
 1
 
                                                 
1
 After hearing of the “Czechoslovakian giraffes” the journalist Ledgard gathered the story through 
various interviews with people involved in the still-secret massacre (Ledgard, 325-8). In the 1990s the author of 
Hannah’s Dream, Diane Hammond, worked as part of the Keiko project, a team working to rehabilitate the 
“killer whale” featured in the Free Willy films. In 2001 she saw television footage of the emotional and highly 
publicised parting of Shirley the elephant and her carer of twenty-two years Solomon James Jnr. following 
Shirley’s relocation from a Louisiana zoo to the Hoehenwald Elephant Sanctuary. “Out of this remarkable 
moment, and informed by my experience with the Keiko project, Samson Brown and Hannah were born” 
(Hammond, v-vi). (A full account of Shirley’s arrival at the sanctuary can be found at 
http://www.elephants.com/shirley/shirleyArrival.php). The Great Divorce author Valerie Martin also briefly 
describes aspects of her research process, in particular hours spent at the Audubon Park Zoo in New Orleans 
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by being necessarily rooted in the socio-cultural climate in which they are written literary 
works may “look at the whole”.2  
Perhaps because of these qualities novels have become an important part of Western 
cultures, both documenting changes in cultural values and also affecting significant changes 
in societal attitudes. When describing the history of Western societies’ attitudes to nonhuman 
animals, several texts use the contemporary novels of the period to evidence the reigning 
cultural perceptions of animals of the time.
3 
In his essay “The Moral Ecology of Wildlife”, 
Andrew C. Isenberg gives the example of Ernest Thompson Seton (author and illustrator of a 
series of books about wild animals published 1898-1917) using “the literary tools available to 
him at the time ... to animate nature” (Isenberg, 50). However Seton’s contemporaries 
“scorned his sentimental, anthropomorphized animal stories as deliberate misrepresentations 
of wildlife” (50). As Isenberg records, when Seton claimed that his stories are true, the nature 
writer John Burroughs called him a “nature faker”. “True as romance, true in their artistic 
effects, true in their power to entertain the young reader, they certainly are; but true as natural 
history they as certainly are not” (Isenberg, 50, citing Keller, 153-54). As a naturalist 
Burroughs obviously disdains stories about wildlife written merely to “entertain” the reader 
and feels that romantic accounts of animals are “fake” by definition. However Isenberg 
disagrees: “Seton’s animals, if anthropomorphized and therefore unreal, were nonetheless 
‘authentic’ in the sense that they were apt projections of modern anxieties...” (50-1). 
Similarly, the novels explored in this thesis give us an insight into some of the attitudes to 
nonhuman animals that exist today in our own contemporary culture.  
                                                                                                                                                        
accompanying an employee “on her extraordinary rounds” and asking her questions (“Acknowledgments”, not 
paginated). 
2
 For the remainder of this thesis any citations attributed to Ledgard refer to his novel Giraffe. 
3
 (For example Isenberg, 49; Baratay & Hardouin-Fugier, 204). 
7 
 
 
The other important role of novels in our society is to affect real change in attitudes and 
values. Literature has been shown to be effective in changing both individual and cultural 
perceptions of nonhuman animals. Barbara Hardy Beierl’s article “The Sympathetic 
Imagination and the Human-Animal Bond” explores how human attitudes toward animals in 
literature can enhance the “psychological and emotional link generated in the text when 
empathy develops among humans, animals, and readers” (213). This “empathy” is the ability 
to put oneself in the place of someone else (human or nonhuman) and see and feel as they do. 
Beierl found that  
[i]maginative literature, featuring both human and animal characters, 
conveys this bond to the reader through sympathetic imagination and 
becomes an effective vehicle through which to support both 
psychological shifts and cultural changes in the reader’s perceptions. 
The psychological shifts produce greatly heightened empathy and a 
deepening of the human-animal bond in the individual reader; the 
cultural shifts result in the growth of a less anthropocentric sensibility 
toward animals in the larger society. 
(213)  
These “psychological shifts” in how a reader thinks about animals obviously rely on the 
effectiveness of the text in representing the human-nonhuman bond; of course a reader’s 
ability and willingness to feel empathy for at least one of the novel’s characters is also a 
necessary for a shift to occur. In J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, the protagonist 
Elizabeth Costello asserts that “there is no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves 
into the being of another. There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination” (Coetzee, 35). 
She says that this is so because humans and nonhuman animals already have something very 
important in common: we are all “full of being” (32). Costello argues that our “minds follow 
our hearts,” and her argument is further explained by Beierl: “If we have closed our hearts to 
animals, our sympathetic imagination can restart by reading literature that induces empathy 
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and compassion. If literature is successful in this role, then perhaps philosophy will follow” 
(Beierl, 219). This power of empathy is also expressed by Malamud in his book Poetic 
Animals and Animal Souls, in which he argues that merely having the desire to imagine the 
experience of a bat (or other nonhuman animal) is valuable, despite the fact that this 
imagination must be limited by our own existence as humans rather than bats (7).  
In the zoo novels the reader is encouraged to imagine the experience of a variety of 
different nonhuman animals. In Diane Hammond’s novel Hannah’s Dream Hannah is an 
elephant who lives in the small American Max L. Beidelman Zoo, formerly the private 
animal collection of a local eccentric, where elderly Samson (Sam) Brown has been caring 
for her over 40 years. Sam and his wife Corinna do not have any children but did suffer a 
miscarriage before Hannah arrived at the zoo; privately they believe Hannah is their daughter 
reborn and think of themselves as a family. At the zoo Hannah lives in a concrete barn with a 
small yard and at night she is shackled to the wall and locked inside. The Browns bring her 
treats, watch television with her, visit her after hours and try their best to heal her captivity-
induced ailments. Sam has a recurring dream in which he is an elephant standing alone in a 
field; when other elephants come over the ridge and greet him he knows that he is home: it is 
the Browns’ dream for Hannah. When young, highly trained zoo keeper Neva arrives at the 
zoo she is appalled at Hannah’s living conditions and together with Truman, an administrator 
for the zoo, she and Sam conspire to move Hannah to a pachyderm sanctuary in California. 
Despite desperate measures by the zoo’s director such as firing the staff involved, changing 
the locks to Hannah’s barn and hiring extra security it is too late and the group manages to 
break Hannah out of the zoo and transport her to the sanctuary. 
In Ben Dolnick’s Zoology Henry is a college drop-out whose life at home with his 
parents is becoming claustrophobic. When his successful older brother gets him a job in the 
Central Park Zoo’s children’s zoo he is excited to be able to move to New York. Henry finds 
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working in the zoo physically demanding and decidedly unglamorous however over the 
summer he becomes familiar with the animals there, in particular a goat called Newman 
whom he sees as his friend. Near the end of the summer during a power blackout in the city 
Henry becomes distraught over a failed romance and breaks into the zoo to see Newman. He 
decides they both deserve some fun together but when he takes Newman out into the park a 
sudden noise frightens them both and the goat runs away. After a frantic search by zoo staff 
the next morning Henry is forced to confess what he’s done and is banned from the zoo. He 
returns home to his parents’ house and Newman is never heard of again. 
J.M. Ledgard’s Giraffe is based on the true story of a group of giraffes who were 
captured in Kenya in 1971 and taken as a herd to Czechoslovakia (ČSSR). After the long 
journey by lorry, train, ship and barge the giraffes arrive at a zoo in a small town where the 
zoo director has fantasies of creating a Czechoslovakian giraffe subspecies. A young local 
woman visits the zoo to see the giraffes and makes friends with the keeper; she learns to 
recognise each giraffe and visits them often. Four years later the herd has increased to forty-
nine when test results at a secret State laboratory indicate the giraffes may have a disease 
which could spread and kill livestock, threatening the economy of ČSSR.  Orders from the 
Communist authority are clear: the laboratory must erase all trace of the test results and the 
zoo must destroy every one of its giraffes. The novel is told by multiple narrators and the 
disturbing scene of the giraffe massacre is told and retold by the scientist, the shooter, the zoo 
visitor and the butcher. Finally the giraffes’ broken bodies are put into the “Destruktor”, a 
machine which turns them into dry cattle feed.  
The Great Divorce by Valerie Martin was first published in 1993 and follows the lives 
of three women in New Orleans, two in the present day and one in the 1840s. Ellen and 
Camille, a vet and her assistant, work in the New Orleans Zoo, while Elisabeth lives with her 
violent husband on his estate. Elisabeth, seeking to free herself from her controlling and 
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abusive husband, visits a voodoo practitioner and one night becomes a wild cat who attacks 
and kills her husband. After being found (in human form) over the dead body she is later 
hanged for his murder. In the present day the two modern zoo employees are both going 
through personal struggles – Ellen, the divorce from her husband and Camille, depression and 
abusive relationships – while at the same time facing mysterious illnesses in the zoo’s 
inhabitants and the reality of the modern conservation crisis and the mass extinction of 
nonhuman species. Cynical Ellen is frank about these issues but resigned to her role on the 
sinking ark of the zoo. Camille meanwhile suffers from psychotic episodes which give her 
the sensation of transforming into a large predatory cat. When her favourite cat at the zoo 
dies depression overwhelms her and she commits suicide.  
The impending extinction faced by extraordinary numbers of Earth’s species is also a 
theme in Lydia Millet’s How The Dead Dream. T. is a successful finance broker whose main 
ambition in life is to acquire wealth. A series of tragic events – killing a wild coyote while 
driving in his car, the death of his girlfriend, his mother developing dementia – force him to 
confront the idea of loss and when one of his property developments accidentally causes the 
extinction of a species this concept of loss takes on vast proportions. T. becomes obsessed 
with nonhuman species and the rate at which they are disappearing. He begins to travel 
around the country, breaking into zoos after hours to spend time with the captives within: 
primate houses, butterfly sanctuaries, even visiting natural habitats and scientific research 
stations in the field. The final stage of the novel sees T. visit one of his developments in 
Central America where he decides to visit the natural habitat of the jaguar. When his guide 
suddenly dies T. is lost alone in the jungle and the novel ends with him struggling to find his 
way out.  
  In each of these novels the zoo is a place wherein human characters’ encounters with 
the captives challenge not just their notions about nonhuman animals but also their concepts 
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of humanity and what (or who) an animal is. Chapter One of this thesis will explore the status 
of nonhuman characters in the texts and how this is expressed in human discourse through 
naming, recognition of nonhuman experience and emotion and the representation of 
nonhuman forms of communication. The concept of “speciesism” will also be introduced as a 
term for both anthropocentric discrimination against nonhuman animals and also the human 
propensity to consider nonhuman animals in terms of whole species rather than as unique 
individuals; a scene from How The Dead Dream will be analysed as an example of one 
character’s first step to overcoming his speciesist worldview.  In Chapter Two the authors’ 
use of nonhuman gaze will be discussed along with the connotations of representing 
nonhuman animals as gaze-bearing subjects. In the third chapter the evolution of modern 
zoos will be examined in the context of Western societies’ changing views of nonhuman 
nature; a particular focus will be the zoo novels’ portrayal of captivity.  In exploring these 
novels I found two poems by Rainer Maria Rilke valuable for their interpretation of the 
nature and captivity of nonhuman animals; these poems are “The Eighth Elegy” and “The 
Panther.”  
Finally, a note on the use of generic pronouns in this text: I consider use of the pronoun 
“it” inappropriate when referring to nonhuman animals for reasons that will be briefly 
discussed in Chapter One. In an effort to avoid this problem, and also to subvert “those 
elements in language which perpetuate a view of the male as a norm or universal and the 
female as deviant or individual” (Mills, 65), I will throughout this thesis use feminine generic 
pronouns when referring to an unspecified or generic animal referent.  
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Chapter One  
Expressing the Other: Literary Construction and Recognition  
     of Nonhuman Animal Identity 
 
As Berger (1980:2-4) reminds us, animals are silent, they 
have secrets and cannot reveal their thoughts. We have 
always to interpret, to provide the meaning for what we 
see, and for that we can only draw upon human values, 
emotions and interpretations. When we gaze at animals 
we hold up a mirror to ourselves. 
 Franklin, 62 
 
If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to  
understand [her]. 
Wittgenstein, 235 
 
“I am aware”  
Ledgard, 9 
 
Much of the way we “socially construct” nonhuman animals involves defining them by 
their perceived differences from us; characteristics such as language, emotions, culture and 
even mind are usually seen as human traits. In accepting exclusively human definitions of 
these characteristics we position ourselves precariously atop the archaic Great Chain of Being, 
from which point our perception of other species is obstructed and distorted. For example to 
define “language” purely in terms of human speech is to ignore the multisensory reality of 
nonhuman animal communication including those olfactory and gestural modes which lead 
ethologist Marc Bekoff to conclude that animals “do indeed speak in their own ways” 
(Strolling, 23, emphasis in original). In “The Speech of Dumb Animals” Helen Tiffin 
describes the exclusivist human outlook and points to “imaginative writing” as way of 
questioning this mindset:  
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Inextricably connected as it has been to concepts of animality, this triple 
lack—language, consciousness, and mind—is best interrogated by the 
kind of imaginative writing that questions, through the ways in which it 
represents animals, the dominant science paradigms whose contrasting 
generic approaches deliberately foreclose knowledge other than their 
own. 
(149) 
Due to this anthropocentric tendency to see traits such as language in exclusively human 
terms many writers anthropomorphise nonhuman animals’ communication as human speech 
while others interpret it for their readers. This chapter will explore the portrayal of nonhuman 
communication and emotions in the zoo novels; it will discuss elephants as an example of 
animals who clearly possess not only emotions but also what must be called “culture”, and it 
will introduce the term “speciesism” as a useful term for this form of anthropocentrism and 
consider various ways of overcoming it in order to recognise the identity of individual 
nonhuman animals.  
In the passage at the start of this chapter Adrian Franklin contends that nonhuman 
animals act as a mirror for humans. An important practice facilitating this conceptualisation is 
the habit of projecting human “social structures and morality” onto nonhuman animals to 
provide a “socially constituted animal world” version of human society through which 
humans can reason or “resolve social tensions, conflicts and contradictions” (Franklin, 9). In 
such instances nonhuman animals are reduced to metaphors, a process also noted by Helen 
Tiffin who observes that speaking animals in modern texts are usually limited to those for 
children and to satirical works for adults which rely on the anthropomorphism of the 
nonhuman characters, such as political cartoons and fables (140). Tiffin points out that even 
serious texts with speaking nonhuman characters risk being interpreted as mere allegories in 
which “we characteristically read through the animals to the humans for which they are 
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merely masks” (141, emphasis in original). Such readings remove nonhuman animals as 
independent subjects so that even when they speak we do not hear them; as Franklin points 
out such anthropomorphic exercises reveal far more about ourselves than about nonhuman 
animals.  
In any case the speech of nonhuman animals in literary texts is necessarily 
anthropomorphic since it is written by a human author. As John Berger notes, the fact that 
humans do not share a verbal language with any other species prevents us from “reckoning” 
with nonhuman animals.  
Language allows [humans] to reckon with each other as with 
themselves. ... But always [a nonhuman animal’s] lack of common 
language, its silence, guarantees its distance, its distinctness, its 
exclusion, from and of [humans].  
(4) 
As I hope to show humans have developed many ways of striving to “reckon with” or know 
other species, but importantly Berger here makes the jump from nonhuman animals’ “lack of 
common language” with humans to their status as “silent”. This “silence” is of course not 
really silence at all – animals communicate and express themselves in myriad ways – but 
rather the propensity of humans to disregard the agentive discourses of other species. 
Language has long been seen as one of the defining characteristics that sets humans apart 
from “dumb” animals and nonhuman modes of communicating are usually considered crude 
and inferior. Tiffin observes that “[s]ubaltern positioning itself can confer voicelessness on an 
erstwhile ‘speaker’” (139, italics in original); the exclusion of the consideration of animal 
expression from human discourse has the effect of rendering nonhuman animals silent, and 
rendering their subjectivity absent from human literary, scientific and legal texts, which in 
turn ensures their continued marginalisation. Consequently nonhuman forms of expression 
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are often ignored in literature, and animals’ lack of speech equated to a narrative 
voicelessness which in turn serves to reinforce the superior position of humans in the text. In 
Giraffe Emil notes, “It is as Aristotle said, we differ from animals in our ability to speak. We 
alone can speak of the Communist moment, of justice and injustice. It is our speech which 
passes judgment on animals, excommunicating eels and condemning giraffes” (Ledgard, 253).  
The nonhuman animals represented in the zoo novels do express themselves in ways 
that, although distinct from human speech, are often mediated by the narrator, as when for 
example we are told that the elephant “Hannah sucked on her trunk apprehensively” 
(Hammond, 126); however it is often left to the human characters to interpret and respond to 
(or ignore) their discourses. The nonhuman animals in The Great Divorce are represented 
almost exclusively from the point of view of the women characters, in particular Ellen the 
zoo vet and the young keeper Camille. Any sounds uttered by the zoo animals in the text are 
understood as representing an aspect of their wild otherness. When Camille stands in the big 
cats’ night house they watch her as they eat and keep up a low continuous growl. None of the 
cats has ever been in the wild, “[y]et the sounds they made seemed to come from a dark 
continent…” (Martin, 10). 4 After cutting apart the dead body of a baby monkey to try and 
determine what killed him Ellen thinks about his last moments. “She remembered the little 
monkey’s terrified expression when he approached the kennel. He had lost control of 
everything—even his agile, responsive musculature had deserted him—and all he could do 
was scream” (29). The screaming of animals is a recurring sound in this text, expressive of 
                                                 
4
 As well as the obvious connotation of Africa, “dark continent” is also a term used by Freud to describe 
feminine sexuality as psychoanalytically unknowable (Irigaray, 48). Freud emphasises the passivity and 
otherness of feminine sexuality, and Mary Ann Doane observes that “the dark continent trope is hence invoked 
in the context of a return to the motifs of castration, lack and envy. … A metonymic chain is constructed which 
links infantile sexuality, female sexuality and racial otherness [as of ‘dark’ Africa]” (210). In the context of 
Valerie Martin’s novel the term “dark continent” evokes colonial conquest and the subjugation of nature 
represented in the caging of the wild cats but also the sexuality of the three female protagonists who each suffer 
sexual abuse, violence or betrayal at the hands of their male lovers. 
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the captive animals’ desperation. Lying at night in the dark prison of her bedroom Camille 
imagines the big cats in their night house at the zoo, and wonders if they have roaring 
matches, “filling up the closed compound with a magnificent sound no one ever heard?” (25). 
Flo the leopard issues “a strangled, terrified sound, something between a snarl and a scream” 
when she is prevented from leaving the night house (152). These explosions of sound are a 
violent last resort for the zoo animals who are mostly seen by the reader not in their exhibits 
but in their small concrete night houses. Not only do the cats have limited contact with each 
other but they do not have any of the physical contact or communication with humans that 
some of the animals in the other novels have. Their style of vocal communication is easy for 
the reader to interpret and reflects the style of their existence: lonely, isolated and desperate. 
The animals Henry meets in the children’s zoo in Zoology do not express this poignant, 
raw desperation. In fact, Henry has difficulty understanding many of the nonhuman animals 
he works with. When Henry first visits the kids’ zoo the director Paul introduces him to the 
potbellied pigs Chili and Lily, and explains that Lily overeats and so has to be watched. 
Henry stands contemplating Lily’s unbelievable obesity and thinks that she looks miserable 
and trapped by her enormous body. “Lily grunted when I touched her, and it could have 
meant, ‘Help!’ or it could have meant, ‘More!’” (Dolnick, 43). Although he can see Lily 
standing in front of him and can hear her grunt, Henry still does not comprehend what she 
wants or how she feels. Instead, in trying to understand what Lily is feeling Henry compares 
her with obese humans he has seen in the city. This human perspective is his only frame of 
reference for trying to understand Lily’s pig experience.  
At the beginning of his article “The Animal as Animal” Steven W. Laycock first 
addresses the nature of questions themselves, more specifically, the human tendency to seek 
the satisfaction or obturation of a question with an answer. Laycock describes the difference 
between what he calls “digital questions” and philosophical interrogation; the former are 
17 
 
 
questions that “can be ‘answered,’ abolished as questions, by repletion,” in this case the 
nature of the answer is determined by the nature of the question which demands it. However 
this “determinate expectation” is absent from philosophical interrogation, in which “the 
answer does not ‘fill’ or satis/fy” a preestablished interrogative space but rather this space has 
the “ability to absorb multiple responses” (Laycock, 273). By approaching the 
communication of nonhuman animals with predetermined expectations of meanings or 
function any genuine understanding will be obscured by that which we expect to see. In 
considering the famous question posed by Thomas Nagel “What is it like [to be a bat]?” 
Laycock proposes that in expecting an answer “the legitimation of human paternalism 
reduces the question of animal subjectivity to trivial decidability. The question is annihilated 
through repletion. And our openness to the animate Other is thereby foreclosed” (280). To 
speak for nonhuman animals is to “impose” our voice on their silence, when instead we must 
“offer the animate Other a vehicle whereby it may express itself” (277). The form of this 
“vehicle” is not suggested by Laycock, who instead directs the reader to remain receptive and 
be content with endless questions. 
Busy imposing our own views, speaking for the animate Other, we are 
not genuinely open, receptive. And it is no excuse to complain that in 
attending the Other’s voice we hear nothing, that we must speak for the 
Other because the animate Other cannot speak for itself, that the screen 
would be blank without or own projection. Let the screen lapse into 
imageless blankness. Let all lapse into silence.  
(279) 
However this silence, perhaps better understood as that which is unfathomable to the human 
listener, is not expressionless and so, paradoxically, the silence is voice: 
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We know that ‘[t]he absence of language is pregnant with the pure 
possibility of all language’ [Harold Coward, 1990]. If silence or 
incomprehensibility is the expression of the animate Other, we must 
nonetheless attend. And we must find a voice in this silence, this silence 
beyond ‘silence,’ that is not our own.  
(279) 
The communication by nonhuman animals in the zoo novels offers various ways of 
understanding the expressions of “the animate Other,” including those who are, and choose to 
be, literally silent. When Henry is feeling low in Zoology Newman cheers him up by 
scrambling to get close to him. “The rest of the goats made noises when they wanted 
something—they’d open their mouths, standing perfectly still, and force out a hard, angry 
myaaaaaaaa. Newman, though, was completely silent” (Dolnick, 59, italics in original). 
Henry finds relief in Newman’s muteness. He sees it as a meaningful silence, as if Newman 
is choosing not to make any noise because his personality is more docile and friendly than the 
other “angry” goats. Henry sees Newman as a personality who displays his emotions through 
actions rather than noises.  
In J.M. Ledgard’s novel the giraffe Sněhurka describes hearing the Czechoslovakians 
discussing her readiness to be transported and how her temperament will enable her to 
survive in their zoo. “I have no answer to this; I do not even bleat, and so am condemned to 
further captivity, not only of time and gravity, but in the passage across also” (Ledgard, 12). 
Sněhurka watches other giraffes protest, like a young bull who “rushes about it fits. He snorts. 
He draws back his neck and shoulders in a bow and bares his yellow teeth like a wild ass” 
(11). Although the bull’s discourse is not expressed in a “shared language” the 
Czechoslovakians understand his discontent and release him. Later, Sněhurka regrets her 
silence and timidity: “If only I had stood against the Czechoslovakians as the young bull 
giraffe did” (12). 
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In Diane Hammond’s Hannah’s Dream there is a very close relationship between 
Hannah the elephant and her keeper, the elderly Sam Brown. Sam, who had never seen an 
elephant when asked to look after Hannah, has had no training but has been with Hannah for 
over forty years. When he tells the young, highly trained new keeper Neva that he thinks 
Hannah has rheumatism like him Neva asks how Hannah shows that she is pain. Sam replies 
“She doesn’t show it, she just comes right out and says it. She’s a talky thing, talks all day 
long” (Hammond, 30). After being with her for so long Sam is used to talking to Hannah and 
interpreting not only her sounds but also her expressions and behaviour as replies. They have 
developed a shared language.  
While Sam and Hannah’s shared language developed through their close personal 
relationship, over the last decades primatologists have documented various more ‘scientific’ 
attempts at human-animal communication. Some of the most well-known of these involved 
teaching apes to communicate with humans using techniques such as American Sign 
Language or a symbols chart (Wynne, 112; Noske, Humans, 137), systems that obviously 
centre around human forms of communication. Such anthropocentric experiments often 
overlook the challenges faced by nonhuman animals in adapting to such unnatural forms of 
expression.  This is something that Dr. John Potter discusses in the documentary about 
dolphin slaughtering entitled The Cove, which he was involved in as an underwater acoustic 
consultant. 
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It sometimes amazes me that the only language which has been 
extensively taught to dolphins is a version of American Sign Language. 
Which of course– you use your hands, right? And so you have all these 
wonderful signals and people use their hands to give messages to 
dolphins. And this somehow kind of misses the point, because dolphins 
don’t have hands. So this is inherently a very one way process. And it’s 
this anthropomorphic “we have something to teach them” or “control 
them”, and perhaps we should be looking at what they can give to us. 
(The Cove) 
Although not common such cases of “two way” discourses have occurred. In “Meeting the 
Other” anthropologist Barbara Noske describes several instances of humans adapting to the 
language of other species, including the fascinating accounts of human children found living 
with various nonhuman species in the wild. Noske reports that over 50 cases of human 
adoption by animals have been recorded over the last 600 years (Humans, 162). One such 
case was observed in the 1960s by Jean-Claude Armen (alias Auger), who in the Sahara came 
across a child living with a herd of gazelle. Armen observed the herd over a period of time 
and even came back two years later to find the boy still living with the nonhuman animals. 
Through his quiet observation Armen slowly became aware of the existence of social rules 
within the group, and of their “coded” messages to each other in the form of “…the stamping 
of heels and hoofs, contortions of the neck, movements of the head, motions of the tail, the 
ears, the horns, wrists and fingers (in the boy’s case)” (Humans, 166). The human boy 
behaved like a gazelle and participated in their communication despite some technical 
setbacks. 
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Some gazelle signs the boy could not make because he did not possess 
the right “linguistic” equipment. He would imitate gazelle ear signals 
with his facial muscles and some tail signs with finger movements, 
having no tail of his own and his ears being covered with hair. The 
gazelle seemed to have had no trouble decoding these signs, which 
shows that the boy and the gazelles between them had constructed their 
own discourse.  
(166) 
This mutual discourse is a rare glimpse into what life might be like if humans had the 
patience and dedication to develop meaningful communication with members of other 
species. While to Armen the communication of the gazelle seemed like “coded signals”, to 
the animals and the human boy who lived with them, these codes weren’t obscure but a clear 
language. Even in zoos, where the keepers spend most of their days looking after and 
hopefully caring for their charges, such a close bond has, to my knowledge, never been 
recorded between human and nonhuman. Reasons for this may become obvious in the third 
chapter of this thesis when the nature of zoos and zoo-keeping is discussed.  
Nonetheless in several of the zoo novels we can see relationships in which, despite the 
absence of a mutual language, an emotional bond (like that of Hannah and Sam in Hannah’s 
Dream) has formed between human and nonhuman characters. In Zoology Henry’s affection 
for Newman develops into a friendship and when Henry is lonely and hurt it is not his brother 
or his parents that he turns to; instead he goes “to talk to Newman” (217): 
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Newman stood up with lots of slow stretching. He spun around twice 
and then lay back down with his head in my lap, as casually as if it were 
an accident. I was so grateful that I choked up. “Oh, you’re one good 
boy,” I told him. “If you ever need to talk, just come find me, we’ll 
figure out what to do. I come to you, you come to me. Deal? Nothing too 
big, nothing too small.” I scratched him hard on his lower back, and he 
lifted his head and bent it way over backward, smiling with his lower 
teeth pushed out.  
(Dolnick, 218) 
Henry implies that Newman not only cares for him but also acts coyly by pretending 
accidentally to offer Henry his head to comfort him. This interpretation of Newman’s 
behaviour is clearly influenced not only by Henry’s humanness but by his emotional state, 
however it also seems clear that Newman has some sort of connection with Henry as he 
repeatedly approaches him with no other apparent motive than to share his company. 
Yet it is important to note that these close emotional connections in the novels are made 
almost exclusively with domestic animals. In How the Dead Dream, Zoology and The Great 
Divorce T., Henry and Ellen all have close relationships with their canine companions at 
home. They confide in them, care for them and wonder what they’re thinking. However this 
is definitely not the case with the zoo animals represented in the novels. Apart from Hannah 
and Newman, both of whom have regular contact with their human companion, none of the 
zoo animals in the novels make any sort of intimate connection with a human character. To 
those familiar with the nature of zoos the reasons for this may be obvious and the immediate 
effect of this lack of connection in the novels reflects that which may be seen in reality: the 
animals are rendered blank, empty of meaning.  Each of the zoo animals comes to represent 
an idea ascribed by the human viewer. In The Great Divorce the big cats represent the last 
remnant of true wildness while in How The Dead Dream the zoo animals also represent for T. 
all that humans have taken from the world; for him the zoo animals are the “last animals” 
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(Millet, 166).  In Giraffe Amina the somnambulist discusses the giraffes with their keeper. 
The keeper describes to Amina the difficulty of early taxidermists, who sought for ferocity 
but were unable to make a giraffe seem menacing. They merely looked “[l]ofty, alien; above 
all blank” (Ledgard, 190). The blankness that the keeper is talking about here is purely in 
terms of the human meaning that can be ascribed to the expressions of the giraffes. This 
reflects the tendency of people to view nonhuman animals in strictly anthropocentric terms, 
describing not the animal’s own identity but how much or how little this resembles the 
human. Matthew Calarco points out that “[e]ven when the traits of being ‘arational’ or 
‘nonspeaking’ take on a positive value, as they do in Rilke and Nietzsche, these traits are still 
nothing more than the negation of supposedly unique human characteristics. To say that the 
animal lacks them says very little positively about what the animal actually is and how it 
differs from other entities” (Calarco, 36). The distinctive pattern on the giraffes’ hides, their 
towering height and even their deep eyes which draw so much attention from the human 
characters: each of these features is overshadowed by their muteness and inscrutable facial 
expressions. The “blank” nature of the giraffes merely describes their ability to resist the 
human traits that people attempt to project onto them.  
In her conversation with the giraffes’ keeper Amina accepts the description of the 
giraffes as blank and tries to describe the effect that this blankness has on human visitors to 
the zoo. “‘Surely their blankness has a purpose,’ I say. ‘A giraffe can be a point of reflection. 
It can bring out of yourself some feeling you did not know was there.’ ‘For you perhaps, 
Amina,’ he says, not unkindly” (Ledgard, 191). Marcus Bullock explains this effect that 
animals have on us, being ultimately outside our language. 
24 
 
 
Animals may not participate in the world of human speech, but the 
muteness that shrouds their senses always accompanies us in the realm 
of our language. Whatever else we may establish in the realm of 
language about them, despite all our convictions, all our knowledge, all 
our reasoning, we have to acknowledge that we are looking at something 
that eludes our ability to form a concept. Therefore, unless we refuse to 
look at all, the muteness of an animal also imposes a moment of 
muteness on us.  
(Bullock, 99) 
It is this “moment of muteness” that overcomes Amina in her first encounter with the giraffes. 
The reader can also see it affect those people who suddenly look up and see the giraffes as 
they pass through the Czechoslovakian countryside on their way to the zoo. Their faces 
astonished, they have no concept for the animals on the back of the truck, and their minds 
jump to various abstract associations such as their childhood (92) or a biblical scene (109). 
While Amina also experiences this “moment of muteness” as she watches the giraffes in their 
zoo enclosure, the keeper expresses doubt that other people feel this.  In Giraffe, and in every 
zoo novel discussed in this thesis, this experience of muteness is largely absent from the 
experience of the zoo-goer. This would seem to be because the framing of the animals and 
their own nonhuman discourses within the context of the zoo changes their meaning for the 
humans who observe them. With muted voice and “blank” demeanour the isolated zoo 
animals no longer defy conceptualisation in the same way, rather they really do become 
empty vessels for the meanings ascribed by their human viewers. 
The ability of nonhuman animals to express themselves to us is tempered by the 
limitations of human understanding in the characters, narrator and reader.  There is one case, 
however, where this is not so; the nonhuman character is able to narrate her own account of 
her life. This partially eliminates the human lens through which her experience is related, 
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however we must remember that her nonhuman account was, of course, created by a human 
author. 
J.M. Ledgard’s novel Giraffe opens with a birth. The account of this event is unusual, 
for it is given by the one who is being born, something the reader knows is an impossibility. 
As we realise we are reading about a birth, described by she or he who is being born, we 
understand that the boundaries of narrative have been expanded. When, as we continue 
reading, we discover the narrator to be a giraffe, it is surprising but already less unbelievable. 
In his essay examining violations of mimetic epistemology in first-person narratives, 
Ruediger Heinze points out that it is an inherent tendency in us as readers which leads us to 
assume that a narrator must be human. 
If we assume that just because there appears to be a narrative agent, 
voice, or narrator narrating the story, this figure need not in any way 
resemble or, by ontological fallacy, even be a human consciousness or 
person, then first-person narrative could actually be told by a fish or 
demiurge without attracting too much attention. In fact, the term first-
person tends to underline the misunderstanding of equating “narrator” 
with “human being.”  
(280-1) 
This assumption of a narrator’s humanity is a further example of anthropocentrism, as 
humans we assume that a human perspective is the only perspective. We do not consider that 
the events in the novel are experienced by any characters other than human characters.  
In the first two chapters of the novel the giraffe Sněhurka shows an amazing awareness 
of herself and of everything outside herself, from the constellation Camelopardalis (5) to 
Czechoslovakians (9). As she describes being born onto the dusty African ground she shows 
an awareness of her history, where she existed before she was born, her identity, her physical 
appearance and her situation both geographically and in life, “ordained” to be a reticulated 
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giraffe cow (6). In his essay Heinze asks “How, then, can one conceptualize first-person 
narrators in fictional narratives whose quantitative and qualitative knowledge about events, 
other characters, etc., clearly exceeds what one could expect of a human consciousness and 
would thus make them prone to being labelled ‘omniscient’?” (280). Heinze seems here to 
have fallen into his own trap of assuming that the narrator is a “human consciousness”. If 
Sněhurka was a human girl narrating her own birth, or an African human child encountering 
Czechoslovakians for the first time and recognizing their language and culture, we would 
indeed say that she must be omniscient, she must be all-knowing, and this would present 
problems for readers trying to accept her as an authentic, reliable narrator. That a newborn – a 
nonhuman newborn – is so aware, has so much knowledge and understands so much gives 
Sněhurka a mystical, wise quality. She alludes to “the constellations” where she came from, 
making her seem ancient and almost supernatural in her ability to transition between worlds 
and communicate her feelings across species boundaries. 
Manfred Jahn, in his essay Narratology: A Guide to the Theory of Narrative, asserts 
theorist Gérard Genette’s definition of paralepsis as “An infraction caused by saying too 
much; a narrator assuming a competence he/she does not properly have” (Jahn, N3.3.15.). In 
her short narrative Sněhurka repeatedly demonstrates that she is a paraleptic narrator. Firstly, 
as she narrates her own birth, then as she recognizes various things which are outside her 
experience such as the Earth’s atmosphere, quarantine in a seaside port and the English 
translation of her Czechoslovakian name and the German name of the ship. Thirdly, though 
the reader may not yet be aware of it, Sněhurka is narrating her story from beyond the grave, 
since by the end of the novel she is destroyed. Finally, Sněhurka is relating her story through 
an English narrative to human readers; as Wittgenstein points out in the statement at the 
beginning of this chapter, even if Sněhurka could speak our vastly different ontological 
positions mean that we would likely not understand her.  
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Despite the readers’ recognition of this paralepsis in Sněhurka’s account, after our 
initial surprise we are able to accept Sněhurka as a reliable narrator and continue reading.  
Heinze explains why this is possible: “A paraleptic machine or dog [is] arguably less 
surprising than a paraleptic human consciousness projected by a narrative because we may 
presume that the reader has no frame of reference against which to judge the experientiality 
of a dog or machine” (283). As readers we do not accept an “omniscient” human narrator 
because from experience we know the limits of human experience and human consciousness. 
We know without doubt that a human could not be self-aware during her own birth, or able to 
understand foreign languages on first encountering them. However this confidence disappears 
when we encounter a nonhuman narrator, since we cannot say what it is possible for a 
nonhuman consciousness to be capable of knowing, doing or experiencing. By accepting 
Sněhurka’s paraleptic narrative we acknowledge the author’s proposition that the 
consciousness of nonhuman animals may be deeper, more omniscient than our own. Her 
demonstrations of her enhanced consciousness serve to further separate her from the human 
in the mind of the reader. Sněhurka is other, and her otherness suggests to the reader that she 
should examine more carefully the role of other nonhuman characters in the novel, that they 
too must be more than “just animals”. In a novel in which nonhuman animals are so 
mistreated this is a very disquieting thought.    
The first word in this novel is “I”, spoken by Sněhurka as she describes being born on 
Earth. This word is a nominative singular pronoun: Sněhurka is referring to herself and no 
one else; in the first line of the novel she takes ownership of her own narrative. In this 
account of her birth Sněhurka also begins with her own deliberate action, “I kick now in the 
darkness…”, however this moment of agency is quickly changed to helplessness, “I am 
squeezed towards the light” (5). This moment when Sněhurka is rendered passive is an omen 
for the rest of her life, a life which is largely out of her control. But in this opening passage 
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even as she acknowledges her own passivity, Sněhurka does so deliberately and thereby 
asserts control over her own narrative and the record of her experience, “Let it be said: I enter 
this world without volition” (5). 
The inability of nonhuman animals to communicate freely with us in our language 
means that we must use our own human experiences to try and interpret their forms of 
communication to understand their nonhuman experiences. By writing the first chapters of 
his book from the perspective of a nonhuman animal Ledgard is not telling us exactly how a 
giraffe would feel in that situation but is urging us to realise that in that or any situation a 
giraffe would be feeling something. In addition the reader is encouraged to understand that a 
giraffe’s feelings possess meaning (for herself and perhaps other giraffes) independent of the 
need for any human interpretation.     
While on a superficial level many of us may not disagree with the notion that 
nonhuman animals can feel and suffer we are part of a modern society which comprises 
systems operating under Cartesian understandings of nonhuman animal emotions.
 5
 All of us 
have memories we would rather forget; embarrassing, uncomfortable or hurtful incidents 
from our past which we try not to remember. Some humans suffer more than others from 
these memories: the trauma of losing a loved one, flashbacks and reliving a harrowing event, 
depression and rage or post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the worst experiences of 
our lives. However in yet another example of anthropocentric arrogance in Western culture 
                                                 
5
 “Cartesian” is used here to refer to the theory commonly attributed to René Descartes that not only do 
animals not “think” in the way humans do (evidenced for Descartes by their lack of human language [Anderson, 
20]) but also that as soulless automata their behaviour is not governed by emotions as humans understand them 
but rather by “mechanistic instincts” (Hayes, 704). 
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most people have never considered that other species might experience the effects of trauma 
as strongly as we do.
6
  
In his book The Age of Empathy, Frans de Waal discusses the effects of social isolation 
on various animals (including humans). He describes the now infamous attachment 
experiments of Henry Harlow who, in the mid twentieth century, “set out to prove the 
obvious” by rearing baby rhesus monkeys for months in isolation in purpose-built “pits of 
despair” to see what the effects on their development would be (13). Furthermore, Harlow 
conducted experiments testing the need for comfort in babies, in which he frightened isolated 
infants until they fled to a “surrogate mother” he had created. This “mother” would then fling 
the babies away with a catapult, stab them with hidden brass spikes or blast them with 
compressed air. “He powerfully demonstrated the psychological need for contact, a need 
deeper even than that of relief and physical pain” (Montgomery, 95).7 Unsurprisingly the 
monkeys became “mentally and socially disturbed” and were unable to function socially (de 
Waal, The Age, 13).  
Hannah, the elephant in Hannah’s Dream, experiences a traumatic separation in her 
childhood similar to that of the rhesus monkeys when she is taken from her home in Burma, 
possibly after watching her mother be killed, and put on a ship to America. Studies of 
established elephants herds in Africa have found that “young elephants stay within 15 feet of 
their mothers for nearly all of their first eight years of life” (Siebert, 45) whereas Hannah is 
                                                 
6
 However recently relatively new fields such as cognitive ethology and trans-species psychology have 
developed, as Gay Bradshaw describes: “Trans-species psychology is the formal study of how animals think, 
feel, and behave. In contrast to conventional psychology, the neologism signifies that a common model of 
psyche applies for all animal species, including humans. It uses the same language and concepts used to study 
and achieve human wellbeing for all species” (Bradshaw, “Conservation”, 147). 
7
 As Sy Montgomery points out in his book on women primatologists, while Jane Goodall was sitting 
quietly in the African jungle observing a family of chimpanzees Harlow had not left the United States and was 
instead in a laboratory creating machines with which to torture animals. However in 1967, the year Goodall’s 
first book My Friends the Wild Chimpanzees was published by National Geographic, Harlow won the National 
Science Medal for his work “with” rhesus monkeys (Montgomery, 94). 
30 
 
 
just two years old when she is exported to the United States. In the confined space of the ship 
she is beaten during the sea voyage and unsurprisingly she becomes anxious, traumatised and 
frightened of being alone. Finally she finds a close friend in Sam, her American keeper who 
cares deeply for both her physical and emotional health and happiness. However when he 
becomes sick and must leave her for the first significant time in their 40 years together, the 
temporary keeper leaves Hannah chained up alone in the barn for three days. As a result she 
is terrified of spending even the night alone in the barn, as Sam explains:  
she gets real upset if somebody gets here in the morning and they don’t 
unchain her. It makes her feel bad, and then she starts rocking, and once 
she’s rocking it’s hard to get her to stop. She can keep it up for days, 
I’ve seen her do it. When she does, that metal anklet of hers just digs up 
her leg something awful. Took three months to heal, last time.  
(53) 
Hannah’s reaction is similar to that of traumatised individuals of other species. Like many 
humans living with the mental and emotional effects of past trauma and social deprivation, 
Hannah rocks herself and even self-harms as she ignores the damage inflicted by her metal 
bonds. What Harlow felt he needed to prove with the rhesus monkeys is exemplified here: 
although her physical mistreatment surely adds to her trauma, Hannah’s psychological need 
for comfort is much greater than her concern with the physical pain she is suffering. The 
elephants that T. encounters in How the Dead Dream show similar signs of depression and 
mental stress and despite having each other for company they too stand and rock. 
“Sometimes, for sixteen hours of the day, they swayed where they stood, rocked and swayed 
as though catatonic, and likely they were” (Millet, 198).  
One way in which Hannah’s behaviour differs from that of the rhesus monkeys is in 
how quickly she apparently recovers from her depression. As soon as she emerges from the 
barn she rushes around finding the treats new keeper Neva has hidden all around her 
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enclosure. Unlike the isolated rhesus monkeys whose social skills were permanently damaged 
(de Waal, The Age, 13), Hannah immediately perks up and seems to forget her deep trauma 
as she participates in her first official enrichment, which Sam calls a “scavenger hunt” 
(Hammond, 48).  Although it seems very unlikely that a few jelly beans and pumpkins would 
be enough to dispel years of psychological damage, this episode serves two functions in the 
novel: to give the reader hope for Hannah, that she will be able to be happy again, and it 
introduces Neva as a kind-hearted person who is an expert on Hannah and her needs.  
While in modern Western discourse the highly competitive, “survival of the fittest” 
aspect of nonhuman nature is often emphasised, studies of many species such as dolphins, 
whales, chimpanzees, elephants and humans have shown strong social systems and 
relationships amongst individuals that support the health and wellbeing of all. This can be 
seen in practical encounters such as mutual grooming in horses or rooks working together to 
get to food, as well as in personal, emotional encounters such as dolphins helping an injured 
friend or relative, or a chimpanzee consoling and sympathizing with another chimpanzee or 
even a human (Boyd & Houpt, 242; Bekoff & Pierce, 56; Noske, Humans, 154; de Waal, The 
Age, 86-90). Bekoff and Pierce note that cooperation, just as much as competition, is essential 
to the survival of species and individuals (88). In the zoo novels there are few examples of 
animal cooperation, or of animal competition. In fact there are few instances of interaction 
amongst animals at all – many of the nonhuman animals are held in captivity and are kept 
isolated, bored and alone. In J.M. Ledgard’s Giraffe when the herd of giraffes is locked in the 
barn at night Sněhurka and a bull whisper to each other memories of Africa and of their 
journey. The two giraffes lay their necks together and comfort each other (172).  In other 
exhibits in the various zoos throughout the novels are other animals who are not housed alone. 
However even among these animals opportunities for cooperation would be rare. Animals 
who in the wild must cooperate to get food, defend themselves from predators or establish 
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homes would have these opportunities for significant social interaction severely diminished 
or eliminated in the zoo where every aspect of their lives is monitored and controlled.  
Nonhuman animals clearly have a variety of complex social relationships and protocols 
which, through cooperation and comfort, enable them to live healthy and contented lives. 
However despite these complex social systems many scientists are reluctant to call the way of 
life of any nonhuman animals a “culture” (de Waal & Tyack, 2003). The American 
anthropologist Ruth Benedict famously explained “culture” in her antiracism pamphlet “The 
Cultures of Mankind” written with colleague Gene Weltfish:  
culture is the sociological term for learned behaviour: behaviour which 
in man is not given at birth, which is not determined by his germ cells as 
is the behaviour of wasps or the social ants, but must be learned anew 
from grown people by each new generation. The degree to which human 
achievements are dependent on this kind of learned behaviour is man’s 
great claim to superiority over all the rest of creation; he has been 
properly called “the culture-bearing animal.” 
(Benedict and Weltfish, 9-10) 
This explanation defines culture by its exclusivity to humans, claiming that our ability to 
learn and pass on our learned knowledge makes us superior to all other animals. However the 
practice of each new generation in learning behaviour from their elders is not restricted to 
humans.  Young of most species begin learning behaviour from their parents as soon as they 
are born, for example what to eat, how to get it, how to avoid predators, how to interact with 
others of their species, and so on. While some might argue that these basic behaviours are not 
learned but are inherent to that animal’s nature, “determined by his [or her] germ cells”, other 
kinds of learning are demonstrated by both human and nonhuman animals. Cultural 
transmission is when an individual acquires knowledge “not only from its physical 
environment but also from its social environment—or from aspects of its physical 
33 
 
 
environment that have been modified in important ways by others” (Tomasello, 14). There 
are many documented cases of cultural transmission in various species, for example a certain 
type of grooming invented by one captive chimpanzee and taught over time to her whole 
group (de Waal, “Foreword”, 10). Types of tool use or communication can also be unique to 
specific communities of chimpanzees and monkeys, and in his foreword to Stephen Hart’s 
book on animal language Frans de Waal affirms that “[i]n fact, the line between innate and 
learned communication has become so blurred that most scientists have given up on the 
distinction, seeing it as a false dichotomy” (9).  Another example comes from a group of 
elephants who together experienced a traumatic event. In 1919 in Addo park in South Africa, 
farmers set out to destroy 140 elephants of whom between sixteen and thirty survived. As 
Barbara Noske reports, “[e]ven today this group is mainly nocturnal and responds extremely 
aggressively to any human presence” (Humans, 111). Descendents of the elephants who 
survived the massacre are notoriously dangerous, despite the fact that “few if any” 
individuals who witnessed it can still be alive. As Noske explains, “they obviously have 
transmitted information about our species even to calves of the third and fourth generation, 
none of whom can ever have been attacked by humans” (111-12). In the past two decades 
instances of elephant aggression and violence against humans and other species in India and 
Africa have risen immensely, with retaliation killings by humans also accounting for many 
elephant deaths (Siebert, 44). Investigations into the reasons for this escalation in aggressive, 
antisocial behaviour led Gay Bradshaw to call them symptoms of “cultures in crisis” (“Not”, 
321). 
The closeness of elephant families is reasonably well-known in the western world, for 
example the way they mourn and bury their dead. The 2005 paper “Elephant Breakdown” by 
Gay Bradshaw and her colleagues details the importance of “patterns of social attachment” in 
elephant societies. Elephant infants are raised by a network of female caretakers known as 
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allomothers in a family group led by the matriarch. In addition, male adolescents also go 
through further periods of development (similar to that of human boys) in which older males 
play a crucial role (Bradshaw et al., 807; Siebert, 45). Because of their longevity – elephants 
may live up to 70 years – elephant communities usually remain intact for many decades 
(Bradshaw, “Not”, 322; Siebert, 45). However the encroachment of humans into elephant 
territories has had a devastating effect on elephant numbers, and subsequently the 
relationships and cultures of the survivors. In African national parks like Kruger, for a long 
time elephant culling was an annual exercise, used as a way to curb populations within the 
limited boundaries of the parks (Bridgland, 1). This means that elephant herds who would 
usually stay together for over half a century are being repeatedly separated and traumatised 
through witnessing the death of family members. As herd leaders are killed and infants left to 
be raised by other inexperienced young females or as orphans, generations of elephants are 
maturing who suffer from disorders that  Bradshaw et al. compare with post-traumatic stress 
disorder in humans, such as “abnormal startle response, depression, unpredictable asocial 
behaviour and hyperaggression” (807). Siebert cites the same paper by Bradshaw et al. when 
describing the state of elephant culture today:  
Decades of poaching and culling and habitat loss, they claim, have so 
disrupted the intricate web of familiar and societal relations by which 
young elephants have traditionally been raised in the wild, and by which 
established elephant herds are governed, that what we are now 
witnessing is nothing less than a precipitous collapse of elephant culture.  
(Siebert, 44)  
Just as we are now realising the impact of fracturing close elephant communities, so we must 
admit that the healing of these “cultures in crisis” will come from restoring crucial elephant 
social relationships. Bradshaw cites research by biologist Rob Slotow which demonstrates 
that in cases of translocated (or “reintroduced”) young male elephants rampaging violently, 
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the introduction of senior older males calmed the juveniles and restored normal social 
behaviour (Bradshaw, “Not”, 323-4). In a similar way in Hannah’s Dream Sam explains to 
the new keeper that when Hannah (whom he calls “sugar”, or “shug”) was young the 
presence of an older female elephant would be all that could calm her anxiety. “Reyna was a 
big old cow, and she’d stand right next to shug in the barn for hours, right up against her, not 
enough room between them for a flea to pass. Guess it made Hannah feel secure, having old 
Reyna plastered on her like that. She quit rocking after a while” (Hammond, 53). At the end 
of the novel Hannah’s ultimate salvation comes when she is taken to a “pachyderm sanctuary” 
to be with other elephants. More than the escape from her small concrete exhibit at the zoo it 
is the escape from her isolation and loneliness that is the real “happy ending” of the novel. 
Although the title of the book is Hannah’s Dream, it is the recurring dream of Sam that sees 
him, in elephant form, reunited with a herd. This is what he and his wife want for Hannah, 
even though it means never seeing her again. They understand that Hannah is not living her 
natural  life, her elephant life, locked in a concrete barn. Becoming part of an elephant herd 
really will be the beginning of her life.  
Considering that as humans we rely hugely on the support and guidance of our own 
families and support systems for healthy mental, physical and emotional development, it is 
astonishing we find it so difficult to admit that this sense of culture and community might be 
just as important for members of other species. In her essay about the work of sanctuaries like 
the David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust in Kenya, Bradshaw records the words of Sheldrick’s wife 
Daphne: “We must liken the emotional trauma of the Elephants to that of humans under 
similar circumstances of hardship and deprivation. To deny this is simply to display gross 
ignorance born of human arrogance” (Bradshaw, “Not”, 326). A similar conclusion is 
reached by Eve Abe, an ethologist whose 1994 doctoral thesis “My Elephants and My People: 
The Twin Fates of Acholi People and Elephants of Uganda”, describes the parallels between 
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the decimated elephant herds in her homeland and her own people who have been ravaged by 
civil war. In a 2007 interview she told Black Star News of her project to heal the relationship 
between her people and elephants, “by use of stories and ecological knowledge that have 
been passed from generation to generation and re-establishing the respect that existed 
between these two groups whose history and livelihoods mirror each other.” She asserts that 
“human and elephant recovery are linked. One cannot occur without the other” (Allimadi, 
2007). This comparison between human and elephant cultures is a radical one when 
contrasted with traditional Western views which usually see “animals” as a category of 
beings completely separate from humans, comprised of various species whose members are 
almost indistinguishable from each other.  
The pervasiveness of these attitudes is apparent in the language we use to refer to 
nonhuman animals. In their book Animals and Agency, McFarland and Hediger explain how 
French philosopher Jacques Derrida “shows us how the very phrase ‘the animal,’ commonly 
used to mean all animals, is itself a profoundly unreasonable usage, denying the manifest 
proliferation of differences that exists in animal lives, from lizard to dog, shark to lamb, 
camel to eagle, and so on (to cite some of his examples)” (10). This use of “animal” falls 
within the practise that Marc Bekoff calls “speciesism”, the discrimination against someone 
because of her species (Strolling, 11). As Barbara Noske explains, speciesism 
amounts to judging animals, not as unique and sentient individuals, but 
solely by their species. They become specimens of a particular species 
which may be favored or abhorred by us, humans. (Noske 1993, 1994). 
The most common use of the term speciesism, however, centers on 
membership or, indeed, non-membership of one particular species, the 
human one, with as consequence the discrimination and often harsher 
treatment of anything non-human. 
(Noske, “Speciesism”, 183) 
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An example of this appears in Marc Bekoff’s book for young people and adults called 
Strolling With Our Kin in a chapter titled “Who counts? Species, individuals, and the 
reintroduction of wolves”. When most people hear about the reintroduction of a species to an 
area where they have become extinct, they are happy and relieved; they feel that finally 
something is going right. We take the “reintroduction” of a native species to an area as a 
triumph of conservation; that through good science and hard work humans have managed to 
reverse the damage caused by habitat destruction, hunting, or the introduction of foreign 
species. However Bekoff asks us to consider the rights of an individual versus the rights of a 
species. Using the reintroduction of gray wolves to areas such as Yellowstone National Park 
as an example he points out that while this is the reintroduction of the species to an area 
where they used to live, for the individual animals involved it means capturing them in an 
area where they and their ancestors have lived and transporting them in cages and vehicles to 
be released into a strange and unknown place where their quality of life may be much lower. 
Another example is the “social shuffling” of elephants in South Africa, where the 
“reintroduction of elephants typically entails bringing in unfamiliar elephants and the 
fragmenting of existing groups and families” (Bradshaw, “Not”, 323). For such social 
animals this uprooting and destruction of social attachments is hugely damaging to the 
emotional and mental health of the individuals involved. Bekoff asks: “[s]hould these 
individuals suffer and perhaps die for the good of their species? While most humans can 
make decisions about whether their own lives can be used for the good of their species, other 
animals cannot” (Strolling, 51). 
This question goes to the heart of the fundamental “us” versus “them” distinction we 
continue to make between humans and nonhuman animals. According to the speciesist 
perspective, one nonhuman animal is the same as the any other; it is the idea of the animal 
that is important, the knowledge that somewhere “out there” live wild animals. J.M. 
38 
 
 
Coetzee’s character Elizabeth Costello describes this form of speciesism in “The Poets and 
the Animals” by explaining the “the dance” of an ecosystem as seen in an “ecological vision”. 
The whole is greater than the sum of the parts. In the dance, each 
organism has a role: it is these multiple roles, rather than the particular 
beings who play them, that participate in the dance. As for actual role-
players, as long as they are self-renewing, as long as they keep coming 
forward, we may pay them no heed. 
(53-4) 
As long as the roles are being played, the players themselves do not concern us. This 
willingness to sacrifice individual animals in captivity and through reintroduction 
programmes, and indeed our reluctance to consider that their welfare is relevant at all attests 
to our ambivalence. As Bekoff points out, “Many of these decisions are made because it is 
humans who want to see or to know that wolves once again are roaming about in areas such 
as Yellowstone” (Strolling, 51). As humans we feel comforted to know that the gray wolves 
are in their “proper place” (that is, the places where we read about and heard about them 
being when we were children). That this may not bring the same peace for the individual 
animals themselves does not occur to us; this possibility is obscured by our nostalgia, our 
guilt at their declining numbers and of course by our anthropocentric world views.  
In sharp contrast to this position, the novel is an art form fundamentally defined by its 
intimate attentiveness to the inner life of individuals and therefore is bound when 
representing nonhuman animals as characters to work against this tendency to value the 
species over the individual. Although a member of a herd of goats in the children’s zoo, 
Newman’s independent identity is established in Dolnick’s novel by describing his unique 
physical characteristics and behaviours and by demonstrating his personality. In Sněhurka’s 
case, her first-person narrative in Giraffe allows the reader to understand not only that she has 
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her own inner thoughts and emotions, but through her eyes the individuality and character of 
other giraffes is also apparent.  
The novel’s defining focus on individual character also allows it to describe in close 
detail the process of a human character overcoming her speciesist tendencies to recognise 
nonhuman animals as unique individuals. In Lydia Millet’s How The Dead Dream T. is a 
man who has spent his life in pursuit of wealth and his career. The beginning of the second 
chapter marks the first real “now” event of the novel; although still told in the past tense this 
experience is the first in the novel which is dramatic, emotional and described in a way that 
involves each of the senses. The events of this chapter, which begins “He killed her driving to 
Las Vegas…” have a huge impact on T. and inform the rest of his actions and decisions in the 
book. The “her” whom T. kills is not a woman but a coyote, an animal traditionally seen by 
many city-dwellers and ranchers as a dangerous pest (Millet, 36). T. also has little affection 
for coyotes in general, however this encounter with the dying animal sees a fundamental 
change in his attitudes about death, nonhuman animals and what it means to be human. This 
profound change can be detected in the way that T. thinks about the coyote and how this 
alters throughout the encounter. 
When T. first realises that who or what he hit in his car is a coyote he feels relieved. He 
knows that because the animal belongs to the coyote species (instead of, for example, being a 
domestic Labrador) he will not be punished. He sees the animal only as a member of larger 
group and thinks, “[p]eople said they were pests” (36, emphasis added). When T. approaches 
the injured coyote he looks at “its” face, into “its” eyes and sees that “[I]t was dying” (36, 
emphasis added). Identifying with the coyote’s pain T. sees the animal as an individual, an “it” 
rather than a general “they”. Shocked by the extent of the coyote’s injuries T. tries to comfort 
“it” and says “[g]ood boy. Quiet there, boy” (37, emphasis added). In trying to relate to the 
animal T. automatically uses the default human gender, the masculine. Finally, looking at her 
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underbelly and seeing that she is a bitch, T. tells her “Steady, girl. It’s OK.” (37). After 
approaching the animal as just a member of an undesirable species, a “they”, as T. identifies 
more closely with the coyote he moves on to consider her as an “it”, a “he”, and finally a 
“she”. In the end he sees her for what she is, a female individual, and he imagines what her 
life was like, what she would want him to do, and what she must be feeling. As he stays with 
her, waiting for her to die, he feels “the fullness, the terrible sympathy!” unlike he has ever 
felt in his life (37).  
The evolution of T.’s attitude towards the coyote is reflected in the language he uses. 
This is one example of the power of language and the important function it has in our 
relationships with nonhuman species. In her book Ethics and Animals Lori Gruen reminds us 
that “the use of gender-neutral and gender-inclusive pronouns, or, more precisely, the lack of 
their use, have implications beyond grammar” (Gruen, xvi). The language we use to talk 
about nonhuman animals reveals how we truly think about them and by becoming part of the 
common English vernacular it perpetuates these views by dictating how everyone talks, and 
therefore thinks, about nonhuman animals. A powerful example of this is the use of gendered 
pronouns to refer to other animals.  
When writing her book Gruen found that the spellcheck on her computer constantly 
admonished her for using either “him” or “her” when talking about an animal, instead 
suggesting the pronoun “it” (Gruen, xvi).  In English today it is usually acceptable to use 
gendered pronouns to refer to nonhuman animals only if one is reading a children’s book or 
narrating a nature documentary on television. As Marc Fellenz notes in his book on 
philosophy and animal rights, “because common nouns in English are not gender-inflected, 
applying personal pronouns to animals often sound anthropomorphic or childlike, while the 
standard use of the pronoun it for an animal antecedent is overtly objectifying” (128). In The 
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Great Divorce zoo keeper Camille corrects a boy who uses the wrong gender when referring 
to a lion she is observing.  
He stopped close to Camille, hanging over the rail. “Look!” he shouted. 
“He’s playing with that log.” 
    Camille frowned at the boy, who seemed indifferent to her. “That’s a 
female,” Camille said. “It’s a she.” The boy gave her a sidelong look full 
of suspicion, then called back to his mother. “Look, Mom, he’s playing 
with that log.” 
(Martin, 273) 
The young boy is suspicious of this stranger who seems to contradict him for no reason. To 
him, the male pronoun is appropriate to all animals who have no real identity or gender. 
However he does not use, as Camille does, the generic pronoun “it”; as a child he has not yet 
been indoctrinated into the cultural discourse of framing nonhuman animals as almost-objects. 
Using the pronoun “it” (usually reserved for inanimate objects) to refer to nonhuman animals 
is another symptom of the anthropocentrism that causes us to deny their emotions. Each 
practice is part of the shroud we draw over the truth that animals are living, feeling beings. It 
is essential that as a culture we maintain this self-deception because acknowledging the 
reality would necessitate a seismic change in every aspect of our lives. As Al Gore notes 
about climate change, “if they acknowledge it and recognise it, then the moral imperative to 
make big changes is inescapable” (An Inconvenient). It is far easier to deny the status of 
nonhuman animals as thinking, feeling beings and to obscure evidence of this truth wherever 
it surfaces than to acknowledge it and be forced to re-evaluate every part of our society. In 
Divorce Camille is both an adult who exists in our culture of denying animal subjectivity and 
a zoo keeper who feels a personal connection to her charges. She straddles the boundary 
between these two understandings of animal identity, as exemplified in her phrase “It’s a she” 
(273). Although she conforms to the accepted practice of using “it”, she does feel the need to 
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speak out when she feels the boy is ignoring the lion’s individual identity. Just as sexist 
pronoun use (the practice of using the masculine as the generic pronoun) is challenged by 
feminists (Mills & Mullany, 153), supporters of animal rights understand that using “it” in 
reference to nonhuman animals is an important part of our collective denial of the realities of 
animals’ existences. As Carol Adams explains, “just as the generic ‘he’ erases female 
presence, the generic ‘it’ erases the living, breathing nature of the animals and reifies their 
object status” (93). This allows us to use animals as tools and resources to construct our 
human world and to exclude them from consideration in any of our decisions or plans. By 
simply referring to them as “it”s, as objects, we are able to construct a discourse in which 
animal interests are irrelevant and invisible, present only in the same way as crops, coal 
deposits or oil reserves.  
This is the way that T. thought of all animals in How the Dead Dream before he hit the 
coyote in his car and before he looked at her and recognised her individual identity. 
Eventually, as T. sits waiting, she dies.  
Presently he realized that her flank had ceased to rise and fall. He was 
relieved but oddly disoriented. Where was the ambulance? No: he was 
all that she had. All her lights, all her rescue workers.  
     It was just a coyote. No one would fault him for leaving. And yet he 
felt confused. 
     “Good girl,” he whispered.  
(Millet, 38) 
This encounter is one that changes T. He is confused because his world view has been altered 
and he is beginning to be aware of the discord in his life, the devastating yet silent crisis that 
is happening all around him. It is his first inkling that there are other beings “out there” who 
experience lives, pain and death but in a way that is a secret to him and everyone he knows. 
This has huge implications for his life and the things that he values most. The effect of his 
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encounter with the coyote on the highway is evident in the permanent change to the way he 
thinks about coyotes. Weeks later he stands at dusk considering his new urban development. 
“He thought of the cool of night descending over the settlement—were those coyotes howling 
out there in the dark, beyond the warm lights from thousands of standardized windows? 
Coyotes. He thought of them rarely but when he did he felt a pulse of identification and regret, 
curious and painful…” (61). Identification with a nonhuman animal is something which 
several human characters in the zoo novels feel at one stage, and like T., identifying with 
another animal leads them to comprehend the individual identity of the animal herself. 
One of the key ways that we acknowledge someone’s individual identity is by giving 
her her own word, a name that signifies who she is. This applies to both human and 
nonhuman animals – one of the most common and observable ways that the recognition of 
animal individuality is expressed by humans is by giving the nonhuman animal a name. This 
is as true for the human-animal relationships in the zoo novels as it is in reality. In her paper 
about the use of proper names for laboratory animals, Mary T. Phillips explains that 
[i]n giving an animal a name and using that name to talk to and about the 
creature, we interactively construct a narrative about an individual with 
unique characteristics, situated in a particular historical setting, and we 
endow that narrative with a coherent meaning. 
(121) 
Phillips argues that the biography and narratives which give lives (both human and non-
human) meaning are socially constructed through people using a proper name for them. As a 
process that relies on human language, naming is obviously concerned with creating human 
meanings; nonhuman animal lives may be supposed to hold meaning for themselves or each 
other without the need for human names or constructions.  
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As Mullan and Marvin note in their book Zoo Culture, zoo animals are usually labelled 
with several different names within the context of the institution. The first is the “scientific 
name”, for example Giraffa camelopardalis reticulata, then the more recognisable “popular 
name”, in this case, Reticulated Giraffe (10). These names obviously refer only to the species 
of an animal and in no way reference the existence of the individual. The final name which 
may or may not be given to zoo animals is what Mullan and Marvin call their “individual 
name”, the name by which specific animals in an enclosure are known. These names are 
usually “absolutely local” and often are known only to those within the zoo or who work 
closely with the animal (10).   
In her article “Animal Selfhood” Leslie Irvine describes coherence as the self-
experience that “provides the boundaries of the self” (333). She expands, “coherence has 
generated the cultural practice of naming animals,” which recognises the animal’s unique 
identity (334). The concept of naming involves a very personal understanding between two 
individuals. As humans we can tell a lot about the relationship between people by the names 
or nicknames that they use for each other. Although with most nonhuman animals we cannot 
understand whether she or he has a name for us, the relationship represented by the name we 
give to them may nevertheless be a strong one. By choosing a particular name for an animal 
we are differentiating her from all others as a distinct, recognisable individual. A domestic 
animal may even recognise this name and respond to it in her own way.  
Sněhurka is the central nonhuman character in Giraffe; various human characters are 
drawn to her along her journey and she also is the only one among the herd of giraffes with 
whom the reader grows familiar in the course of the novel. This is emphasised as she is the 
only nonhuman animal who is given a name that is known and used by various human 
characters throughout the novel. She is given her human name when she is first captured in 
Africa and her white underbelly and legs remind the Czechoslovakian hunters of the snow on 
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Mt. Kilimanjaro; they name her Sněhurka, “Snow White”. She remembers that day: “From 
this point on, for as long as I live, the voices of men will call after me, ‘Sněhurka!’ They will 
call my name, and I will recognize the sound, as I have long ago learned to distinguish the 
sound of one insect from another” (Ledgard, 10). Sněhurka herself understands the name and 
recognises it but describes her own way of knowing something as a process of distinguishing 
different from the labelling of humans. She describes the name as just another sound in her 
environment, disconnected from herself in the same way she describes part of her species’ 
“scientific name”, Camelopardalis, as a constellation outside the Earth’s atmosphere from 
which she descends. She does not tell us whether she has ever had any other giraffe name.  
Of course, as with almost any practice in a zoo the naming of its captive animals serves 
a primarily human function, for example the naming of “charismatic” mammals makes them 
more relatable to the public, who are then more likely to pay to see them. Many zoos around 
the world make the most of this publicity opportunity by holding naming competitions in 
which the public is invited to submit potential names for a new (or old) animal (see for 
example Garland; “Al Ain”; “Naming competition”). This gives people a sense of connection 
to and even ownership of the animal with the winner’s name often published along with the 
name of the animal and sometimes written on the animal’s enclosure. The naming of a zoo’s 
animals can be financially beneficial in other ways when the idea of a naming competition is 
taken a step further. While many zoos invite individuals and companies to sponsor animals or 
exhibits, some zoos also auction naming rights to their animals. One reader of the Buffalo 
News was shocked to see the names of the Buffalo Zoo’s three new lion cubs, named after the 
local law firm of Siegel, Kelleher and Kahn. While the reader had no problem with the law 
firm sponsoring the zoo habitat, he felt that “naming animals after representatives of any 
business entity is just plain wrong”, “ostentatious”, and “crosses the line of good taste” 
(Smukall, 2010). The reader suggested that “Animal names should have simple and appealing 
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names that are easy to relate to and identify with.” One way that some pet owners choose to 
do this is by selecting names inspired by an animal’s physical characteristics, such as Fluffy, 
Socks, Spot, or Goldie. In the same way the physical features of zoo animals are often used to 
tell them apart and sometimes this is apparent in their name; just as Sněhurka is named after 
the fabled Snow White because of her white belly, in Zoology Othello the big black bull is 
presumably named after “the Moor” in Shakespeare’s famous play.  
While Sněhurka is the only animal recognised by name by most humans in Giraffe, 
after watching them for hours each day Amina learns to tell the herd apart by their markings 
and in her head she gives them names.  She tells the giraffes’ keeper, “I have memorized the 
patterns on the necks of the giraffes so that I can say aloud to myself on the bench, that one is 
Jánošík and this one is Rudolf, named for the emperor” (Ledgard, 189). In Zoology too the 
zoo director Paul differentiates between the seven goats mainly by their physical attributes 
and also their position in the herd. “That little one’s Suzy. She’s the mom. Her kids are Pearl, 
there, and Onyx, who’s over there with the gray spot. Sparky’s up on the stump, Spanky’s 
this one—he’s trouble—Scooter’s asleep right there with the long beard…” (Dolnick, 33). 
Newman, however, is obviously an individual of whom the zoo staff have become fond: 
“‘and that,’ he said, pointing to the tall white one, the only one without horns, ‘is Newman. 
He’s a Nubian. Totally different species. He’s a big goof. One of the security guards calls 
him Jar Jar, because of the ears.’” (44). His large ears earn him a “pet” name and by 
describing his as a “big goof” Paul indicates that staff know this particular goat to have a 
playful, silly personality. Newman is the only goat at the zoo to have both a given name and 
an affectionate nickname. 
It is not strange that the animals Henry works with are given names because these 
individuals are held in the children’s zoo. It is natural for children to name animals and the 
juvenile names of many of the goats reflect their “petting zoo” status. As species which are 
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domesticated in most cultures around the world the animals of the children’s zoo are framed 
by the zoo as “ordinary”; they are able to be approached, touched, fed and given affectionate 
names like Scooter. While the children who visit the zoo clearly love to interact with the 
goats the petting zoo animals are obviously seen by both staff and visitors to the zoo as 
inferior to the comparably wild and exotic animals in the adult zoo, who apparently remain 
unnamed (at least to zoo visitors). In a 1989 paper psychology professor Donna FitzRoy 
Hardy suggests that deliberately naming only the “domestic form” of a species is a good way 
for zoos to educate visitors about the appropriate ways to relate to each type of animal. For 
example, “mustang colts would receive names but Przewalski colts would not” (Hardy). 
Hardy realises that naming zoo animals encourages people to connect emotionally with 
captive animals, to think anthropomorphically about them in terms of their feelings (which 
she clearly views as a negative response) and she also writes that this ultimately supports the 
market of exotic animals as pets by making these species more desirable. 
One zoo which at least partially supported this view – although it did not discriminate 
by species – was the Pittsburgh Zoo and PPG Aquarium where president and CEO Barbara 
Baker in 1990 installed a policy of not allowing its animals to be known “by affectionate 
names” (“A Human Zoo”). Baker explained that the purpose of the no names policy was “to 
preserve the wild mystique of our animals and encourage visitors to admire them for their 
natural beauty as a species” (Srikameswaran). The animals in the zoo were not meant to be 
individually valued and identified with, but rather were present only as supposedly generic 
examples of their species.  
Although the policy may have been intended to prevent the anthropomorphising of the 
zoo’s animals, as one newspaper editor pointed out the people who worked with the animals 
had to call them something, so many of the zoo’s animals already had names which were 
used by their keepers (“A Human Zoo”). Therefore the issue was really a public relations one. 
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The decision not to let the zoo’s animals be publicly named was to preserve the animals’ 
marketable exoticism and “mystique”; while the first elephant born at the zoo was named 
Victoria by staff, she was only known to the public as the more anonymous and mysterious 
“V”. Jeffrey Hyson has written on the history of zoos in North America and he notes that 
“[o]ne of the reasons why zoos are reluctant to reveal the private names that keepers might 
call the animals is because that would give the impression that the keeper has made the 
animals into pets” (Srikameswaran). This would certainly be problematic for an institution 
attempting to market the untamed exoticism of its captive animals and would also conflict 
with the zoo’s desire to be seen as a scientific institution.  
Another reason that Baker was reluctant to allow public naming of the zoo’s animals 
was the speciesism that is apparent in the process itself. She is aware that those who she calls 
the “warm-and-fuzzies”, charismatic megafauna such as elephants and big cats, attract 
affectionate names easily while other animals like birds and reptiles do not. This tendency 
has also been noted by Mullan and Marvin who observe that  
even in a culture where animals are given individual names, those which 
do not attract attention (those with low exhibition value) and those which 
live in large groups in the zoo – a shoal of fish, a herd of deer or cage of 
mice for example – are unlikely to be named, even though they might be 
recognized as individuals.  
(11) 
It is only those animals with whom people connect individually and on an emotional level 
that are usually named by zoos. As Hyson points out, this is dangerous because it can suggest 
that some animals “are more worthy of names than others” or are more valuable and worthy 
of conservation efforts (Srikameswaran).  
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The Pittsburgh Zoo’s no-naming policy was eventually changed in 2004 after studies 
suggested to Baker that “naming zoo animals can instil in children a lifelong devotion to 
animals” (Srikameswaran). By publicly naming their animals, the zoo’s CEO hoped to create 
a new generation of devoted zoo-goers. This promotional opportunity was utilised by naming 
April of that year as “Meet the Animals” month, in which “[s]igns will be displayed with not 
only information about the animals, but also their names” (Srikameswaran). For the first time 
the public was invited to see each of the animals as an individual. A quick look at the zoo’s 
website today, however, does not reveal any evidence of this change in policy. For example 
in the “Animals and Exhibits” section click on the page about the “African Elephants” and 
you will learn not about the zoo’s actual elephants, for example their names, physical 
characteristics or behaviour, but general facts about African elephants as a species: “[t]he 
African elephant (Loxodonta africana) is the largest living land-dwelling animal … These 
animals can weigh anywhere between 13,228 and 19,843 lbs” (“African Elephant”). This is 
what most of us expect from a zoo: scientific, dispassionate, informative facts about abstract 
species. Click over to the “Press Room” section of the website, however, and it is a different 
story. One press release from 2009 is titled “Jackson, Our Bull Elephant, Is a Dad Again!” 
The release details the new birth of a calf at another zoo and gives accounts of Jackson’s 
other daughters. “Jackson is the father of Angeline and Zuri, born here at the Zoo last year, as 
well as Victoria and Callee, born in 1999 and 2000” (“Jackson”). With these two very 
different accounts of its elephants the Pittsburgh Zoo is obviously trying to balance the two 
aspects of its identity as a zoo: the generic scientific data which portray African elephants as 
animals not to be named or valued as individuals but as a species to be studied, and the public 
relations notices which encourage the public to celebrate events in the lives of individuals in 
their elephant family just as if it were a human family.  
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The inherently political nature of zoos has also become an issue in the naming of 
captive animals in even more overt ways. Two pandas who were chosen from the Wolong 
Panda Reserve in Sichuan as a gift from the Chinese government to Taiwan were also named 
after a national naming competition in which over 100 million people voted (Toy, 2007). 
However the winning names exacerbated an already tense political situation when the public 
voted for the names Tuan Tuan for the male (formerly named just “No. 19” in the Wolong 
Reserve) and Yuan Yuan for the female (formerly known as “No. 16”) (“Giant”).  Together, 
the names form the Mandarin phrase “tuán yuán” which means “reunion” or “unite”. This 
took the “panda diplomacy” too far for Taiwan’s DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) 
president and the gift of the pandas was ultimately rejected by Taiwan’s Council of 
Agriculture, officially on the grounds that the Taiwanese zoo did not have the necessary 
facilities to properly care for them (Jennings). However after a KMT (Kuomingtang) 
president was elected in 2008 the pandas were accepted and arrived at the Taipei Zoo in 
December that year. This incident exemplifies the way in which nonhuman animals have 
become symbols in much of our modern cultural discourse and this status means that any 
names given to animals will be enhanced as signifiers to have even greater symbolic meaning 
that can be culturally, emotionally, even politically loaded. 
While naming animals after their physical attributes is quite common, like Jackson the 
elephant, named animals in the zoo novels are predominantly called by typically human 
names. In The Great Divorce the female cats all have names like human women: the white 
tiger Sonya, leopard Magda, clouded leopard Flo and the lion Antonella. While in theory 
bestowing human names on the powerful cats might be thought to make it easier for human 
zoo visitors (and readers of the novel) to relate to them, in fact the contrast between their 
human names and their nonhuman identity actually emphasises their otherness. This 
incongruity echoes the strangeness of the situation the cats find themselves in; just as their 
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names may seem foreign or unsuited to them, so they themselves seem alien and unsuited to 
the concrete and metal enclosures where they are contained.  
One nonhuman animal in the zoo novels whose human name is somewhat contentious 
is not a zoo animal at all but a companion animal (pet) bought by a zoo employee. In 
Hannah’s Dream Miles the miniature pig becomes a focus in the narrative of Truman’s life 
around which his insecurities about his ex-wife revolve. Rhonda has left Truman and their 
son Winslow a year earlier and Truman always hears her exasperated and derisive voice in 
his head criticising him and Winslow and the way that they choose to live. Epitomising this is 
the name that they choose to give their new porcine companion: “Miles. Truman could see 
Rhonda rolling her eyes at the name he and Winslow had deliberated over for so long. It’s a 
pig, not a banker. Why not name it Sir Francis Bacon, something clever?” (Hammond, 69, 
italics in original). In his mind the flamboyant and self-absorbed Rhonda sees the name 
chosen by Truman and Winslow as showing a lack of imagination compared with her own 
“clever” one. In her paper on the use of proper names for laboratory animals Mary T. Phillips  
notes that when researchers named laboratory animals after people “the name had less to do 
with recognising the animal’s individuality than it had to do with poking fun at the namesake” 
(133). Phillips also gives the example of the famous chimpanzee Nim Chimpsky, named after 
American linguist Noam Chomsky. Although the pun in the name itself is amusing, in giving 
that name to an animal the namer was obviously thinking of themselves and their own 
aspirations, not the individuality of the animal. While the hypothetical Rhonda considered 
only her own “cleverness” in naming Miles, Truman and Winslow take the process very 
seriously and in doing so show their respect for Miles as a new member of their small family.   
Another animal in Hammond’s novel who has a typically human name is the book’s 
eponymous elephant, Hannah. Although we don’t know who gave Hannah her name it serves 
an important function and represents the unique relationship she has with her keeper Sam 
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Brown and his wife Corinna. The couple’s only child was a daughter who was stillborn, a 
loss which helped draw zoo owner Max to Sam after the death of her other beloved elephant, 
and upon meeting Hannah the Browns were convinced that she is their baby daughter reborn. 
For forty-one years later the couple still has pet names for Hannah like “shug” (sugar) and 
“baby girl”, just as they call each other “mama” and “papa”; anyone listening to them talk 
about her wouldn’t immediately know that Hannah is not human. Sam tells Corinna that the 
new keeper looks at him strangely when he talks to Hannah. 
   “Don’t you stop talking to her, now,” Corinna warned. 
   “There’s nothing out there than can shut me up, you know that. 
Hannah knows it, too. It would probably scare her half to death if I came 
in quiet.” 
(Hammond, 43) 
 Hannah’s human name allows her to be naturally included in the familial discourse, although 
not in a way which challenges the traditional anthropocentric view of “family” as a strictly 
single-species family; indeed, since the Browns see Hannah as the reincarnation of their 
human daughter their family dynamic could be seen as supporting this view; Neva observes 
(and is “unnerved” by) the way that “Hannah’s Hannah-ness” is “more important to Sam than 
her elephantness” (Hammond, 196). For the reader, Hannah’s name serves to familiarise the 
family’s relationship while for the other human characters her human-like name also 
indicates her individuality and value (by differentiating her from other nonhuman animals). 
When Sam first meets the boy Reginald at the zoo he introduces him to Hannah. 
“Say hello to her. Her name’s Hannah.” 
The boy lifted a hand self-consciously. “Hey.” 
“Hey, Hannah. Elephant’s got the right to expect good manners.” 
“Hey, Hannah.” 
(16, emphasis in original) 
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By insisting that Reginald use Hannah’s name Sam is insisting on Hannah’s identity as an 
individual and her right to be treated as such. He is also encouraging Reginald to set aside his 
“self-consciousness” and see Hannah for who she really is. 
In her article on naming laboratory animals Phillips discusses her observations of 
animal experiments over three years in 23 different laboratories. When interviewing 
researchers she noted that many thought of laboratory animals as being ontologically 
different from other categories of animals such as pets, wildlife or vermin (120, 134; see also 
Birke, 216). A rat who lives in a human home as a companion, for example, is a different 
type of animal entirely from a rat who is sold to a laboratory for use in experiments. It is 
completely natural to name the former because she an individual with whom a human will 
share a relationship. The latter, however, is simply a collection of parts which exist to be used 
for science. The two animals are not the same; one is a named individual, the other is an 
unnamable component of a much larger experiment. As Phillips notes this socially 
constructed category of “the laboratory animal” “contrasts with nameable animals (e.g., pets) 
across every salient dimension” (119). In which category then do zoo animals fall? Are they 
nameable, as are domestic animal companions, or are they unnamable like laboratory animals 
and vermin? In thinking about this question it is helpful to note that in her interviews with 
researchers in animal laboratories Phillips found that the different categories into which 
researchers separated animals were often “expressed in teleological terms, the category being 
based on the purpose for which the animal was intended” (134, emphasis in original). The 
use that humans intend an animal for dictates into which category that animal falls. The 
category that she belongs to is then used to validate why she can be treated in a certain way 
when an animal from another category may not be. Whether or not an animal in a zoo is 
named is therefore evidence of the purpose that the zoo intends to use the animal for. Most 
zoo animals are publicly unnamed because their purpose is to represent an exotic wildness. 
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However when a zoo decides to officially name an animal, as the Pittsburgh zoo did, this 
indicates a teleological shift in the classification of the animal; the purpose of that animal has 
changed from representing a glimpse of the mysterious wild to becoming a sort of 
ambassador of her species, intended to promote the zoo by appealing to the emotions of the 
wider public and attracting more paying visitors who will then develop a lasting affection for 
her.   
While keepers at zoos have practical reasons for calling their charges by a name, the 
emotional bond this represents is now becoming more widely acknowledged. Not only does 
forming a relationship with a nonhuman animal encourage us to name them, but giving an 
animal a name also creates or strengthens the relationship as well. In a 2012 episode of 
Campbell Live investigating the home-kill practice of “cow pooling” (in which several human 
individuals or groups invest in the purchase and maintenance of a cow and then each receive 
a share of the meat when she is slaughtered), social trends researcher Jill Caldwell notes that 
the unwritten rule of cow pooling is “[d]on’t name your beast—don’t name your food”, the 
reason being that “it’s very much harder to kill a friend than it is to kill a perfect stranger” 
(“Kindest Cut”). Despite purchasing the cow for the purpose of killing and eating her, the 
simple act giving her a name is enough to move her from being in the teleological group 
“food” to uncomfortably close to being a friend in the mind of the purchaser8. Phillips also 
observes that researchers who worked with lab animals were aware of this and it was one of 
the reasons they do not name the animals they work with. “They saw a direct connection 
between naming animals and developing emotional ties to them” (Phillips, 132). As Phillips 
                                                 
8
 This is also noted by Jovian Parry in his thesis “The New Visibility of Slaughter in Popular Gastronomy” 
examining the recent “New Carnivore movement” (14-17). However he goes on to show that acknowledging the 
sentience and subjectivity of a nonhuman animal (for example by bestowing a name on her) before slaughtering 
and eating her distinguishes for the New Carnivore the “authenticity” and “prestige” of the meat (63-67). In fact 
the animal’s carcass may continue to be identified using her name during the process of cooking and 
consumption; for the New Carnivore “this recognition of the animal as a living, feeling being imbues the eating 
of her carcass with a special significance” (65). 
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explains almost all the experiments she observed must end in the death of the animal, 
therefore the scientists sought to distance themselves from the animal by not naming her, and 
further, by framing her as unnamable.  This correlation between naming and emotionally 
bonding has also been observed by Bekoff who notes that more researchers are starting to 
realise that genuinely caring for the animals one studies actually enhances one’s observation 
of and therefore understanding of a study (“Deep Ethology”, 154-5).  
One character who struggles with this conflict between the clinical, supposedly 
objective approach and the more natural human response is the giraffes’ keeper in Ledgard’s 
novel. Like Emil the keeper is familiar with Sněhurka but he tries to resist naming her, 
perhaps because he wishes to remain scientific, perhaps because he understands the 
emotional effects of naming nonhuman animals mentioned by Caldwell, or perhaps because 
he would like to set the nonhuman animals he works with, captive in every other way, free 
from human names. 
“That’s Sněhurka,” he says. “She’s one of the leaders. She is always the 
first to step out when I open the doors in the morning. She stands quite 
still in the open with her head pushed back, like this, almost lifting up 
off the ground. Then she nods and the others venture out.” 
     He looks up at Sněhurka. 
     “Animals should be stripped of names,” he says, “but I cannot bring 
myself to do so in her case.” 
(188-189) 
For some animals, like the big cats in The Great Divorce, being “stripped” of their human 
name might seem like something of a release, an acknowledgment of their unknowable 
otherness. In this passage, however, the keeper describes his familiarity with Sněhurka; this 
awareness of her identity makes her different in his mind from other nonhuman animals and 
therefore makes her worthy of a name. Although he believes nonhuman animals should not 
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be given human names he feels that taking Sněhurka’s from her would be wrong; stripping 
Sněhurka of her name would both be to deny her worth as an individual and to again render 
her as other and admit his inability to ever truly know her. 
As we have seen, for various reasons many zoo animals remain unnamed and after 
detailing the importance and functions of a name for human and nonhuman animals, Phillips 
assures us that those who have no name still live lives that are meaningful. “This is not to say 
unnamed animals are meaningless … For creatures with no names … construction of 
meaning follows a different path from that of the narrative account” (Phillips, 121). One 
insight into this alternative construction of meaning can perhaps be seen in Millet’s How the 
Dead Dream. In this novel the protagonist does not develop a close relationship with any of 
the zoo animals he meets. Instead, his encounters with them are more like glimpses into their 
experience; there is an awareness for him and the reader that the animals he visits in the zoos 
existed in the same way before he arrived, and that same existence will continue 
uninterrupted after he leaves. There is a sense, then, of a collective narrative of captivity 
which is recognisable to the reader. As we accompany the protagonist on his nocturnal visits 
we glimpse quiet moments inside the cages but the animals themselves remain unnamed and 
unknowable.  
The one nonhuman animal the protagonist forms a close relationship with is his adopted 
dog; however she too remains nameless in the novel. Despite the fact that she is only ever 
referred to as “the dog”, she is the one who provides the main character with comfort, 
companionship and a sense of mutual trust. Finally, the novel’s protagonist himself is almost 
unnamed. Called only “T.”, his first name is only revealed incidentally through a 
conversation near the end of the novel. In terms of the text’s narrative this namelessness 
aligns T. much more closely with his dog and with the other nonhuman animals he 
encounters than with any of the human characters. It suggests names are purely arbitrary 
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constructions which in fact hinder emotional connections and by removing these from his 
interactions with other animals it allows T. to see them more clearly. T. does not get to know 
each of the zoo animals in an individual way but in his night-time observations he does 
acknowledge their identity as individuals in the collective narrative of captivity. In this case it 
is not the absence of a name which precludes the existence of a unique biography or structure 
of meaning for each animal, but the captivity which is imposed on them. Within the context 
of the narrative of their encounter, T. meets the zoo animals on a more even footing than any 
other human character in the zoo novels because as a nameless character himself he is in a 
position to see past their namelessness. 
The names of animals serve a variety of functions, from the practical need of zoo 
keepers to have something to call their charges, to a way to show respect or express a deep 
emotional bond. All animal names, however, reflect the way that humans choose to interact 
with nonhuman animals. After her observations of adoption and renaming at a humane 
society shelter, Irvine points out that “[t]he act of changing an animal’s name reflects the 
degree to which an animal’s identity emerges through interaction” (Irvine, 334). Names, 
therefore, are a sign not of an animal’s individuality, but of the recognition and 
acknowledgement of this individual personality by a human. 
While the form of nonhuman animals’ expression in the zoo novels may be seen as 
necessarily anthropocentric, since their accounts are of course written by a human author for 
human readers, I argue that speciesist narrative elements are overcome by creating genuine 
nonhuman characters who possess a narrative voice and who are recognised as subject-
bearing individuals by human characters within the text. This recognition is expressed 
through the awareness that nonhuman characters experience emotions and by bestowing 
names on nonhuman characters to signify awareness of their unique identity. In the next 
chapter I will explore the human visual sense as a primary channel through which human 
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characters try to identify with individual nonhuman animals and both human and nonhuman 
eyes and gaze as serving important literary functions within the zoo novels. 
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Chapter Two 
“With a View to Seeing”: Reading Eyes,  
       Interpreting Gaze 
 
An animal looks at me. What should I think of this 
sentence?  
  Derrida, 6 
 
With both its eyes the creature-world sees 
the open. But our eyes are 
as though reversed and set around it 
like snares, all around its path to freedom. 
What is outside, we know from the animal’s 
countenance alone. For we already turn the small child 
around and compel it to look backwards 
and see formed nature, not the open that 
is so deep in the animal’s face.  
Rilke, “Eighth Elegy,” lines 1-9, trans. Llewellyn, 223. 9 
 
At their most basic, zoos are sites of (human) looking and observation. For humans as a 
species vision is a hugely important sense. Although many other species in fact rely more on 
their other senses to experience the world and communicate, when observing or representing 
other animals humans nonetheless often tend to emphasise the eyes and vision. For example 
in his “Eighth Elegy” quoted above Rainer Maria Rilke proposes that humans, separated from 
“the open” (a term used by Rilke for “the universe as a timeless continuity of life and death” 
[Llewellyn, 136]) by their awareness and fear of their own death, can only experience it in the 
“countenance” of nonhuman animals.  Unaware of their separation from the open at birth and 
not fearing death, nonhuman animals can see the open, indeed they remain part it and move 
                                                 
9
 “Elegy Eight” from Rainer Maria Rilke’s Duino Elegies. For Terry Llewellyn’s translation of the full 
poem, see Appendix. 
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already “in eternity” (line 13). For Rilke, then, humans’ separation from the open is 
expressed in our “reversed”, inward-looking eyes; however even nonhuman animals’ 
privileged access to the open is also expressed visually: the creature-world sees the open 
“with both its eyes.”  
The value of eyes as signifiers imbues them with meaning in much of human discourse. 
This is true for the zoo novels, in which human characters use eyes as a point of familiarity 
with (or difference from) other species. This chapter will explore the ways that the gaze of 
nonhuman animals in the novels can appeal, confront or disregard and may, occasionally, act 
as the means by which a human character experiences a transformative identification with 
another animal. In this chapter I will also demonstrate that the zoo is not only the site where 
many of these encounters take place, it also defines the context of the mutual gaze as being 
that between subjective (human) observer and objectified (nonhuman) observed. For this 
reason most of the meaningful visual exchanges between human and nonhuman in the novels 
take place outside the conventional parameters of the zoo visit. Finally, this chapter will 
discuss the status of modern zoos as authority-bearing institutions and examine the role of 
Science and the Scientific gaze in two of the zoo novels. 
Eyes, as we all have heard, are the windows to the soul, but while humans may 
exchange meaningful looks and convey emotion to other humans, what do the eyes of 
nonhuman animals – thought by many (for example Cartesians and many Christians) to be 
“soulless” (Scholtmeijer, 3) – tell us about their bearers?10  The animals in the zoo novels 
have a range of anatomies and a variety of eyes, from the pupfish in How The Dead Dream, 
who are tiny “but their eyes [a]re large, and for this reason even the adults loo[k] like babies” 
                                                 
10
 For a detailed historical discussion of the connection between the spiritual status of animals and their 
treatment in human society see Rod Preece’s Brute Souls, Happy Beasts and Evolution: The Historical Status of 
Animals (2005). 
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(Millet, 160), to Othello the bull in Zoology, whose eyes are “as big as pool balls” (Dolnick, 
42). In Hannah’s Dream Harriet Saul loves small finches for their nonhumanness. She 
“didn’t share the prevailing worship of wolves and whales and dogs of all descriptions. They 
looked out of eyes just like hers” (Hammond, 61). For Harriet the eyes of other large 
mammals are too similar to human eyes, too familiar; like Camille in The Great Divorce as a 
result of her past treatment at the hands of other people she sees any similarity to humans as a 
repugnant and undesirable trait. However in most of the texts discussed here the description 
of nonhuman animals’ eyes, including those of large mammals, tends to highlight not their 
familiarity but their otherness; nowhere is this more evident than in Emil’s description of the 
eye of a giraffe in J.M. Ledgard’s novel. 
Giraffes see the world. The giraffe eye is the largest in the animal 
kingdom, several times larger than the human eye, larger still than the 
eye of a mermaid. It is almond-shaped, framed by long lashes that in 
Africa blink away flies and swarming gall-ants, but in Magdeburg now 
only flutter. The optic nerve of a giraffe is as thick as an index finger and 
the celestial view which plays through the nerve on the brain of a giraffe 
– of stars invisible to the human eye and all the subtle colours denoting 
the age of the star, which twinkle prehistoric down on us – is more finely 
grained than any Brahe could have hoped for. 
(Ledgard, 108) 
Haemodynamicist Emil sees the giraffes’ eyes from a biological perspective, as someone who 
has studied diagrams and perhaps cut open the faces of giraffes to observe the mechanics of 
the eye. As well as comparing the eye of a giraffe with that of a human Emil declares giraffes’ 
eyes to be biologically superior, imagining that giraffes perceive stars more accurately than 
(sixteenth century Danish astronomer) Tycho Brahe could have.  
More than just examples of the differences in our anatomies, the many different 
nonhuman eyes present in the novels convey much more of each animal’s identity. These 
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eyes, while varied, contain something that the human characters recognise; if not a “soul” 
then the spark of life. It is this that zoo vet Ellen watches disappear as the small howler 
monkey dies beneath her hands: “she saw the light leaving his eyes, a dull gray sheen in its 
place that seemed to flood the eyeball from the inside, announcing that life had gone” (Martin, 
19). Rather than using the similarities between primate and human faces to describe the death 
of the monkey and enhance its effect on the reader, Martin chooses to focus on his eyes. Ellen 
witnesses the loss of something that most of us will recognise as more than just the absence 
brought by death; she witnesses the loss of the feelings and emotions that make up a self, as 
she confirms later when she remembers the little monkey’s “terrified expression” (5).  
In Hannah’s Dream this spark is present in Hannah’s eyes and conveys her personality 
and self to human characters almost despite her vast nonhuman body. The elderly Sam recalls 
the first time he saw Hannah, the first elephant he’d ever seen, forty years ago.  
When he first met her, Hannah had reminded him of nothing so much as 
a worn-out, hip-shot, low-slung, dog-ugly, poorly dressed old floozy in 
bad shoes. … And yet there was a soul, a thing of pure beauty, behind 
those eyes. Max Biedelman had seen it clearly all those years ago and … 
Samson Brown saw it shining there every day. 
(Hammond, 15) 
In his book about how various nonhuman animals express their emotions, Marc Bekoff notes 
that “[e]ven when we can’t measure their meaning, it is the eyes that most evocatively convey 
sentience” (Bekoff, Emotional, 50). Despite being unimpressed on first encountering Hannah, 
when he sees her eyes Sam recognises her as a unique and sentient being. It is this realisation 
that causes him to treat Hannah as an individual and a friend throughout his life, something it 
takes other human characters (who haven’t spent time with Hannah and recognised her 
sentience) much longer to realise. Similarly, When Amina first sees the giraffes on the back 
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of the lorry in Ledgard’s novel she is drawn to them, both to their otherness and also the 
commonalities they share with her, such as their “sensitivity of expression” (Ledgard, 161).  
As well as showing the presence of a self, like those of the howler monkey the other 
animal eyes in the novels also offer the reader an insight into the feelings of nonhuman 
characters and are often used by the authors to help the reader understand what the animal is 
experiencing. For example in Zoology when Henry first meets Othello he describes his eyes 
as looking “hungry and worn out” (42). As Bekoff writes, “Eyes are magnificently complex 
organs that provide a window into an individual’s emotional world. As in humans, in many 
species eyes reflect feelings, whether wide open in glee or sunken in despair. Eyes are 
mysterious, evocative, and immediate communicators” (Bekoff, Emotional, 49). Importantly, 
Bekoff states that eyes are windows into an individual’s emotions and so acknowledges both 
that “animal eyes” is not an anatomical category – each species experiences vision in a 
different way – and that individual animals have unique emotional lives different to other 
members of their species.  
While human and nonhuman eyes may both be powerful communicators, as Bekoff 
points out we are not always able to “measure their meaning” (Emotional, 50). In Hannah’s 
Dream Neva remembers an old war veteran employed as a sun-bear keeper. Despite the bears 
being “sad, sleepy”, “old” and “vegetarian”, the man is terrified of them and insists on being 
armed in their presence. He tells Neva “I see them watching me—I see them watching me all 
the time. You look in those eyes and you can see murder, plain as day” (Hammond, 52, italics 
in original). Clearly the man’s interpretation of the bears’ eyes is influenced by his own 
experiences.  
In Dolnick’s novel the strange horizontal pupils of the goats are indicative of both their 
separation in Henry’s mind from the other animals in the children’s zoo and of their stark 
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physical otherness to Henry himself. “The goats looked smart and scrappy … Their pupils 
went the wrong way, and they all looked up at me expecting something—they were the Bad 
News Bears and I was their coach” (Dolnick, 44).11 Despite the otherness of their eyes Henry 
is still able to recognise expression in them and in the stance of the goats: expectancy. 
Although he cannot relate to the goats’ “wrong way” pupils, they enable Henry to recognise 
something in the goats and form an immediate bond with them. 
Although, like Henry, many human characters may recognise something in the eyes of 
nonhuman animals there is much more there that is unfamiliar to them, the first sign of which 
is the jolt of being confronted by the other-than-human. In Millet’s How the Dead Dream, the 
protagonist T. experiences this confrontation in surroundings which are already unfamiliar to 
him and also probably to the reader. In the middle of the night, after climbing over a chain-
link fence topped with barbed wire, T. sits in the quiet dark of the Mexican gray wolf’s pen 
before aiming his torch in front of the wolf and switching it on. “A quick yellow flicker of 
eyes and then the wolf moved fluidly, fleeing along the fence” (Millet, 136-7). This “yellow 
flicker” of the wolf’s eyes in the torchlight is starkly nonhuman, a characteristic of various 
predators’ eyes which struck fear into the hearts of people for generations. In his article “The 
Gaze of Animals” Philip Armstrong explains how for many centuries eyesight was believed 
to be “an active force” consisting of a “current, flame, fire, steam of particles or corporeal ray” 
emanating from one’s eyes and nocturnal eye-shine, a characteristic “strongest in the gaze of 
humanity’s most feared animal predators”, was thought to show the transmission of 
venomous or evil effects on the subject of the gaze (181). In the case of the wolf’s vision it 
was believed the “noxious influence” of her glowing eye had the power to take away the 
                                                 
11
 The Bad News Bears is a 1976 film (remade in 2005) about a Californian Little League baseball team 
called “the Bears” comprised of supposedly untalented social misfits rejected by the other teams in the league. 
The players form a close relationship with their coach, a down-on-his-luck former player, and together they 
surprise everyone with their success.   
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voice of any unsuspecting person caught in her gaze (179, 181). While today we know this 
conclusion to be false, Armstrong notes how in the bestiaries’ fantastic descriptions of the 
fiery, wrathful eyes of animals like wolves and cats “a dynamism is ascribed to the nonhuman 
gaze that correlates with uncertainty about human mastery over the animal in question” (178). 
However such long-held beliefs about the powers of nonhuman animals’ vision were 
eventually challenged and in 1672 Sir Thomas Browne posited that the speechlessness of a 
person upon encountering a wolf was not caused by “venomous emanation, but a vehement 
fear” (Armstrong, 181). T., suddenly encountering the luminous gaze of the wolf, does not 
meet with a “venomous emanation”, but neither does he feel a “vehement fear”. In fact, it is 
the wolf who immediately “flees” and, having nowhere to go, remains in a corner of his pen, 
not allowing T. to come any closer (Millet, 137). The potent and mysterious power of the 
wolf’s gaze is largely absent from this encounter, the wolf himself isolated, contained and 
subjected to the objectifying human gaze. Armstrong observes the foundations of this 
unequal power dynamic in the seventeenth century works of scientists like Kepler and 
Descartes, which “represented the progressive abandonment of the ancient and medieval 
notion of vision ... in favour of an abstract and mathematical concept of vision as a field of 
intersecting vectors” (Armstrong, 182). This was an important shift away from thinking about 
animals as gaze-bearing subjects and a move which would have far-reaching consequences 
for human-animal relations in Western culture.  
One consequence of this paradigm shift was the removal of visual 
agency from nonhuman animals and its sole investiture in the human 
mind, which alone possessed the capacity to apprehend optical geometry. 
(182) 
As Armstrong demonstrates, this method of understanding the world by its reduction to two-
dimensional planes “is a crucial enabling factor in the modern conquest of nature”, ultimately 
facilitating practices of geographical colonisation, anatomical dissection and the incarceration 
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of animals in modern zoos (182). Despite this scientific legacy of denying agency to 
nonhuman animals, when T. remembers the yellow flicker of the wolf’s eyes it is not as the 
empty gaze of a dumb beast; rather, the wolf’s “visual agency” remains clear to T. “He 
thought he recalled feeling, in the flash of its eyeshine, a similar flash in himself—a fleeting 
awareness that in the wolf’s gaze there was a directness unlike the directness of men” (Millet, 
137). After trying to look into the eyes of the wolf, expecting to read there something of his 
feelings or his experience, T. is confronted not by passive “windows into” the wolf’s 
“emotional world” but by the returned gaze of the wolf himself. Not only is the wolf looking 
at him, but his look is more direct that those of humans. This realisation echoes the 
acknowledgment by Ledgard’s Emil, cited above, that “Giraffes see the world” (Ledgard, 
108). In The Great Divorce young zookeeper Camille also experiences the regard of 
nonhuman animals as she stands before the night cages of the zoo’s big cats. “Though they 
never looked one another in the eye, they were all willing to stare coldly at their keeper, so 
Camille stood in a crossfire of feline eyebeams” (Martin, 10). The power of the cats’ gazes is 
evident and Camille does not look into their eyes.  
We know, then, that in the zoo novels the eyes of nonhuman animals are not empty; 
they are used to convey feelings and expressions of sentience. Nor are they passive, mere 
windows into another’s experience; rather they look, see and gaze around them.  In her essay 
on animal gaze in the work of two German authors, Jutta Ittner draws on the writing of 
French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan to try and explain how nonhuman animals see the world. 
“In his attempt to locate the source, or ‘original point’ of vision, Lacan differentiates between 
the eye and the gaze. This distinction introduces a subject whose intention is to see and 
attribute meaning to the image that its eye sees” (Ittner, 107). Similarly, in the novels I am 
concerned with here human characters find the gaze of a nonhuman animal startling because 
they see something there they did not expect: a subject looking back at them. T. is startled by 
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the wolf’s gaze because he is not approaching the wolf as a subject. Entering the wolf’s pen 
he expects to be the only subject “whose intention is to see and attribute meaning to the 
image that [his] eye sees.” Another man who was similarly startled is the philosopher Jacques 
Derrida, as he describes in the first chapter of his book The Animal That Therefore I Am. In 
an encounter called by Danta and Vardoulakis a “modern fable” (5), the philosopher stands 
naked his bathroom and turns to find himself being gazed at by his small cat. What he feels in 
this moment, naked before a cat, is shame. Then more than that he feels ashamed of his 
shame; embarrassed that the cat looking at his nudity makes him feel ashamed. As Derrida 
points out, philosophers traditionally profess that what makes nonhuman animals different 
from us is that they are naked and do not know it (4-5), therefore the cat cannot recognise his 
nudity. However the philosopher stands “face-to-face” with the cat and sees her eyes 
“looking at me from head to toe, as it were just to see, not hesitating to concentrate its 
vision—in order to see, with a view to seeing—in the direction of my sex” (4). The cat does 
not look passively, therefore, but is a subject who concentrates her vision “in order to see.” 
Gerard Bruns suggests that “the joke is that if the cat had not looked at the naked Derrida, he 
(Derrida) would have remained (like) an animal, unaware of his nudity. The gaze of the cat is 
what makes him human” (Bruns, 82). However this is not entirely accurate, as Derrida 
realises he has been caught off-guard and the cat has been considering him for longer than he 
was aware of it. He describes “that strange moment when, before the event, before even 
wanting it or knowing it myself, I am passively presented to it as naked, I am seen and seen 
naked, before even seeing myself seen by a cat” (Derrida, 11). Thus it is not the gaze of the 
cat that makes Derrida human, but his awareness of her gaze and his own reaction to it. The 
function of the cat’s gaze is not to render Derrida human, but to see. She is a subject in 
herself, with her own motivations for looking, and for seeing. Never is her subjectivity more 
obvious to a human observer, than when that observer finds herself under the cat’s gaze. In 
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their essay “The Political Animal” Danta and Vardoulakis explain this effect: “While gazing 
at the human, the animal prohibits (its) animality being reduced to a pure naked body, a body 
of absolute passivity, a body to be brushed and patted. With this interruption, the animal also 
becomes political, in the sense that it conditions the possibility of singularity and of identity” 
(5). In finding himself the subject of the cat’s gaze, Derrida is confronted with her identity 
and her singularity. Her own point of view and its stark difference to his own occur to him 
more strongly than ever before. 
And from the vantage of this being-there-before-me [the cat] can allow 
itself to be looked at, no doubt, but also—something that philosophy 
perhaps forgets … —it can look at me. It has its point of view regarding 
me. The point of view of the absolute other, and nothing will have ever 
given me more food for thinking through this absolute alterity of the 
neighbor or of the next(-door) than these moments when I see myself 
naked under the gaze of a cat. 
(Derrida, 11) 
It is not only seeing the cat or the gaze of the cat that gives Derrida pause, but seeing himself 
under her gaze. 
In Hannah’s Dream Hannah’s singularity and identity are known to Sam, who feels a 
special, fatherly connection to her. However he faces a challenge in trying to convey this 
identity to strangers who haven’t had the opportunity to interact with Hannah themselves. 
The tendency of humans to discount the possibility of nonhuman subjectivity is shown in the 
first interaction young Reginald has with Hannah. Sam is walking with Hannah one day when 
they meet Reginald for the first time. 
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He heard someone call, “How come you’re walking that elephant, 
mister?” A boy appeared at his elbow, a small but good-looking kid 
about eleven years old. 
“How come you’re walking around the zoo?” Sam asked. 
The boy shrugged, falling into step beside Sam. “To see stuff.” 
“Guess you answered your own question, then,” Sam said. 
(Hammond, 16) 
Reginald makes the assumption that the reason Hannah is out walking is different from his 
own. It does not occur to him that as a nonhuman animal Hannah could enjoy walking for the 
same reason that he does. In a non-confrontational way Sam encourages Reginald towards a 
similar realisation to Derrida’s: that Hannah looks in order to see.  Reginald is doubtful, 
however, and asks Sam, “[c]an she see me? She’s awful damned big” (16).  As with 
Derrida’s cat, whose diminutive size and entirely nonhuman anatomy are an initial barrier to 
the philosopher’s considering the possibility of her subjecthood, Hannah’s size and physical 
otherness distract Reginald from recognising that she has a point of view. Her stature makes 
it impossible for him to look into her eyes or be sure that he himself is the subject of her gaze. 
It is important to him that Hannah sees him and it is only once Sam reassures him that she 
does that Reginald begins to consider her as an individual. 
While experiencing the gaze of the nonhuman animal forces us to realise that other 
animals have their own points of view, the experience is far from making those points of 
view known to us. Marcus Bullock argues that every part of an animal, being so different 
from ourselves, “looks” at us and forces us to respond to it. Although the gaze of a nonhuman 
animal makes us acknowledge in these moments the sentience and subjecthood of the 
encountered other, we are far from understanding them or their perspective: “there is no part 
of an animal that does not look back at us. There is no part that does not remind us that there 
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is something, a life, an existence that in some way echoes our own, but which remains always 
behind what meets our gaze, elusive, impossible, unimaginable” (Bullock, 101).  
While the whole being of a nonhuman animal can be said to “look back at us”, 
challenging our perceptions, it is when our eyes meet theirs that we may be forced to 
comprehend that the encounter really is an exchange between two subjects, a true experience 
of eye contact. In The Emotional Lives of Animals Bekoff acknowledges that understanding 
what we see in the eyes of nonhuman animals is not simple. “Reading emotions in eyes is not 
as clear-cut as reading gestures like the play bow. Personal interpretation or intuition plays a 
role, and yet there is no more direct animal-to-animal communication that staring deeply into 
another’s eyes” (Bekoff, 50). While the mutual gaze between two individuals provides the 
opportunity for meaningful interaction its effectiveness depends on the culturally-formed 
perceptions and personal interpretation of the human participant.  
At the end of The Great Divorce Ellen visits Minx, the young jaguar who has been sick 
overnight. “She leaned closer in to see the jaguar’s face, and as she did he stopped drinking. 
He lifted his head, the water pouring in two thin streams from his slightly open jaws. He gave 
her a long, steady look, his yellow eyes betraying nothing of his sentiments, if he could be 
said to have any” (Martin, 320). Ellen doesn’t see Minx’s eyes as windows into his feelings, 
but rather has amplifiers of his subjecthood. Since his eyes don’t betray his emotions, much 
less his thoughts, Ellen naturally reverts to “personal interpretation”. “In fact, Ellen thought, 
his look was the opposite of sentiment. This was the look that sees no moment beyond the 
present, that contemplates the world in an eternal now, the natural, healthy, straightforward, 
and increasingly rare regard of the wild and predatory cat” (Martin, 320). In his “Eighth 
Elegy” Rilke attributes the calm gaze of a nonhuman animal, who lives already “in eternity” 
to her being so much a part of “the open” that she barely sees humans who are separate from 
it. 
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Or that an animal,  
a silent one, looks up, and calmly through and through us. 
That is what destiny means: being opposite, 
and nothing but that, and always opposite. 
(lines 31-4, trans. Komar, 145-6) 
Just as lines thirty-one and thirty-two of Rilke’s poem “confront insecure mortals with the 
secure animal” (Llewellyn, 143), Ellen recognises that Minx’s gaze is “natural, healthy” and 
“straightforward”, apparently free of the insecurities of human sentiment. Ellen’s 
interpretation of Minx’s look is informed by her own experience and her knowledge of the 
wider context of their interaction, including her culturally-learnt presuppositions about how 
“wild animals” and in particular big cat predators “should” be. She was expecting him to be 
sick, so in the absence of illness his look seems “healthy”; recently she has been thinking a 
lot about the imminent extinction of species like Minx’s and she projects the status of his 
entire species onto him as an individual when she sees his look as being on the brink of 
nonexistence, viewing the world in “an eternal now”. Through this cycle of observation and 
interpretation we can see that our understanding of an animal’s gaze tells us more about 
ourselves than about how that animal truly thinks or feels. Bullock writes, “Yet precisely 
because the gaze of an animal refuses us so much compared to the look we exchange with 
another person, to whom we may speak in expectation of a reply, we can say that the animal 
glances back not only literally but figuratively, through a capacity with which we must invest 
it, as well” (101). Because the meaning of an animal’s look is withheld we are forced to 
endow it with our own meanings and, like the paranoid veteran in Hannah’s Dream, these 
meanings may have more to do with ourselves and how we perceive the animal than with 
how she perceives us.  
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For these reasons the eye is a powerful symbol, an image that may beckon and appeal 
to the viewer and also arrest and confront her. The five novels examined in this thesis each 
use the eyes of a nonhuman animal, an animal’s square regard, on the cover of the book.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Book cover and detail of the five zoo novels.  
From left: Giraffe (Ledgard), Hannah’s Dream (Hammond), How The Dead Dream (Millet), 12  
The Great Divorce (Martin) and Zoology (Dolnick). 
 
In large part these cover images reflect the role of the animals themselves in the novels. The 
giraffe on the cover of J.M. Ledgard’s novel is shown as “lofty”, “alien” and subdued, while 
the elephant on the cover of Hannah’s Dream has one startlingly human-like eye looking 
toward the viewer. The close-up image of the elephant eye on the cover of How The Dead 
Dream is cropped to remove all context, leaving the viewer to apply a human emotional 
inference of panic and turmoil to the widened eye and floating pupil; the drama evoked here 
reflects the novel’s themes of helplessness and destruction of the vast majority of nonhuman 
animal species. The image of the half-woman half-feline face on the cover of Valerie 
Martin’s novel stares out at the reader, the starkness of the contrast between the human and 
                                                 
12
 This cover image is taken from the 2008 edition of Lydia Millet’s novel published by Counterpoint. 
Throughout this thesis references to the text of the novel refer to the 2009 edition published by Vintage, the 
cover of which features an image of a black bear who is also looking out towards the reader. I have chosen to 
use the cover featuring the image of the elephant eye here to illustrate the effect of the single confronting 
nonhuman eye, and to contrast this with the eye of the elephant on the cover of Diane Hammond’s novel.  
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nonhuman eye embodies the concept of humans’ divorce from the natural world: eerily 
similar, yet discordant even as they exist in the same face. Finally the illustrated cover of 
Zoology emphasises the “wrong way” pupils of the goat’s eyes ensuring that his gaze, which 
is directed out to engage the viewer, is emphatically nonhuman. 
While encountering the gaze of a nonhuman animal causes many humans in the novels 
to confront the animals’ individuality and subjecthood, several humans also take the next step 
and are drawn to imagine what it is like for the animal in their position. The most common 
way they try to do this is through the animals’ eyes: they literally try to imagine what looking 
out of an animal’s eyes feels like. Human characters attempt this in various contexts and with 
varying degrees of success.  
When Emil is considering the eye of a giraffe he imagines how superior the astronomer 
Brahe’s discoveries would have been if he could have “employed giraffe eyes” (Ledgard, 
107). Here Emil’s contemplation is inspired not by meeting Sněhurka’s gaze or even by 
watching her and the other giraffes. He is simply drawing on his knowledge of giraffe 
anatomy, considering the eye of a giraffe, anonymous and supposedly generic. He imagines 
only how such an eye might be used for human ends, removing the giraffe’s point of view 
and inserting a human one.  Later in the novel Amina is walking through the zoo and stops to 
watch a rhinoceros. She observes that her eyes are “small, without colour or expression” 
(166). Amina tries to imagine how the rhinoceros must see the world but like Reginald 
looking up at Hannah she struggles with the rhino’s physical otherness, distracted by her 
large, grey, dinosaur-like armoured body, “I cannot imagine how dimly the world must arrive 
inside the head of this rhino, whether it sees me through its lanced eyelets, or ever notices the 
red banner hung over its pit declaring: Our Morals Are Fixed!” (166-7). Amina shows that 
she is too trapped in the human “Communist moment” to be able to try to truly empathise 
with the rhinoceros and imagine her nonhuman experience. The nature of Amina’s encounter 
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with the rhinoceros also inhibits her ability to connect with the animal, for reasons which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
In Lydia Millet’s novel, T. takes a very different approach to his own encounter with a 
rhinoceros. After breaking into her cage at nighttime T. considers her in the gloom. Like Emil, 
he uses a human perspective to understand the rhino’s experience but unlike Emil and Amina 
he focuses on seeing the rhinoceros on an individual level and instead imagines humans as 
the anonymous ones. “She was the only one of her kind for thousands of miles, across the 
wide seas. What person had ever known such separation?” (Millet, 145). Meeting the 
rhinoceros in the dimness of her night enclosure doesn’t affect T.’s ability to imagine her 
perspective since instead of looking at her eyes, he imagines her vision. 
Sight was less important to a rhinoceros than to him, he knew that, but 
she still had to see. He put his hand to his nose, blocking sight between 
his own two eyes, closing one and then the other. He had read that the 
vision of many animals was dichromatic; they saw everything in a 
scheme based on two primary colors, not three. Were they red, he 
thought, red and blue? He closed his own eyes, heard the rise and fall of 
his chest and nearby a rustle whose nature he could not discern. 
(145) 
Like Emil, T. has scientific knowledge of how a rhinoceros’ eye works. Unlike Emil, 
however, T. uses the knowledge to inform his imagining of this rhinoceros’ experience. He 
experiments with his own sight, physically manipulating it to try and understand what the 
rhino’s nonhuman vision might feel like. Throughout the encounter he acknowledges the total 
uniqueness of rhinoceroses as a species and also this particular animal, trapped alone in a zoo 
in the Bronx. “No other animal could have eyes like these, see the ground and the trees from 
this place with this dinosaur’s consciousness” (146). Ultimately T. fails to completely commit 
his imagination to the rhino’s perspective. Closing his eyes to focus on the sounds in her 
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enclosure he can’t concentrate for long. “Behind the eyelids it was thick and dark but 
impressions of light passed there, distracting. They passed like clouds he found himself idly 
drawn to interpret, to fix into the shape of rabbits or swans” (145). His mind drifts away in 
this manner until it is brought back by a familiar sound: a sigh. “After a while the rhinoceros 
sighed. It was a familiar sound despite the fact that they were strangers. He knew the need for 
the sigh, the feel of its passage…” (145). Although he fails to completely experience the 
rhino’s point of view, by simply trying T. realises how much they have in common as 
individual beings. By focusing his attention on the rhinoceros and the experiences they have 
in common (they both see, they are both standing in the same quiet room, they are both 
alone), T. both expands his view of her to include her individuality and subjecthood and at 
the same time contracts it, excluding the cultural and scientific presumptions of what a 
Sumatran rhinoceros is. In their essay “The Political Animal” Danta and Vardoulakis claim 
that “singularity only arises at the threshold of commonality” (6) and describe an important 
part of respecting animals as individuals: 
A key step here is to return the philosopher’s gaze to the nonhuman 
animal – and, in what amounts to the same thing, to welcome the 
animal’s gaze itself. Only through such a double gesture may human 
commonality be expanded to incorporate animality. This newfound 
being-with-the-animal requires nothing more or less from us than a 
slight readjustment of consciousness in the most precariously mundane 
moments. 
(5) 
Although T. does not share eye contact with the rhinoceros he regards her passively, allowing 
her to choose to also look at him. He does not think of himself as the only subject in the room, 
there to observe an object. Instead he and the rhinoceros are both sentient selves sharing a 
moment in time, separated only by T.’s freedom to leave as he chooses. Sitting (illegally) in a 
quiet, dark room at night watching a rhinoceros might seem quite unusual and exciting but for 
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T. it is the kind of experience he is becoming used to. Sometimes on his night sojourns in 
different zoo enclosures he even falls asleep, overcome by boredom; however he becomes 
better and better at readjusting his consciousness in these “precariously mundane moments.” 
 In The Great Divorce two of the main human female characters identify so closely 
with a nonhuman animal, a large female cat, that they physically become her – at least in 
their minds. A bond between women and cats has often been noted throughout Western 
history, the relationship at times perceived as demure domestic companionship like that of a 
lady and her pet (Rogers, 114-7), or as an unholy covenant with the devil like that between a 
witch and her familiar (Lawrence, 631-2). Women and cats have also been described as 
sharing many supposedly feminine traits both positive and derogatory, for example fertility, 
charm, beauty, female sexuality, gracefulness, vulnerability, lust, arrogance, spite, laziness, 
deceitfulness or cunning (See Lawrence; Rogers 114-141). In The Great Divorce the two 
human women are drawn to the female big cats both by the felines’ physical power which 
they admire and the cats’ embodiment of rage and resistance against captivity, which the 
human women share. White slave owner Elisabeth Schlaeger, finding herself trapped in an 
abusive marriage, seeks out the voodoo magic of the coloured community. In a nighttime 
ceremony a spirit, suggested in the shape of a black cat formed by melting wax, is transferred 
into her. The “petro” spirit is young, cruel and strong: “some said he was the spirit of rage 
against imprisonment” (Martin, 254). The next day Elisabeth is taken back home by her 
husband where he rapes her and locks her in her room. Looking out the window one night she 
sees a great black cat, a leopard, who “fixed its strange bright eyes suddenly on her face” 
(312). As she watches “[t]he golden eyes, like twin shafts of light, penetrated with uncanny 
accuracy the darkest corners of her pounding, incredulous heart”; Elisabeth is “mesmerized 
by the animal’s unblinking, determined regard” (312) “Giving up all resistance” before the 
leopard’s gaze Elisabeth closes her eyes and when she reopens them she sees the world 
77 
 
 
through the golden eyes of the cat. As the leopard Elisabeth experiences not only her night 
vision but other finely attuned feline senses: 
And the world was entirely different. The night was as bright as day; she 
could hear everything, even the smallest movement of a leaf, the 
flickering of a mouse’s whisker in the thicket nearby. She could smell 
something strong, something dead. The smell assailed her and tempted 
her; she was ravenously hungry. 
(312) 
 Attracted to the house by the smell of raw meat she senses a man approach and his inferior 
human senses are exposed: “[t]here was nothing but the man and her perfect apprehension of 
the man. He could feel it now himself, though he didn’t know it” (313-4).  With her head full 
of rage she leaps at the man “in a delirium of purpose” and kills him with her teeth and claws 
(314). Opening her eyes Elisabeth is her human self once more, covered with blood and 
crouched over her husband’s body.  
Elisabeth’s being with the leopard is very different from T.’s being with the rhinoceros. 
While the contemporary writer relating her story in the novel surmises that the leopard 
Elisabeth sees has probably escaped from a circus, the animal herself or where she came from 
is unimportant to Elisabeth. Although she fully transforms into a feline, engaging with her 
senses and desires, for Elisabeth the leopard functions as a symbol only, an embodiment of 
the rage she feels and physical power she desires. As a nonhuman animal the leopard’s 
identity is significant only because of the petro spirit inside her; she is merely a vessel, a way 
for the cruel spirit to exist in the world and carry out its retribution. In contrast to Elisabeth’s 
escape into the leopard, the young zookeeper Camille experiences an involuntary physical 
transformation into a nonhuman animal with whom she has a personal history.  
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Camille admires Magda, a leopard who is part of the zoo’s “Asian exhibit” where she 
works as a keeper. She often watches Magda, the way she moves, eats and watches those 
around her. Away from the zoo Camille experiences a sensation in stressful moments which 
to her feels like a physical transforming into a cat like Magda. She describes to her 
psychiatrist the way the feeling starts in her mouth, then her hands and fingers, then her eyes, 
her hearing alters and she hears Magda’s heart beating. Finally, “everything gets red. I see 
everything in shades of red” (Martin, 15). This often happens to her during sex when a rage 
like Elisabeth’s fills her and she feels a barely-controlled violence. While Elisabeth 
transforms into a leopard as a means of escape and victory over her husband, Camille’s 
transformation into Magda is involuntary and stems from her admiration for Magda and her 
perceived shared experiences with the cat. When Magda dies it is as if Camille loses the 
potent second half of herself and it is not long before she too is dead. Camille remembers 
watching Magda fight against the anaesthetic and her helplessness in the face of the 
impending darkness: “[d]on’t fight so hard, Camille had thought, watching her. Just give it up” 
(307). Camille experiences a similar loss of dignity at the end and feels it as “a kind of liberty” 
as the day after Magda’s death she sits naked on a stranger’s bed and shoots herself (308). 
Although Camille feels that Magda is beautiful, powerful and impressive, knowing her is not 
necessarily a positive part of Camille’s life. Camille’s being with Magda is tainted by the 
isolation, loneliness, rage and helplessness of Magda’s existence in the zoo which in turn 
affects Camille and, like Magda, ultimately destroys her. As these feelings start to influence 
her psychologically Camille is frightened of her own violence and inability to control her 
transformation into a nonhuman animal. In her nightmares she does not turn into a beautiful 
cat like Elisabeth, but instead she has twisted, stunted arms and legs and a monster’s face. In 
the nightmares she feels unendurable pain and she wakes screaming (24). Despite this while 
she is awake during the day she still yearns for the beauty and power she sees in Magda. It is 
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only when she sees the zoo vet, Ellen, working on the unconscious clouded leopard, Flo, that 
Camille feels warmth and admiration for another human. The feeling only lasts an instant, 
“[b]ut the lie of the hidden world had been exposed, and for a moment Camille knew she 
resembled the woman sewing more than the unconscious leopard under her hands. She had 
no wish to deny it; for the first time in her life she was not ashamed of her own kind.” (161) 
Although this glowing scene makes her proud to be a human, soon afterwards a seedy 
encounter with a man brings on a vision of feline transformation: “her hand was a black paw 
raking sharp claws into the flesh of his face” (182). The angry violence of her own 
transformation into a cat is directly influenced by the anger she so often feels emanating from 
Magda. Their common bond is their experience of alienation and helplessness in their own 
lives, which manifests itself in frightening and destructive ways in Camille’s transformations. 
 Similarly, in How The Dead Dream T. senses that, like Magda, the final animals he 
visits (three retired circus elephants) are filled with “a massive and brooding rage” due to 
their confinement and the conditions in which they are kept (Millet, 198). Although T. does 
not feel the sensation of physically transforming into an elephant he does experience what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “becoming animal”. As with the other animals he visits T. does not 
strive for eye contact with the elephants. He sits quietly in their concrete barn and watches 
them, imagining how they feel, how they experience the world, what makes them happy and 
sad, what they enjoy and what they dislike. He feels their warm breath, the touch of their 
trunks and he understands that they recognise him when he returns. Through his being with 
the elephants T. does not physically turn into an elephant but he does experience a 
psychological and emotional becoming-elephant. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, 
“[b]ecoming is certainly not imitating, or identifying with something; neither is it regressing-
progressing … Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its own; it does not reduce to, or 
lead back to, ‘appearing,’ ‘being,’ ‘equaling,’ or ‘producing’” (39). Greater than simply 
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“identifying with” the elephants T. wakes one morning and feels that he is becoming one of 
them. Aware of their suffering and hopelessness he is terrified of what is happening and 
struggles to resist it. 
One morning he woke to the elephants pacing and felt he was pacing 
with them. A panic took hold of him. He was sinking into the torpor of 
the elephants himself, their permanent impoundment, and he had to get 
out. Their deep rage that was as heavy as they were, massive in its 
resignation – this lay over him in a swell, a contagion of misery. He 
almost thought they had conveyed it to him, had entrusted him with the 
purpose of getting out.  
(Millet, 199) 
Although T.’s becoming lasts only a moment – he does not succumb to the elephants’ rage 
but reacts against it with a desperate fear – for a moment he does feels himself becoming 
elephant. Just as Deleuze and Guattari argue that “contagion” across species is the “only way 
Nature operates – against itself”, T. feels the weight of the elephants’ emotional and mental 
pain as a “contagion” transmitted to him through the time he spends with them (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 41). As Matthew Calarco explains of becoming-animal, T.’s becoming-elephant “is 
a matter of being transformed by an encounter with nonhuman perspectives. Becoming-
animal is thus better understood in terms of symbiosis, affect, alliance and contagion between 
beings that are usually identified as distinctly ‘human’ and ‘animal’” (42). Ultimately T. feels 
as though the elephants have made him a kind of emissary, bestowed on him the vital mission 
to escape from the zoo on their behalf. While Emil feels he must leave the giraffes’ zoo for 
the simple reason that as a human “[t]he zoo is not my place” (Ledgard, 148), in the moment 
of his waking T. feels the elephantine rage carrying him away from that zoo and from all zoos.  
While the zoo is ostensibly a place for humans to go to observe nonhuman animals 
according to much of the fiction and cultural critique about zoos, most zoo visitors 
81 
 
 
(consciously or not) are actually seeking something more. As discussed above a truly 
meaningful gaze is an interaction, a moment of potential give and take, an acknowledgement. 
Visitors to the zoo may go there for the purpose of seeing exotic animals but, as studies of 
zoo visitors show (for example Kreger & Mench; Woods, 355-6), in seeing each individual 
the visitor feels the urge for something more: contact with the animal, interaction, reaction, 
acknowledgement. In Giraffe a sailor describes this urge when he tells Emil about the time he 
saw a mermaid, “I opened my mouth to call out to the mermaid. I felt a great need for her to 
look at me, as we all have felt the need for the giraffes to turn and meet our gaze” (Ledgard, 
72). What the sailor and the other humans who encounter the giraffes feel in their presence is 
an overwhelming impulse, a need, for the giraffes to make eye contact. When Amina first 
sees the giraffes travelling on the back of the lorry she is drawn to them and they respond to 
her, “[t]he giraffes move towards me. They see me” (161). These few seconds have a 
profound effect on Amina and from that night on she continues to feel a connection to the 
giraffes. To Emil, this is a function giraffes serve for humans: “[t]his is a service the giraffe 
performs: it moves towards those who stand still before it and offers them a sense of 
otherness” (142). Whether it is seen as a service or a privilege, this nonhuman response is 
something most humans in the zoo novels desire, not merely to see but to be seen. Later in 
Ledgard’s novel the zookeeper explains to Amina the purpose of the zoo for the public of 
ČSSR, 
“The zoo is nothing more than a contrivance,” he says, “to make workers 
forgetful of the monotony of their lives. They arrive here from industrial 
towns. They move from cage to cage. What do they want? Not to 
contemplate, as you seem to do, but to make strange animals see them. 
You’ve seen how they put their hands through the bars, how they throw 
in food or litter, and how they wave their arms until the pygmy hippo 
takes the smallest step in their direction.”  
(191) 
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Caught up in the “Communist moment” the Czechoslovakian workers visit the zoo to regain 
something, to be “awakened” (165). They too feel the need for the animals in the zoo to see 
them and acknowledge their existence. Why do captive animals create this yearning in us? 
Why do we want so badly to be seen by them? Perhaps it has something to do with the place 
“wild” animals occupy in our culture which places them in pure Nature outside the taint of 
modern society. By placing them outside our society we exclude them from our own 
corruption and imperfections and preserve them in our culture as innocent, powerful, pure 
beings. This is may be why the acknowledgment of a captive animal means so much. In 
wanting animals to see them a person is seeking an acknowledgment not just of her self but 
of her self-worth. In this sense the gaze of an animal can truly be seen as a regard; an animal 
who withholds her regard of the human visitor truly seems to the human to disregard them.  
In Giraffe the author offers us a glimpse into a mirror when Emil describes the 
“urgency” of an orang-utan in an enclosure at the Prague zoo, which (sic) “beat with open 
palms on the Perspex window of its cage to attract the attention of every passer-by, as though 
from the inside of an airless cockpit” (63). In this disturbing story the orang-utan is panicked 
and we imagine the horror and despair of her imprisonment, her desperation all the more 
arresting for its human-like expression. However the Perspex window in the story also acts as 
a mirror, in the orang-utan’s actions we see a reflection of our own “urgency” as we try to 
attract the attention of the animals within the zoo enclosures. Alone outside nature, trapped 
on one side of a separation we constructed (but have forgotten how to overcome), we beat our 
palms on the Perspex window, shout at the zoo animals and try to attract their attention “as 
though from the inside of an airless cockpit.”  
Like the Prague zoo orang-utan, we too need the acknowledgement of other animals. 
As discussed above the gaze of an animal is one marker of her subjecthood and the freedom 
to choose whether to look or not to look, to bestow one’s regard or to withhold it represents a 
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power which nonhuman animals retain. Randy Malamud writes: “[a] king may look at a cat, 
but perhaps a cat disdains to look back at a king” (Reading, 229). This form of power (and 
the conquering of it) is also an element of the zoo visit. As Mullan and Marvin note, “[z]oos 
are ostensibly about going to view animals, an activity in which the people are not important 
except as passive viewers. But this is not how it works in practice; in the zoo the humans 
demand to be noticed by the animals” (134, emphasis in original). Therefore one of the 
functions of the zoo is to contain the nonhuman animals within so that human zoo visitors can 
force themselves into proximity with the animal, proximity which the animal would not allow 
in her natural habitat (that is, if she had a choice), and attempt to (mis)appropriate the 
animal’s regard. Beardsworth and Bryman also use Mullan and Marvin’s work on power 
dimensions in the context of the menagerie when they argue that in the zoo as an institution, 
“the powerless are at all time subject to the gaze of the powerful” (Beardsworth and Bryman, 
88, emphasis in original). This gaze takes many forms such as the “scientific gaze”, 
“zoological gaze” and “recreational gaze”, while in each of these may be seen the power of 
the “male gaze” (89). Beardsworth and Bryman agree with Kay Anderson’s argument “that 
the gaze of the ‘rational male subject’ has established itself as the generic human gaze, 
objective and all-encompassing.” Like the gaze of the powerful human captor over the 
powerless captive nonhuman animal, “[t]his dominance is, in turn, seen as based upon the 
denial or exclusion of competing possibilities” (89). Malamud suggests a different view: 
“[t]heir [animals’] obliviousness to human exploits may heighten people’s sadistic 
compulsion to master them, to keep them in captivity. If animals in nature taunt people with 
their innocence and freedom, zoos represent people’s revenge” (Malamud, Reading, 14). If 
this is truly the case then the need the zoo visitor feels for the captive animals to meet her 
gaze could be the result of that “sadistic compulsion”, a triumph over the “obliviousness” of 
animals in forcing them to acknowledge us, our exploits and our power over them. While this 
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may definitely be the case for some zoo visitors, perhaps for others the need for the regard of 
an animal is more a supplication, an entreaty for forgiveness for the “sadistic compulsion to 
master them” to which the zoo itself and the very nature of their interaction attests.  
An example of the former, more sadistic type of zoo visitor is found in How The Dead 
Dream, when T. witnesses a family throwing garbage at a black bear asleep in a zoo exhibit 
to try and provoke him into looking up towards the camera for a photograph. The litter “hit 
the bear a glancing blow on the ear and he stirred, disoriented, turned around once and then 
settled down again” (132). Fiddling with his camera the man tells his wife and children that 
he missed the shot and they should try again, next time throwing a foam cup of drink at the 
bear. The idea of trying to experience a kind of genuine observation or interaction with the 
bear has not occurred to the family visiting the zoo, although in their own way they seek the 
gaze of the animal. In this incident the camera serves as a useful symbol for the changes that 
have occurred in our encounters with nonhuman animals since the industrial revolution. The 
camera serves as a mechanical eye, technology designed and brought to bear on nature as a 
way of improving it. The eye of the photographer values image quality, the aesthetic and 
superficial appearance of a scene as well as composition, literally framing the nonhuman 
animal as an object to be observed. Although wildlife photography can be beautiful and 
powerful the camera nevertheless acts as a mediator between human and nonhuman, altering 
the value and purpose of the interaction. We are reminded of this in Giraffe when Amina 
describes watching zoo visitors with their cameras. “I have seen visitors who do not look at 
the creatures in the zoo except through the lens of their camera and curse when they run out 
of film, as though they have been made blind” (Ledgard, 191). For the visitors the camera is a 
way of capturing a piece of the beauty or otherness of the animals to keep for themselves, 
however they are so focused on this goal that they ignore the very animals they wish to know. 
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In this sense the act of photography is an extension of the philosophy of acquisition and 
captivity of animals by and for the dominant human gaze. 
Although zoo visitors seek acknowledgment from nonhuman animals, such an intimate 
encounter is all but impossible in the zoo setting. As John Berger famously explains 
The zoo cannot but disappoint. The public purpose of zoos is to offer 
visitors the opportunity of looking at animals. Yet nowhere in a zoo can 
a stranger encounter the look of an animal. At the most, the animal's 
gaze flickers and passes on. They look sideways. They look blindly 
beyond. They scan mechanically. They have been immunised to 
encounter, because nothing can any more occupy a central place in their 
attention. 
  
Therein lies the ultimate consequence of their marginalisation. That look 
between animal and man, which may have played a crucial role in the 
development of human society, and with which, in any case, all men had 
always lived until less than a century ago, has been extinguished. 
Looking at each animal, the unaccompanied zoo visitor is alone. As for 
the crowds, they belong to a species which has at last been isolated.  
 
This historic loss, to which zoos are a monument, is now irredeemable 
for the culture of capitalism. 
(28) 
If it is true that we all seek the gaze and acknowledgment of nonhuman animals but that 
“nowhere in a zoo can a stranger encounter the look of an animal”, how then do the zoo 
novels examined here create convincing interactions between human and captive nonhuman 
characters? The answer is that none of the main human characters in the novels have a 
realistic zoo-going experience. Not one is a mere zoo visitor. Each human character in the 
zoo novels occupies a privileged position in relation to the animals held captive in the zoo. 
For characters like Sam, Neva and Truman in Hannah’s Dream, Ellen and Camille in The 
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Great Divorce, Emil and the giraffe keeper in Giraffe and Henry in Zoology, it is their 
employment by the zoo which permits them to have close encounters with the zoo animals. 
Young Reginald is perhaps the only genuine zoo visitor, taken to the zoo by his aunt; even 
Amina visits the zoo only after a freak middle-of-the-night encounter and connection with the 
giraffes outside the zoo. For both these zoo visitors an early encounter allows them to interact 
personally with a nonhuman animal (Hannah and Sněhurka ) and then through forming 
friendships with a zoo employee gain continued access to those animals. Every main human 
character in the novels is able to develop a relationship with or at least have interactions with 
captive animals either repeatedly or over an extended period of time. The reason that none of 
the human characters in the novels are typical zoo visitors is simple: it is impossible for a 
casual zoo visitor to have a meaningful interaction with a captive animal. If “nowhere in a 
zoo can a stranger encounter the look of an animal” then that all zoo visitors are doing is 
looking at animals. That would not make for a very thrilling or emotional novel. Something 
extraordinary must occur for the zoo visitors to be able to experience that connection with 
animals which ordinarily is impossible in a zoo. 
Once these characters gain access to the captive nonhuman animals, circumventing the 
inevitable “disappointment” of the typical zoo experience, they nevertheless are always 
disturbed or discontented by what they find within the zoo enclosures. When T. searches for 
the desert pupfish he first visits their natural pool, then seeks out the facility built for their 
protection. “But there was another place: the scientists had moved some of the fish to a 
refuge, not open to the public” (160). Like most others in his society, T. trusts “the scientists” 
to manage the natural world using their superior knowledge and skills. As Helen Tiffin notes, 
Science is “the dominant paradigm of our time” (139); it is valued and venerated in both 
academia, where funding is often withdrawn from the humanities and directed to the “hard 
sciences” (Hurn, 151) and public discourse, where Science is usually presented “as a marker 
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of ‘progress’” (151). In his book What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity Philip 
Armstrong explains the distinction drawn by French theorist Bruno Latour between “the 
sciences” and “Science”: 
The former term, he suggests, refers to the multiplicity of theories and 
activities actually formulated and practised by scientists, which 
comprises a constantly changing, non-unified and non-totalising network 
of propositions pertaining to “the plurality of external realities”. The 
latter term, capitalized and singular, represents a reified and unified 
“myth” that conceals how partial, provisional and contested the sciences 
actually are: “Science” therefore gains social authority by claiming 
unique access to a unified Nature.  
(182) 
One example of Science’s “social authority” at work is the case of Japanese scientific 
whaling. In 1986 the International Whaling Commission (IWC), of which Japan is a member, 
banned commercial whaling (that is, killing whales to sell their meat) due to concerns about 
the depletion of whale populations. However in the same year as it announced the cessation 
of commercial whaling the Japanese government commissioned the Japanese Institute of 
Cetacean Research (also responsible for marketing whale meat and pro-whaling education) to 
begin lethal scientific research (allowed under Article 8 of the IWC’s “International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling” [IWC, 2]); the resulting dead whales are 
processed and sold as meat on the Japanese market (Morikawa, 38-9; 47). Despite opposition 
from other members of the IWC and environmental groups (Zifcak, 1; “Scientific Whaling”), 
and despite non-lethal research methods being used elsewhere (Australia, “Non-Lethal,” 1), 
the size of the scientific whalers’ annual catch continues to grow (Morikawa, 45). While the 
actual scientific value of the whaler’s research is disputed (Gillespie, 133), the authority of 
Science in modern social politics ensures the whalers can continue their practices. As I will 
show in the following chapter, at the same time that Japanese whalers began using Science to 
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justify their killing of whales for meat Western zoos were in the middle of their own process 
of rebranding to emphasise their (self-conferred) scientific value. 
In the zoo novels Science’s claim of a “unique access to a unified Nature” is evident in 
the structure and politics of the zoos, even as this claim is proven hollow. When T. locates the 
pupfish’s scientific “refuge”, he is stunned by the reality: “It was a concrete tank” (Millet, 
160). Knowing it was built by “scientists” and the exclusivity of it being “not open to the 
public” led T. to believe that a great amount of care, effort and finance was going into the 
protection of the pupfish. In his mind was perhaps a glistening state-of-the-art facility with 
tight security, a dedicated team of scientists and various equipment and technologies to 
ensure the safety of the pupfish. The reality is a concrete tank surrounded by a fence in the 
middle of the desert. Similarly, in Ledgard’s novel the giraffes are brought to the zoo amid 
hopes of developing, through scientific breeding techniques, a new “camelopardalis 
bohemica” giraffe subspecies. However when a disease is supposedly detected in a secret test 
the Communist regime exerts its power on the zoo: it is quarantined, disinfected and every 
trace of the giraffes is destroyed. But the futility of even the Communist authority’s 
containment efforts is exposed when in the final stage of the process one of the butchers 
saves a piece of hide from one of the allegedly infected giraffes as a souvenir. 
In The Great Divorce zoo vet Ellen is trained in veterinary science; at home in the 
world of “machines”, “tubes” and “gleaming metal” she confidently brings scalpels and 
chemicals to bear on the zoo’s nonhuman animals, seeing their body as an “elegant 
mechanism” (Martin, 157, 29). Zoo keeper Camille is in awe of Ellen, who to her seems to 
live “on a higher plane” (160).  As Armstrong notes, “Latour suggests a quasi-religious 
authority is arrogated by the Scientist, who assumes the prerogative to commune with the 
objective world of nature and to return to the subjective world of society ‘like a latter-day 
Moses,’ bringing back ‘the legislation of scientific laws, which are not open to question’” 
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(Armstrong, What Animals Mean, 182, citing Latour, 9-11, 249). Although she is trained to 
look after the animals in the zoo’s Asian Exhibit, Camille sees Ellen’s position as completely 
separate from her own, elevated far above through her association with the world of Science. 
To Camille, “Ellen seemed to come down to her from another world, the world of science, of 
the hospital, which Camille had seen only from the outside...” (150). Like the other keepers, 
who are anxious when Ellen visits their animals’ enclosures “lest she find something amiss in 
their supervision”, Camille is partly afraid of her and watches shyly from outside the hospital 
room as the vet begins work on the unconscious leopard, Flo (160, 157-8). Within the clinical 
site of the hospital Ellen has absolute power and may control the access of both human and 
nonhuman animals throughout the areas of the zoo.  
Although Camille sees Ellen in the glorified role of Latour’s Scientist for much of the 
novel, the reader is privy to Ellen’s reservations about the abilities of Science and the status 
of the zoo as a supposed ark. Despite the authority wielded by Science, even within the 
clinical space of the zoo hospital the limitations of human control are obvious, for example 
when Flo briefly lifts her head during an operation using a new anaesthesia drug.    
All three humans watched the cat’s mouth drop open. Her mouth 
twitched again. 
“I thought this Tiletamine was seizure-free,” the technician said. 
“I guess Flo didn’t read the insert,” Ellen replied.  
(Martin, 159) 
It is the most clinical of scenes: after drugging her Ellen cuts into Flo’s body to insert a 
plastic implant which will remove the leopard’s ability to have cubs. Yet at the centre of this 
tableau in which the nonhuman animal is objectified and apparently rendered powerless Flo’s 
unconscious action forces the admission that she has agency which is not entirely oppressed 
by the application of human science.  
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While Camille continues to admire Ellen and respect her status at the zoo, in How The 
Dead Dream T. becomes disillusioned with Western capitalist societies’ ideals of empirical 
knowledge and authority. Growing up T. loved authority, those (men) who possessed it and 
the institutions they created. “Great institutions and the tall columns and white soaring domes 
that stood for them—these seemed to him the crowning achievement of his kind. Authority 
inspired him...” (Millet, 2). As his understanding of modern society’s relationship with (or 
exploiting of) nonhuman nature grows, it erodes T.’s respect for human knowledge and 
achievement. This disillusionment finally finds expression in his reaction to the politics of 
zoos and the power of such institutions to control people’s relationships with nonhuman 
animals. “And how arbitrary it was that certain authorities ruled over zoo animals, decided 
which persons could draw near to them—authorities vested by neither the state nor any other 
body, handed permits with a near-infinite laxness by the Department of Agriculture” (151). 
The authority of the zoo is shown to be hollow, a meaningless construction. T. realises that 
the reason he can no longer love institutions is his loss of respect for the “wisdom of men”. 
“As a child he had thought man advanced ... That was what had changed, he thought. To love 
posterity and the great institutions you had to believe in the wisdom of men. You had to love 
them as a child might, gazing upward (117). The arbitrary authority of “the great institutions” 
exists not because of any inherent or earned quality but simply because society is willing to 
venerate them. Like Laycock’s proposition that an informational answer is determined by the 
question which expects it, so T. believes that to love society’s authorities and institutions a 
person must first adopt the role of small, wondering child in relation to them.  
At home in his apartment T. researches many species of nonhuman animals and their 
habitats around the world but in the Central American jungle, cut off from the authority of 
Science, T. realises he is “barely equipped”; without the “data”, “foresight” and “research” of 
other people he would not even recognise a “last animal” (Millet, 218). When he sees a small 
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furry animal on a tree branch “[h]e had no idea what it was. And this pleased him: maybe 
there was hope yet” (231). After learning of all that Western society and modern Science 
have wrought on the natural world and understanding the powerlessness (and unwillingness) 
of humans to avert ecological disaster despite their vast knowledge, T. ultimately finds hope 
in the realisation that there are still spaces and beings outside the control of humans. “How 
was it that his own ignorance was a comfort? But it was” (231). In Coetzee’s The Lives of 
Animals Elizabeth Costello challenges the idea that nonhuman animals, lacking the 
supposedly human quality logos, are therefore inferior Cartesian machines. Helen Tiffin 
quotes Costello’s argument that experiencing the fullness of living is more valuable than 
mere “ghostly reasoning.” Costello says “[t]o thinking, cognition, I oppose fullness, 
embodiedness, the sensation of being ... of being a body with limbs that have extension in 
space, of being alive to the world” (quoted in Tiffin, 149). Alone in the jungle, it is this 
experience that T. embraces. Thinking back on his life he rejects the human-built cities, 
monuments and lights and instead re-examines the spaces between them and the “spectacular 
bestiaries” which dwell in the darkness there (Millet, 235). For years he has idolised human 
knowledge, authority and power; he has himself excelled in the economics of greed. Finding 
himself alone in the jungle, however, T. thinks about the “miracles” that are “the beasts” and 
discards the masculine knowledge of Science and authority for the simplicity of a mother’s 
love. “He was fortunate. He had ended up here, in the middle of what was real—not what 
came easiest but what turned out to be closest to the center ... This was the knowledge that 
mattered, he thought: simple, simple, simple” (237). 
While eyes are most humans’ primary way of experiencing the world our self-
consciousness and subsequent constant struggle to comprehend the world, represented in 
modern Western society by the authority of Science, mean that our gaze is always directed 
inward, as Rilke puts it, “set around [the creature-world] / like snares, all around its path to 
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freedom.” In the zoo this form of entrapment is quite literal, as a site of human observation of 
nonhuman animals the zoo is empowered to contain wild animals for the purpose of 
subjecting them to the rational male “scientific”, “zoological” and “recreational” human gaze. 
Several of the zoo novels expose the limitations of Science in allowing us to fully know or 
understand nonhuman animals and in Lydia Millet’s novel T. finally journeys past the “snares” 
of empirical human understanding to the “simple” knowledge of an individual embodied 
being. The following chapter will continue this discussion of the zoo gaze, in particular how 
the altered power dynamic of the zoo’s Scientific site changes the function of the gaze 
between humans and captive animals and how this change can represent an alteration of how 
the identity of the animal is constructed by zoo visitors. 
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Chapter Three 
“A Different Kind Entirely”: Actors and Illusions in the Modern Zoo 
 
 
The Panther 
  In the Jardin des Plantes, Paris 
His vision, from the constantly passing bars, 
has grown so weary that it cannot hold 
anything else. It seems to him there are 
a thousand bars; and behind the bars, no world. 
As he paces in cramped circles, over and over, 
the movement of his powerful soft strides 
is like a ritual dance around a center 
in which a mighty will stands paralyzed. 
Only at times, the curtain of the pupils 
lifts, quietly—. An image enters in, 
rushes down through the tensed, arrested muscles, 
plunges into the heart and is gone. 
(Rilke, trans. Stephen Mitchell, 25) 
 
Both zoo stories and zoo culture suggest that spectators 
tend to display few of the nobler instincts of inquiry or 
epistemological and experiential appetite as they pass 
from cage to cage. 
(Malamud, Reading, 226) 
 
Loud self-congratulation by zoos about the contributions 
they are making to conservation booms noisily, but it is 
amplified within a relatively empty barrel.  
   (Hancocks, A Different, 150) 
 
The concept of the zoo is one that has become established in the modern psyche as an 
acceptable and even desirable one and often, as Mullan and Marvin argue, “people regard the 
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zoo as an easily understood and essentially unproblematic institution, and the zoo visit as an 
unproblematic event” (xxi) The zoo novels examined here give accounts of the conflicted and 
paradoxical nature of zoos enabling the reader, like Randy Malamud in his book Reading 
Zoos, to “problematize zoos” and the zoo-going experience (5). Each novel presents a view of 
a zoo that “cannot but disappoint” the reader’s expectations, even as most zoo visitors in the 
text remain blissfully oblivious. This not only gives the reader an insight into the lives of the 
captive animals and their keepers, but also allows the reader to observe the human zoo 
visitors and their practices as “problematized” events. As I pointed out in my previous 
chapter, none of the main characters in these novels is a simple zoo visitor; instead each 
enjoys privileged access to the zoo and its inmates. While average zoo visitors in the novels 
seem to see the zoo as unproblematic, this chapter will explore how the characters who are 
allowed closer to the animals and the institutional system of the zoo itself often find the 
reality discomfiting and some, like T. in How The Dead Dream, are even made to consider 
“the complexity of the cultural processes involved in the selection, gathering and presentation 
of wild animals for display” (Mullan & Marvin, xxi). In each case, as a character is 
confronted by the realities of keeping nonhuman animals captive in zoos, the reader too is 
encouraged to consider the “cultural processes” at work. 
 One aspect of the zoo that a number of these novels’ characters find problematic is the 
physical reality of the animals themselves. While most of the human characters in these texts 
seem able to appreciate the physical beauty of the captive nonhuman animals (with the 
exception of especially crass visitors like the camera-wielding, litter-throwing family 
encountered by T.), many cannot help but find the animals to be less, somehow, than they 
expected. This is because the animals they encounter are not animals “as they were meant to 
be”, but animals who have been changed by their captivity. In Giraffe, Emil describes how 
this change will affect Sněhurka once she is captive in the zoo: “Sněhurka will become a zoo 
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animal. Her eyesight will falter. Distances will mean less to her. She will look across less 
often. Her view will instead be drawn down, to Czechoslovakians stopped and staring up at 
her” (Ledgard, 148). Emil understands that captivity will affect Sněhurka physically and also 
affect her behaviour. The reader is invited to infer, accordingly, that her thinking or feeling 
may also be affected. Emil draws a distinction between an animal and a “zoo animal”. The 
former is natural, as she was born, “genuine”; the latter, although a genuine member of her 
species, is altered by the restrictions of captivity. As a haemodynamicist Emil has worked on 
giraffe carcasses and one living, captive giraffe; these do not prepare him his first experience 
of wild giraffes.   
I see the giraffes and am dumbfounded. I stop. I stare up. I have worked 
with one living giraffe, but an old giraffe, a zoo animal, weary, blind, 
hunched somehow under those electric lights. I have seen nothing like 
this. There are so many of them, and wild, not of a zoo, and impossibly 
stretched. There is no such animal! 
(62) 
After visiting many nonhuman animals held in various zoos and facilities T., too, recognises 
this altered kind of animal in How The Dead Dream. He is drawn to “last animals”, animals 
who are among the final living members of their species, and he imagines them as relics of 
disappearing ways of life. Yet T. also recognises that the last of their species may actually 
already be gone, since the remaining animals in captivity are altered from others of their 
species. “But even when the animals were relics they were less the last of their kind than a 
different kind entirely – a hybrid kind, he thought. A zoo kind” (Millet, 198). In The Great 
Divorce, zoo vet Ellen believes some captive animals, such as outcast primates, exist in a 
kind of semantic vacuum. “Neither wild nor domestic, they existed in a netherworld of 
human scrutiny and intervention” (Martin, 4). For her these outcasts and loners are the true 
“zoo animals”.  
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Like Rilke’s panther, the zoo animals in the novels are changed by their struggle to live 
in captivity without the purpose of their natural lives. For the panther in Rilke’s poem, this 
struggle has consumed him to the extent that he no longer sees anything but his captivity. In 
Giraffe, Emil imagines that it will be similar for the captured giraffes as they are forced to 
become zoo animals.  
A lion roars. Sněhurka and the other giraffes start forward and wish to 
take flight from the wet floor of the lorry. Hus laughs. Perhaps he is right, 
perhaps the giraffes will come to understand that the lion is caged also 
and can never move on them, but is instead fated to plough, with ruined 
claws, its own furrow of despair on concrete. Only occasionally, when 
the light strikes their enclosure in a certain way, … will the pupils of the 
giraffes dilate in some contrary fashion, betraying in a clinically 
observable way, even to a haemodynamicist, a memory of something 
more than the walls which contain them. 
(148-9) 
While to anyone who has known a nonhuman animal, or who has any imagination, it might 
be obvious that the transition from animal to zoo animal could be nothing else but altering, 
Emil’s description of Sněhurka’s memory places the emphasis on the biological 
manifestation of the memory, the fact that there is clinical, scientific, objective evidence of its 
occurring. This is in stark contrast to the description of the whispered memories shared later 
between Sněhurka and the bull in the darkness of their barn, which are vivid and emotional. 
Within the context of the story this exemplifies the opposition between what a nonhuman 
animal may feel, expressed here by Sněhurka herself as narrator, and what science will allow 
that a nonhuman animal feels, that is, what is biologically observable. Like Rilke’s panther in 
whose eyes “the curtain of the pupils lifts, quietly”, the dilation of the giraffes’ pupils 
indicates their otherwise hidden emotional reaction to their captivity, or rather, to their 
memories of freedom.  
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This concept of the “zoo animal” seems to reflect Berger’s description of the 
marginalised animals of modern capitalist culture, epitomised in the animals kept within zoos. 
“However you look at animals, even if the animal is up against the bars, less than a foot from 
you, looking outwards in the public direction, you are looking at something that has been 
rendered absolutely marginal; and all the concentration you can muster will never be enough 
to centralise it” (Berger, 22, italics in original). For Berger zoo animals are the most visible 
reminder of the animality that has been lost through the commoditisation of nature under 
capitalism. Zoo animals are only shades or remnants of their species, and more importantly 
for Berger, of the human-animal relationship in general.  
Randy Malamud agrees with the concept of a “zoo animal” as a hybrid alteration of a 
natural animal. At the beginning of his book Reading Zoos he states “[t]he spectator does not 
see a zebra in a zoo – a zebra is something that exists on an African plain, not in an urban 
North American animal collection” (2). Vicki Croke, too, writes that “[c]ut off from its place 
in the world, an animal appears as only a shadow of its true self” (14). In Ledgard’s novel the 
hunter Jiří also recognises this. From the edge of the forest above the town he looks down 
through his binoculars at the zoo and sees an okapi. “It stands on concrete. It is not right to 
see it so revealed. It has no understanding of Czechoslovakian daylight. It belongs to the 
Upper Congo and is meant to move there through boles, creepers, vines and large leaves, 
shedding rivulets of water” (209). Jiří feels that the okapi is meant for the jungles of the 
Congo; her purpose is rooted there. In the Czechoslovakian zoo her meaning has been taken 
from her. Jiří understands that it is the mode of seeing the okapi that “is not right”; he does 
not see any visible change in the okapi herself but recognises that it is her position on the 
open concrete of the zoo which alters her meaning, both for himself as an observer and for 
the okapi who is now an object of human observation. Seeing her, a zoo okapi, is not the 
same as seeing an okapi in the African jungle. The shift in context has changed not only how 
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easy it is for humans to physically observe her but also the way they think about her, no 
longer seeing her as an unknown other but now as a “revealed”, dominated and contained 
animal. The human observer becomes the spectator.  
For Malamud too the transformation of a zebra into a zoo animal is not any particular 
change in physical appearance or behaviour caused by her captivity but rather is a result of 
the subsequent cultural framing of her. Human spectators approach her in a new way, a way 
valorised by her containment in the zoo, her status as a “zoo animal”. Malamud explains:  
Passive spectatorship is not only not a good way to appreciate a zebra, it 
is a bad way. It teaches children and other zoo visitors exactly the wrong 
thing about a zebra: they do not see the creature as it is – an animal that 
lives its life in a certain way on a different continent – but rather as an 
amusement, a display, a spectacle in a menagerie.  
(Malamud, Reading, 2) 
In this sense the change a nonhuman animal goes through to become a zoo animal relates 
purely to how humans see her; the new teleological status of “zoo animal” has changed the 
meanings that human spectators ascribe to her and her captivity. This is an important point; as 
Steve Baker observes, “the dubious notion ... that the ‘zoo animal’ is in some sense not a real 
animal” is one that “is peddled rather too easily and too often” (Baker, “Animals,” 191). 
Malamud does not say “a zebra in a zoo is not a zebra”, but rather “the spectator does not see 
a zebra in a zoo” (emphasis added). The fundamental difference of zoo animals, then, is in 
the supplanting of an animal’s natural identity (for the human observer) with human-ascribed 
meaning. However it must also be conceded that nonhuman animals contained in the zoo and 
subjected to its anthropocentric processes, while still living, feeling animals, cannot remain 
unchanged. 
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In her book Zoos: A Philosophical Tour Keekok Lee distinguishes between the 
domestication and “immuration” of nonhuman animals, the latter being a collective term for 
the various limitations and alterations imposed on an animal during her transformation into a 
zoo animal, an animal “different in ontological status from ... animals-in-the-wild” (64-66). 
In the zoo novels the changes in nonhuman animals resulting from the process of immuration 
include physical and behavioural alterations. While the idea of emotional pain can be 
dismissed by some as anthropomorphism – the sentimental projection of human feelings onto 
nonhuman animals – unnatural physical and behavioural alterations caused by captivity are 
“clincally observable”, and therefore are harder to ignore. Both T. in How The Dead Dream 
and those who work with Hannah in Hannah’s Dream notice the stereotypic behaviour of the 
captive elephants. In a chapter entitled “Emotional Numbness and Deprivation” in his book 
on animal suffering, Neville G. Gregory explains that stereotypies and OCDs (obsessive 
compulsive disorders) are “persistent, recurrent and sometimes unwanted thoughts and 
actions” which “can be linked to types of automatism or repetitive comfort behaviours” (37). 
For Hannah, her tyre is a comforting object which she compulsively touches and carries with 
her trunk and keeps near her for security. When she is stressed or anxious, for example when 
her elephant companion died, her tyre is taken away or when she is locked up in the barn 
each night, she begins to rock herself. As T. experiences, the group of elephants in the zoo he 
visits also rumble and pace frenetically back and forth in the darkness of their night barn. 
Gregory also describes other kinds of stereotypies: 
Stereotypies are common in confined zoo animals and include fence-
pacing, pathway-pacing, head-weaving and body-rocking … Sometimes 
zoo animals take to compulsive licking, gnawing or scratching, and these 
can develop into self-mutilation. Causes of these behaviours include 
insufficient exercise, unsatisfied drive to hunt prey and sexual frustration. 
(39) 
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Hannah’s rocking becomes self-mutilation because of the shackle fastened around her ankle 
each night chaining her to the wall of the barn. Her rocking causes it to cut deep into her leg, 
creating a wound which, due to the frequency of her distress and subsequent stereotypic 
rocking, never fully heals. Far from being caused by mere boredom Hannah’s agitation and 
distress are clearly caused by her loneliness and lack of control of her own life, and what Sam 
describes as a fear of the dark and of being confined inside the small barn. Gregory explains 
that stereotypies “can develop from a frustration behaviour, but they can also arise from 
depression or conflict caused by an inappropriate environment or management” (37). Former 
zoo enricher Simmons explains that “[a]pes in captivity get as moody as any intelligent being 
would.” (Copstick) He notes that captive apes “develop the same behaviour patterns as some 
human prisoners” and compares chimp behaviour with the events of the Northern Ireland 
“Dirty Protests” in which prisoners, in protest at their treatment, refused to leave their cells 
and resorted to smearing their faeces on the walls (which caused a visiting Catholic Cardinal 
to remark that “one would hardly allow an animal to remain in such conditions…”) (Coogan, 
170).  
In the zoo novels the primary reasons for the zoo animals’ stereotypies seem to be 
frustration and waiting. T. notices this in How The Dead Dream, “[i]t was obvious: all of 
them waited and they waited, up until their last day and their last night of sleep. They never 
gave up waiting, because they had nothing else to do” (200). As their captivity stretches out, 
the animals’ waiting takes many forms.  
Waiting for a feeding the animals paced or swam or leapt from branch to 
branch, as their natures dictated, with a bat now and then at a so-called 
enrichment tool or a peck at an errant insect. Their lives were simple 
monotony. They slept to use up time; this was how their days were spent, 
the last sons and daughters. 
(165) 
101 
 
 
While at first “in his smallness” T. assumes that the animals are waiting for food, he finally 
concludes “[t]hey waited to go back to the bright land; they waited to go home” (200).  
The fact that animals suffer depression and associated disorders such as stereotypies 
due to captivity is never acknowledged by any of the zoos in the zoo novels, but is a 
realisation made by human individuals concerned by the welfare of the nonhuman animals 
involved. In the novels these stereotypies largely take place in the zoo animals’ night 
compounds, away from the eyes of general zoo visitors. This means that in the text the plight 
of each animal is also put into an intimate context, allowing the reader to understand and 
consider the physical, emotional and psychological implications of the situation. Although 
some of the novels’ zoo animals do display stereotypic behaviour while in their exhibit these 
are not necessarily recognised as such by the casual zoo visitor. For example in a zoo located 
in “a desert valley” T. sees “a sleek bobcat pacing restlessly” (Martin, 131). While the 
bobcat’s pacing may be a captivity-induced stereotypic behaviour, zoo visitors see only the 
fierce animal that they expect. Despite being a stereotype created by captivity, this image of 
the ferocious pacing cat is one that has become so common in Western culture that it now 
accepted by many as natural behaviour. In this way the zoo reinforces an incorrect stereotype 
of an animal, a stereotype which it created in the first place. 
In Giraffe, after being taken to the Czechoslovakian zoo Sněhurka and the other 
giraffes also develop stereotypies during their transformation into zoo animals. Wild giraffe 
spend most of the day foraging and feeding, using their long tongues to carefully browse for 
leaves while avoiding obstacles such as thorns and fire ants (Bashaw et al, 237). In their study 
of stereotypies in captive giraffe and okapi, Bashaw et al. suggest that the absence of this 
element of difficulty in feeding in captivity, where high quality food is easily accessible to 
the giraffe, is related to the increased occurrence of oral stereotypies, such as the licking of 
non-food items like the painted branches on the walls which the giraffes in Ledgard’s novel 
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sometimes do (Bashaw et al, 237, Ledgard, 189). While in Giraffe zoo director Hus also 
expounds the diet of “[a]lfalfa, formulated pellets, fruit, plenty of beets, switches of elm and 
alder” which would double the natural life-expectancy of the giraffes in the Czechoslovakian 
zoo, the study by Bashaw et al. noted that “a high-quality feed (e.g. alfalfa) was associated 
with greater oral stereotypy” (237, italics in original). While Hus is focused on the removal of 
complexities from the giraffes’ lives he does not consider the lack of purpose that results. He 
views the giraffes as biological machines that can be tuned and adjusted to ensure optimal 
running time. Finally, the study of giraffe stereotypies also found a relationship between 
smaller indoor enclosures and increased pacing (Bashaw et al., 242), one explanation for 
which Sněhurka offers in Giraffe: “We are sleepwalking beasts. Our eyelids flutter but 
remain open. Our teeth grind in fits of bruxism. We walk with unfocused eyes through the 
barn. We bump into each other, not waking but galloping inward across ash-coloured 
grassland, stretching ourselves up to the highest branches” (Ledgard, 173).  
Although these physical and behavioural changes are made obvious to the readers of 
these novels, the zoo managers who are portrayed in them seem oblivious to the changes 
wrought as captivity alters their charges into zoo animals. Business people by definition, they 
seem preoccupied with politics, especially in the case of the fanatical comrade Hus in 
Ledgard’s novel, or economics, like steely businesswoman Harriet in Hannah’s Dream. 
Cheered by the prospect of using Hannah’s image to revitalise the zoo’s finances, Harriet 
tells Neva “[a]nything to keep our star happy!” But when Neva responds “[h]ow about 
another elephant?” Harriet “pretended Neva had said something funny and walked on” 
(Hammond, 63). The concept of Hannah’s overwhelming loneliness still does not occur to 
her. However there comes a point when a zoo may recognise the negative impacts of 
captivity on zoo animals and choose to act. The term “enrichment” by definition concedes 
that the lives of zoo animals are impoverished, dull and unfulfilling and they are in need of 
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artificial stimulus. In a newspaper story about a zookeeper turned comedian, former “animal 
enricher” Sam Simmons described his job, “I just hung out with them, created fun stuff for 
them to do so they wouldn’t get bored” (Copstick). In Hannah’s Dream one of the first acts 
of the new young zookeeper Neva is to create a scavenger hunt for Hannah, hiding vegetables, 
peanut butter and pumpkins full of raisins and jellybeans around her yard. Neva says she 
loves doing it because “the animals light up just like it’s Christmas” (Hammond, 48). 
Afterwards Hannah dozes “peacefully in the sun, sated with treats and happiness and hay” 
(51). The scene with Hannah rushing around finding the treats and then being able to relax is 
a heart-warming one, especially when shown in the context of her isolated and monotonous 
life. However a more cynical view of zoo enrichments is shown in Zoology, where Henry is 
responsible for the enrichments of animals in the children’s zoo. One day Henry invites a 
woman he’s interested in to visit him at the zoo and he introduces her and her little brother to 
the goats before giving Newman an enrichment.  
I held the trash can out in front of Newman—I’d smeared the insides 
with peanut butter—and he plunged in his head. This, or giving him a 
plastic ball to bump around, or dangling a set of keys from the end of a 
bamboo pole, was what we called Enrichment. These things are 
enriching, I guess, the way a honking truck might be enriching for a 
driver falling asleep on the highway. 
(Dolnick, 86) 
Henry’s view is starkly different from that of Neva, who has worked in different zoos for a 
lot longer than Henry and is perhaps used to the otherwise eventless lives of the zoo animals, 
seeing enrichments as the one precious interruption to the tedium or depression of the animals’ 
existence. As a new employee not yet indoctrinated into the policies and practices of the zoo, 
Henry recognises the reality behind the zoo jargon. Although he has not been working there 
long, Henry too has considered the unending monotony of Newman’s life in the zoo.  
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Each morning when he first came out, his legs still stiff and his eyes 
even smaller than usual, I felt for a minute the weight of all the 
thousands of days he’d spent here. The day I moved into the dorm at 
American, falling asleep that first night on my new sheets with the new 
traffic sounds outside, Newman was in his pen. High school graduation, 
while I sat itching in my robe, not remembering which hand takes the 
diploma, he was in his pen. The Thanksgiving in tenth grade when 
Walter dropped the turkey taking it out of the oven. Every time you’re 
waiting in line at the pharmacy. Every time you wake up in the middle of 
the night and can’t decide whether to get out of bed to pee. How does he 
survive it? Is he miserable or just empty? Or is he happy—is he like a 
prisoner who discovers religion and turns gentle and stops noticing the 
bars? 
(80) 
Henry shows not only an awareness of the conditions of Newman’s existence in the zoo but 
also compares it with his own freedom, his choices with Newman’s powerlessness, the rich 
detail and varied experiences of his own life are contrasted with the empty monotony of 
Newman’s. Furthermore, he widens his discussion from a consideration of just his own life to 
that of people in general, “every time you’re waiting in line … every time you wake up” 
(emphasis added). He includes the reader in his moment of realisation and perhaps in his 
sense of guilt at the deprivation of Newman’s life in comparison with most humans’.  
Since Henry knows Newman as a friendly, charismatic being who feels emotions the 
full realisation of Newman’s captivity is somewhat astounding. This acknowledgement 
makes the statements of the head keeper of the children’s zoo, just pages later, even more 
ridiculous. After Newman has enjoyed licking the peanut butter from inside the garbage can 
the head keeper arrives and admonishes Henry in front of his friend for using the goats to 
impress her.  
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“Did you just give the goats an extra Enrichment?” Paul said. 
I felt like I’d pass out. “I just gave Newman a little peanut butter, 
because he didn’t really eat breakfast.” 
“We don’t ever want an animal getting two Enrichments, especially not 
Newman. Quit showing off.” He walked off like he’d slapped me with a 
glove.  
(87, emphasis in original)   
The seriousness of the head keeper’s reprimand is farcical; the idea that a nonhuman animal 
in the zoo could somehow become too enriched through the use of trash cans and peanut 
butter seems ridiculous. But of course there are political and social motivations at play here, 
too. Henry does enjoy giving Newman treats, but the trash can activity was indeed aimed at 
impressing the woman visiting him. The head keeper reproves Henry for breaking zoo 
protocol and for making a decision about the care of the animals which as a new and 
untrained keeper he was not in an official position to make. He may also be enjoying the 
opportunity to exercise his own power over Henry, as Henry has always seen him as a petty 
and controlling man who enjoys his authority at the zoo. The head keeper is also mindful, 
perhaps, of the financial cost of enrichments as is zoo director Harriet Saul in Hannah’s 
Dream. When Neva arranges an easel and canvas for a painting enrichment for Hannah, 
Harriet’s primary concern is the cost of the art supplies (Hammond, 108). But enrichments 
can also be used by zoos to provide financial benefits, as Neva explains to Sam: “It gives the 
elephants something fun to do, and the zoos can sell the paintings to raise money to improve 
the elephant yards” (95). 
One thing that almost all zoo enrichments have in common is that they are not the 
normal events or activities that would enrich a nonhuman animal’s life in her natural 
environment but artificial human constructions to try to stave off the effects of a monotonous, 
uneventful life wrought by captivity. At home in the jungles of Asia Hannah would not have 
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painted on canvases or used a mallet to play large drums (although she may have “doodled” 
with sticks or rocks [Croke, 67-8]). Only in a zoo would keys on the end of a pole be 
considered an enriching aspect of a goat’s life. While the creation of such arbitrary and 
artificial enrichments may seem to disregard a nonhuman animal’s natural lifestyle and 
enjoyments, the reality is that zoo animals already live in a totally artificial environment 
which dictates that any possible enrichments in their lives will be similarly artificial. Some 
human characters in the novels do however believe that these artificial enrichments can rouse 
the natural talent and interest of the animals in the zoo. When Neva asks the eccentric 
Johnson Johnson if Hannah could ruin his drums by playing them, he replies seriously: “Well, 
if she re-tunes them it’d probably be so she can play her own songs better. Maybe elephant 
music doesn’t sound like people music” (Hammond, 217). While elephants in the wild 
obviously do not play drums, Johnson believes Hannah may still have unique musical tastes 
and abilities which could be nurtured and so enrich her empty zoo life. 
Although by offering enrichments a zoo seems to concede that an animal’s life has 
somehow been impoverished by captivity, zoos’ response to this impoverishment shows an 
assumption about the depth of alteration or suffering that a captive nonhuman animal 
experiences. Assuming that a plastic ball or trash can of peanut butter can fix the problem 
simplifies and trivialises the animals’ experience. This presumption precludes the possibility 
that the suffering caused by captivity is anything more than simple boredom, an absence 
easily filled by adding another foreign object to the captive animal’s environment. This is a 
reductive attitude which frames the wellbeing of a captive animal like a mathematic equation 
or a mechanical problem to be fixed by the tweaking of external components. It does not 
consider the possible depths of feeling experienced by the animal that have been affected by 
her captivity. The existence of these feelings and emotions and the effect of captivity on them 
is shown in each of the zoo novels both through nonhuman animal narration and through 
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human characters whose interactions with captive animals causes them to wonder about the 
effects of the animals’ captivity. Just as Henry wonders about how Newman copes with his 
captivity other human characters in these texts also wonder about the loneliness, boredom and 
discomfort felt by nonhuman animals kept in zoos. As the zoo’s veterinarian in The Great 
Divorce, Ellen mostly believes she understands the zoo’s nonhuman animals, for example 
Sonya the white tiger who Ellen thinks has “a miserable, truly vicious disposition” due to 
“the strictness of her diet” (Martin, 111). For Ellen this suffering or discomfort is an 
inevitable aspect of all zoos and how they must operate. All zoos share the common ethos of 
nonhuman animal captivity and all its implications and while he admits that “all zoos are not 
exactly alike”, Randy Malamud argues that the differences between various zoos are merely 
“cosmetic” (Reading, 4) Cosmetically, the zoos represented in the zoo novels discussed here 
do vary. Some are modern, like the New Orleans zoo in The Great Divorce and the Central 
Park zoo in Zoology. In How The Dead Dream T. draws a distinction between zoos which are 
“accredited” (presumably by the Association of Zoos and Aquariums) and those that aren’t. 
“He had standards. He only broke into accredited zoos. In the others he knew he would see 
nothing but misery” (Millet, 151). Conversely, in Hannah’s Dream highly trained and 
experienced zookeeper Neva decides to become “an elephant-care ambassador, bringing what 
she knew to one of the country’s many mediocre, backwater, needy facilities” (Hammond, 
33). She takes the job at the small, unaccredited, not-for-profit zoo which has “clueless, 
arrogant misguided and blind” leadership (33). This leadership is something Hannah’s zoo 
has in common with the zoo in Giraffe, whose manager is obsessed with politics and 
patriotism. The giraffes are brought to the small, propaganda-filled zoo to fulfil the director’s 
delusion of a ČSSR giraffe subspecies.  
The conditions in these latter two zoos are often rudimentary, while those in the other 
zoos are generally more modern. In his essay on modern American zoo exhibits Ken Kawata 
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notes that, as in many aspects of society, each generation sees itself as achieving where others 
have failed in terms of providing acceptable conditions for the welfare of captive animals. 
“This view, self-absorbed, cheerfully neglectful and ignorant of history, represents 
generational chauvinism that takes a position that the current generation is superior to all the 
past generations” (“Romancing”, 242). We see this in Hannah’s Dream when the narrator 
notes that when the zoo was the private menagerie of Max Biedelman, “the accommodations 
weren’t luxurious, but for their time they were adequate” (Hammond, 7). This is an example 
of how human context dictates our view of what is acceptable in relation to the treatment of 
nonhuman animals. Malamud warns against this anthropocentric impulse. 
Zoos are better now than ever, many advocates would have us believe. 
We must mitigate this, however, with the standard caveat about temporal 
relativism: people always tend to think they are doing something better 
than it has ever been done before, and subsequent developments 
generally prove their self-congratulatory convictions hollow. 
(Reading, 46) 
Just as the “conical thatched huts” (Hammond, 7) of the menagerie came to be seen as 
inadequate, so too might the concrete night cages of modern zoos also come to be seen as 
unacceptable by future generations. Of course throughout these ages of changing human 
values, the needs of nonhuman animals have not changed.  
These human values have been changing ever since people began collecting nonhuman 
animals thousands of years ago. This process has accelerated since the nineteenth century saw 
the advent of “the golden age of science” and the proliferation of museums and zoos 
throughout Western societies (Lyles, 902). Heavily influenced by the imperialism of the era, 
the outside of zoos’ bare concrete cages were built with a grandness designed to convey 
power and authority and were often embellished with architecture inspired by the human 
cultures associated with the animal’s country of origin: “fantastical exhibits that replicated 
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castles, cottages, Greco-Roman and Far Eastern temples, alphine chalets, renaissance 
pavilions, whimsical ruins, and other follies” (Hancocks, “Zoo Animals”, 96). Lyles 
compares this form of animal display with an art collection: “These animal collections were 
viewed as analogous to collections of art, and even the zoo architecture of the period came to 
be considered art” (902). Like artworks displayed in a stark, featureless gallery the “naked 
cage” was an empty box in which the animal was the only feature. As Mullan and Marvin 
explain, “[t]he architecture was not specifically designed to accommodate the animals’ needs 
but rather was intended to create a mood in order to emphasize what was felt to be some 
cultural quality associated with the animal” (48). Despite the success of radical new zoo 
designs built by Carl Hagenbeck at the turn of the century in his Hamburg zoo, which used 
enclosures with artificial environmental elements and moats instead of bars to separate each 
exhibit, the advent of modern design with its emphasis on “boldness” and “simplicity” 
(Hancocks, “Zoo Animals”, 100) brought about a period of popular zoo design that became 
known by many as “the bathroom period” (Kawata, “Romancing”, 251). As Jeffrey Hyson 
describes, “[a]longside modernism, an increasing concern for more sanitary exhibits 
developed” (35) and as a result in this period the emphasis was on sterile, easy-to-clean cages 
such as small, glass-fronted, tiled rooms, and state-of-the-art self-cleaning features. 
Eventually during the twentieth century the Western animal welfare movement gained 
momentum and the public attitude towards nature and nonhuman animals changed. As 
Kawata notes, “[z]oos are no isolated island, hardly insulated from every mood and economic 
and political nuance of the society” (“Romancing”, 240). Zoo visitors no longer wanted to see 
lone animals in stark, artificial cages. Zoos responded, as ever, by striving to give the public 
what they wanted and elements of Hagenbeck’s designs began to appear. The bars and walls 
of the “naked cage” were disguised with “natural” details such as moats or “foliage”. Exhibits 
began to be arranged by geographic regions and allusions to animals’ natural habitats were 
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made with the addition of artificial scenery. In the zoo novels, token scenery like this is added 
to the giraffes’ cage in Giraffe in the branches painted on the walls and in How The Dead 
Dream T. visits a zoo in a desert valley where bighorn sheep stand “on artificial cliffs” 
(Martin, 131). Berger notes that “[t]hese added tokens serve two distinct purposes: for the 
spectator they are like theatre props: for the animal they constitute the bare minimum of an 
environment in which they can physically exist” (Berger, 25).  
In the second half of the twentieth century conservation also became a prominent issue 
in the West as the extinction of various species, human-made pollution and the destruction of 
natural habitats around the world was increasingly publicised. This shift in Western societies’ 
attitude to the natural world brought zoos to a vital juncture in their history. Traditionally 
sites of entertainment and leisure for the public, zoos’ premise of keeping animals captive for 
the amusement of humans, which had become unpalatable to much of the public in recent 
years, was starting to be seen as socially and morally unacceptable (Carr and Cohen, 176; 
Marino et al, 26; Beardsworth and Bryman, 93). A rebranding of zoos was necessary, an 
ongoing process which Beardsworth and Bryman call “a crucial structural and ideological 
transformation” (83). The role of zoos, their existence as an industry in our society, was 
under threat.  
From their inception animal collections and menageries have been a place of spectacle. 
Whether created as a status symbol for an individual or a nation or as a public venue for the 
masses the purpose of an animal collection is to amaze, amuse, divert, surprise, impress or 
titillate the human visitor; in short: to entertain them. In Zoology, for example, in the 
children’s zoo where Henry works the pens are arranged in a ring so that the animals 
“perform” for the crowds everyday by standing, scratching or allowing themselves to be fed. 
Henry finds the work of cleaning out the pens “stupid” and “embarrassing” but initially he 
feels he must play his part in the spectacle. “At first I’d make friendly, tired faces at the 
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families standing looking in, but eventually I realised they weren’t looking at the keepers any 
more than they were looking at the water bowls. We were stagehands in a play starring 
Dudley and Frankie and Kramer” (Dolnick, 58). This role of zoo animals is also noted by 
Beardsworth and Bryman in their commentary of modern zoos: “Increasingly they will be 
‘staged’ as attractions in quasified entertainment settings. In a very real sense, they will 
become ‘workers’ or ‘cast members’ in the playgrounds created by the leisure industry” (99). 
In the zoo it is the nonhuman animals who are the object of the spectacle: they are the 
performers and the stars. Without them there is no show. This means that the zoos’ inmates 
are valuable to the zoo not simply as fellow beings, but as actors performing the role of 
“exotic animal” or “endangered species”. As Amina observes the giraffes’ zookeeper she 
notes that “the giraffes are desperately important to him in the way actors are important to a 
stage manager, seen always from behind or at side angles” (Ledgard 227). 
Of course like any good show the zoo has other enticements with which to attract its 
audience. Concession stands, gift shop, café, restaurant, venue hire, performances, 
“encounters” and even rides have been added to zoos to entertain visitors and encourage them 
spend as much time and money there as possible. In most areas zoos are advertised in 
newspapers, magazines, tourist brochures, on the radio or even the television and drawing the 
crowds is the job of a dedicated P.R. person. In Hannah’s Dream zealous new zoo director 
Harriet Saul, veteran of a regional science museum, a library system and a dairy cooperative, 
also takes on the Public Relations role after being hired to turn the zoo around. Harriet 
eagerly commissions a marketing study to find out how the zoo can make more money. “She 
wanted to know who came to visit and why; when they came, what they saw while they were 
there; how long they stayed; and how much money they spent per capita in the gift shop and 
food concessions” (Hammond, 60). Later she launches a “megalomaniacal marketing 
campaign” which includes a large billboard featuring herself dressed as the zoo’s founder, 
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Max Biedelman, which increases zoo attendance by twenty percent (87, 121, 154). As the zoo 
director all Harriet’s efforts are focused on attracting visitors and turning the zoo into a 
financially successful organisation.  
While the communist zoo in Ledgard’s novel is not as openly commercial as the Max L. 
Biedelman zoo in Washington State, the captive animals themselves are still commoditised. 
Once the giraffes arrive at the zoo Amina goes often to see them; even on her meagre factory 
wage she can afford to do this, noting “[t]he zoo is not expensive. It is a subsidised workers’ 
entertainment” (Ledgard, 166). Bussed in from all around, workers are brought to be 
“awakened” by what the zoo offers (165). However one day when she arrives at the zoo the 
woman in the ticket office tells Amina she cannot see the giraffes that day. “‘The giraffes 
aren’t showing, dear,’ she says, as if talking of a film, as if the zoo were a cinema” (165-6). 
While in the communist Czechoslovakia of the 1970s where Giraffe takes place the overt 
presentation of the zoo as a venue of “entertainment” was acceptable, at the same time it was 
rapidly (in terms of zoos’ history) becoming unacceptable in the West. The commoditisation 
of nature in zoos reflected the international widespread destruction of nature that was being 
driven by the culture of capitalism. In light of this “the zoo as a site for the exercise of naked 
power over animals, and as a location for the indulgence of an unashamedly recreational gaze 
upon its captive inmates, becomes less and less appealing, and more difficult to justify” 
(Beardsworth and Bryman, 89). 
As an industry, zoos were scrambling for a reason to justify their existence. One answer 
was to “loudly position themselves as leaders in wildlife conservation”, revolutionising 
themselves as modern Noah’s Arks that preserve species and are important educators of the 
public about animals and global conservation (Hancocks, “The Right”). This rebranding has 
been total, a message that “saturates” zoos from the exhibits to the gift shop (Marino et al, 
26). Gathering speed at the end of the twentieth century this effort sought to erase from the 
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public consciousness the former purpose of zoos and replace it with rhetoric that fits the 
current social climate. As Malamud observes, this involved the traditional habit of blaming 
any problems with animal captivity on the mistakes of previous generations. 
A public relations deluge which zoos have embarked upon during the 
last decade – aggressively coopting green rhetoric – serves to anticipate 
and defuse potential resistance to zoos. Whatever negative thoughts may 
invade the spectator’s experience are displaced onto the bad old days.  
(Reading, 48) 
While this “deluge” has been largely successful, Beardsworth and Bryman agree that it is 
only cosmetic; the intrinsic nature of zoos has not changed, merely the way in which zoos 
package the idea of animal captivity: 
through its theming and entertainment motifs, this new configuration can 
offer an accessible and palatable model of humankind's continuing 
ability to exercise power over nature. The power, once conceived of as a 
right to exploit, has now been transmuted into a duty to manage and 
conserve. Thus the theme of conservation, delivered as part of a ‘fun day 
out’, becomes a reassuring legitimisation of the continued existence of 
one of the earliest forms of total institution, the menagerie.  
(101) 
As Kawata notes, in the New Age zoo the ideal of Conservation (with a capital ‘C’) has been 
thrust to the fore of zoos’ self-representation, “as a putative motherhood ideology, a driving 
force above all else as if it were to justify taking wild animals into captivity” (“Romancing”, 
241).  
This sweeping change is evident in the evolution of the discourse employed by zoos to 
describe their practices. Kawata observes that by the end of the twentieth century “‘cage’ and 
‘menagerie’ have become pejorative term[s] denoting some unholy marriage of anachronism 
and barbarism, and thus were purged from the collective lexicon of zoos” (“Romancing”, 
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241). Beardsworth and Bryman note the “growing unease about the use of the depiction ‘zoo’ 
and the substitution of alternative terms stressing conservation and education” which has 
caused many zoos to label themselves using terms like “park” or “conservation society” (94). 
Kawata also references a letter to the editor of International Zoo News regarding the 
censorship of zoo vocabulary by zoo staff. “The verb ‘to catch’ was carefully replaced by ‘to 
collect.’ ‘Notions of cage and paddock have gradually transferred via enclosure and exhibit 
into ‘encounter’ and sometimes, rather pretentiously, ‘habitat’” (“Romancing”, 251).  
The overhaul of zoos’ image included stepping up the “theming” of zoos in a process 
that Beardsworth and Bryman call the “Disneyization” of the zoo industry: the application of 
Disney theme park principles to the modern zoo. Cages, now called “exhibits”, are often 
arranged in a more “abstract” way than just Tiger House, Monkey House and so on, instead 
grouped around a theme such as Jungle World or African Savannah (Beardsworth and 
Bryman, 91-2). The rebranding of zoos “in an institutional and cultural sense, in the light of 
changing public sensibilities” is also a form of theming (93). This deliberate theme of 
conservation extends, of course, to the cages themselves. As noted above in many zoos 
distasteful aspects of captivity such as bars and walls had been largely disguised in recent 
decades but now the conservation theme requires more: the total concealment of the physical 
realities of captivity. Modern zoo cages therefore aim for a “naturalistic” appearance or, even 
better, total “immersion”. Lyles explains that “[i]mmersion exhibits are ones that seek to 
make visitors feel that they are in the habitat with the animals” (903). Techniques and 
technologies such as greenery, mist machines, habitat soundtracks and the use of the same 
terrain materials in the visitor area as in the cage (for example logs or rocks) are employed to 
make visitors feel like they are with the nonhuman animal in her own habitat (Kawata, 
“Romancing”, 242; Lyles, 903). Importantly, these step are taken specifically to “hide cage 
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elements” and “help create an illusion” for the human visitor (Lyles, 905). The “immersion” 
at issue here is that of the human visitor, not the animal.  
In her 1997 book The Modern Ark Vicki Croke points out some of the realities behind 
the illusion of “naturalistic” and “immersion” exhibits such as fibreglass trees, painted 
backgrounds and real foliage planted only near the human viewer or else protected from the 
animal inmates by electric wires (Croke, 76-9). David Hancocks, former director of four zoos 
in the United States and Australia, agrees, noting the deliberate deceptiveness of “naturalistic” 
exhibits: 
Today, zoos boast about their green revolution. The new zoos, sans 
cages, make visitors feel better, but it is all deception. The animals 
typically have no contact with living plants, separated from them by 
electric wires. Many “natural” features are made of disguised, unyielding 
concrete. The restricted dusty spaces the animals inhabit are often of no 
better quality than the old cages. 
(Hancocks, “The Right”) 
This concentration on the entertainment of human visitors rather than on nonhuman animal 
welfare is not accidental. Croke includes quotations from several AAZPA papers from 1978 
to 1992 which clearly show the “homocentric bias” of zoo design – that the redesign of zoo 
cages is aimed primarily at the zoo visitor (Croke, 78). The natural elements, even if not 
artificial themselves, represent a “Faux-Naturalism” (Kawata, “Romancing”, 245), a 
“quasification” of nature which involves imitating the environment in a way which is 
recognised as artificial, but causes the observer to be “diverted, entertained and impressed by 
the skill, scope or scale of the artifice.” (Beardsworth and Bryman, 87) The captive animals 
themselves are presumably not impressed by this artifice but this is irrelevant since the entire 
enterprise is wholly for the benefit of human visitors (Croke, 77; Beardsworth and Bryman, 
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92; Kawata, “Circus”, 355). Zoos are businesses and nonhuman zoo animals do not pay the 
bills; human visitors do.   
This focus on the giving the zoo visitors what they want – in this case, to be deceived – 
is evidence that the fundamental role of zoos has not changed. As Berger observes, 
[w]ithin limits, the animals are free, but both they themselves, and their 
spectators, presume on their close confinement. The visibility through 
the glass, the spaces between the bars, or the empty air above the moat, 
are not what they seem - if they were, then everything would be changed. 
Thus visibility, space, air, have been reduced to tokens.  
(Berger, 24-25) 
This ersatz deception does not go unnoticed by cynical zoo vet Ellen. In The Great Divorce 
she contemplates the painting of ‘The Peaceable Kingdom’ and its “inevitable” use in zoo 
marketing all over the world. “It’s the lie the public requires these days; everything must be 
seen mysteriously to thrive” (Martin, 56). Ellen is aware of the transformation of zoos as the 
result of the changing nature of Western humanity’s relationship with nonhuman nature.  
In other centuries, when the wild held its own against the forces of 
civilization, it was enough to look at a miserable, flea-bitten, half-starved 
lion stalking a cage barely large enough to turn around in, to point at him 
and taunt him for having been so unfortunate as to be captured; this was 
a satisfactory attitude toward the wild: bring it down. Now that we have 
been successful in that quest we want to be told it isn’t so, to see wild 
animals at a safe distance, healthy and strong, as if their existence is not 
threatened at all. 
(56-7) 
It is this public demand for a “healthy and strong” nature which is “serene and imperturbable” 
that drives the naturalisation of zoo exhibits (56), the covering-up of what we have done to 
nonhuman animals and what we continue to do. Nigel Rothfels calls this process “managing 
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eloquence—attempting to redirect the audience from seeing and imagining an animal’s fate in 
captivity” (197). As Rothfels points out, while the eloquence of animals in traditional zoo 
cage were starkly obvious, “the illusion of freedom so carefully created” in modern zoos 
distracts the human audience from the reality of the animals’ captivity, so that animals in 
modern zoos “face a much more difficult time finding a voice with which to query their 
audience” (Rothfels, 197-8). The purpose of a zoo exhibit is to create for the visitor a 
different, better reality in the same way that a stage set is created and manipulated to present 
different versions of reality. In his essay reviewing American zoo exhibits Ken Kawata 
quotes J.C. Coe’s 1996 article on zoo exhibit design which advises that when creating an 
exhibit the designer must create a scenario with a similar purpose to “a cinematic or theatrical 
scenario” that “sets the scene for performance” (Kawata, “Romancing”, 242). Modern 
embellishments to zoo cages are just so many “stage props”, as Berger observed at the 
beginning of the “naturalistic” movement. The spectacle presented by zoos, themed in its 
current incarnation under the guise of conservation, continues to be one of audience-driven 
performance.  
This also explains why the usual idealised version of nature is absent from the zoo 
novels, despite many of the exhibits being modern (notably those in The Great Divorce and 
How The Dead Dream). The purpose of a stage is to present a performance to be viewed by 
an audience. The set and stage props are designed to create an experience for the audience; 
flimsy façades and carefully placed suggestive details are enough to create not a new reality, 
but the quasification of one which will satisfy the audience and allow them to recognise the 
context of the performance. In a zoo the audience is of course the visitors. I have already 
described examples of the various techniques used to “set the scene” in immersion exhibits 
but, like theatrical props, these are only effective when viewed from the position of an 
audience member, a spectator, someone who wants to be deceived. The reader of the zoo 
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novels is not a member of the audience but rather someone who approaches from the wings. 
From this vantage the mono-faceted stage set is inconsequential, stripped of its deception, 
while the players and the nature of their performance are starkly revealed. At work zookeeper 
Camille moves along a narrow path in the “wings” of the zoo, a path “that separated the 
public from the secret world of those responsible for maintaining the illusion they paid to see” 
(Martin, 268-9). Just as the animals are the performers in the zoo spectacle, the keepers and 
staff are the “stagehands” moving in and out of the wings and doing most of their work 
offstage. As playwright William Somerset Maugham wrote, “[i]t is dangerous to let the 
public behind the scenes. They are easily disillusioned and then they are angry with you, for 
it was the illusion they loved” (77). However as readers of the zoo novels we are not part of 
“the public”; in the novels we are not presented with the illusion but with the means of its 
construction.  
In reading the novels we continue deeper into the backstage area of the zoo where the 
mechanics of the theatre are revealed. Camille first appears in The Great Divorce “closing 
out the Asian exhibit” after the zoo visitors have left for the day. The beginning of her daily 
ritual involves collecting the meat sticks for the big cats and yoghurt cups for the sun bears 
before she enters the empty night house. “At the door she put everything down, beat against 
the metal with her fist, opened the door, and shouted, ‘Hello, hello,’ as she had been taught to 
do, for one could never be too careful around the big cats, particularly Sonya, who longed to 
tear apart something that would give her resistance” (8). The danger represented by the cats is 
acknowledged by Camille and also the existence of human error within the mechanical 
system of control. Before letting the animals into the exhibit she gives each of the padlocks 
“a perfunctory tug. Keeper-trainees were not always reliable” (9). Keeper safety is paramount 
and the mechanical system allows her to manipulate and control the nonhuman animals while 
maintaining her distance. “There were eight cats to bring in, a total of six steel doors to be 
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opened by means of heavy chains and wheels” (9). Like the ropes used to open the curtains 
on the stage and manipulate the performance space, the metal chains allow Camille to control 
the areas where the cats and sun bears may access. This world of metal and mechanics and 
concrete is where the captive animals spend most of their time. Ultimately the “naturalistic” 
exhibit is for the benefit of humans; once the human visitors leave the zoo animals are 
returned to their unadorned cages. This is something also noted by Hancocks: “It is still the 
rule rather than the exception for most zoo animals to spend the greater part of each day in 
concrete cubes or cages so like the conditions that Hediger argued against. Enter almost any 
service area in almost any zoo and you step back into the zoo conditions of the nineteenth 
century” (“Insufficiency”, 2). The “naturalistic” revolution extends only to the area seen by 
the audience. As Kawata points out, not only do animals spend most of their time in an 
indoor concrete cage similar in size to a circus wagon, but for large animals like the big cats 
this is often where they are during their natural “peak activity hours” (“Circus”, 353-4). 
Camille knows this and lying in bed in her dark room she imagines the cats closed inside 
their concrete cages. 
What did they do all night? Did they have roaring matches, filling up the 
closed compound with a magnificent sound no one ever heard? Did they 
pace all night? Certainly they didn’t sleep much, because they slept all 
day. Magda was a night hunter; did she spend the long hours gazing into 
the darkness, listening for anything that moved? 
(Martin, 25) 
Just like Hannah rocking in the darkness of her small concrete barn, Camille remembers 
seeing Magda tearing at the ceiling with her claws, “every muscle taut and straining with the 
same urgency: I must get out” (26). Throughout The Great Divorce the backstage area of the 
zoo is described in very hard, bare, metallic, mechanical, clinical terms. Kawata points out 
that “[s]ymbolism is important: Iron bars are associated with punishment while chains on an 
120 
 
 
elephant’s foot, slavery, in the public’s anthropomorphic prism and together they represent 
the embodiment of captivity” (“Romancing”, 240). These symbols of bars and chains appear 
in most of the zoo novels in one form or another. Creating “naturalistic” exhibits removes the 
symbol or the signifier (the metal bars) and in doing so obscures the signified (the nonhuman 
animals’ close confinement). By describing the backstage realities of a modern zoo The Great 
Divorce forces the acknowledgement of what these signifiers mean for the captive animals 
and about the zoo industry. Unlike in Hannah’s Dream, this is not to garner sympathy in 
preparation for the animals’ climactic rescue and relocation. Rather the shocking reality of 
nonhuman animal captivity and the impending environmental disaster represented by climate 
change, multiple species extinction, mass depletion of habitats and extensive pollution of 
ecosystems are used as a backdrop for stories of human women whose lives also become 
shocking and in some aspects, doomed. Camille and Elisabeth both identify with a particular 
big cat and in both cases this leads to the woman’s death (Camille commits suicide after 
Magda’s death while Ellen is hanged for the murder of her husband while she was in the form 
of a leopard). Ellen’s marriage is likewise doomed and although she does not die her role at 
end of the novel is as a harbinger of death; not simply the death of one animal this time but 
the eventual collapse of most wild animal species. Camille listens as Ellen explains to her that 
“[w]ild animals, particularly the bigger ones, the dangerous ones, who took up space, were 
doomed. Zoos operated as arks, holding animals for the future, but it was a future that would 
never come” (Martin, 287). While the novel ends with a personal triumph for Ellen in the 
recovery of Minx, the sick jaguar, the novel’s message of hopelessness in the face of the 
current environmental crisis is unrelenting. Ellen acknowledges that the survival of Minx is 
insignificant in terms of the losses about to be suffered by global biodiversity. “In the face of 
what was coming it was laughable, a joke, like struggling to scoop out a thimbleful of water 
from a sinking ship, from the Titanic, just before the great stern slipped beneath the icy black 
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water and the prow began to rise in the frigid air: that was how sure she was this ship would 
sink” (340).  
The Great Divorce is deliberately positioned in opposition to the conservation message 
espoused by zoos as an industry. In contemporary society the concept of “conservation” is 
used broadly to describe almost any practise with beneficial or even neutral effects on the 
environment. One such general definition of “conservation” is found in The American 
Heritage Science Dictionary: 
The protection, preservation, management, or restoration of natural 
environments and the ecological communities that inhabit them. 
Conservation is generally held to include the management of human use 
of natural resources for current public benefit and sustainable social and 
economic utilization. 
(“Conservation”) 
For many zoos their conservation goals, which are used to justify their self-conferred status 
as important leaders in wildlife conservation, consist of protecting various nonhuman animal 
species, preserving and increasing their populations for reintroduction back into the wild, as 
well as educating the general public about conservation. These are certainly admirable goals; 
however conflict occurs when they meet with the traditional values of a zoo as a site of 
human entertainment. For example, one question that arises from this conflict is: how many 
of the animal species in zoos are actually endangered and therefore most in need of protection? 
As Koen Margodt puts it, “space on the Zoo Ark is limited”, yet after analysing a variety of 
studies he concludes “only a very limited part of available space in most organized zoos is 
dedicated to threatened species.” (13, italics in original). For most zoos the decision of which 
species to include and which individuals to display is less a scientific one than a business one. 
While it is highly desirable to have some rare specimens to display, to reinforce the exotic 
spectacle as well as provide evidence of a conservation agenda,  as we have seen this is 
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certainly not the most important criteria when choosing nonhuman animals to put in a zoo. 
The most important thing is the species’ attractiveness to the human visitor. The modern zoo 
is highly mammalocentric, which means that for the most part reptiles, birds and 
invertebrates, despite making up 97% of all species, are out. Those who are in are those who 
possess what Hediger calls “Schauvert or show value” (Sommer, 237, italics in original); the 
ones who are “furry, large, brightly colored, or otherwise captivating for people” (Lyles, 907). 
Kawata calls these the “ABC animals” (like those who appear in children’s alphabet books, 
“T is for tiger” and so on) and Hancocks the “glamorous few”, while Margodt prefers 
“charismatic fundraiser”s and Croke, those with the “money-making gene” (Kawata, 
“Romancing”, 248; Hancocks, A Different, 152; Margodt, 23; Croke, 223). In Hannah’s 
Dream zookeeper Neva Wilson arrives at the Max L. Biedelman Zoo and is briefed on its 
“financial challenges.” She points out that at least the zoo has a “charismatic mega-vertebrate” 
and explains the term to Truman: “Whales, dolphins, elephants. They’re the money animals. 
They’re what people come to see” (Hammond, 25). After studying different zoos around the 
world Mullan and Marvin note the most popular zoo animals which seem to be “essential for 
the zoo-going public” (73). These are all mammals and are almost exclusively from Africa, 
including the elephant, giraffe, lion and so on. The authors point out that their popularity is 
due to the cultural framing of their species. 
What these animals possess is exhibition value, a cultural property 
(though not culturally specific) over and above their inherent zoological 
interest. This combination of animals seems to represent zoo animalness 
as well as a general sense of the exotic. The appeal of these animals 
derives not from any natural-history interest but from popular culture, in 
the sense of jungle adventure films or the circus. 
(73)   
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Visitors are drawn to the zoo not by the desire for education but to see the exotic animals they 
recognise from their books, films and soft toys. In Hannah’s Dream Harriet Saul’s marketing 
campaign is “balanced on the back of an ailing elephant” (87), something administrator 
Truman feels uneasy about. Harriet outlines her plan to impersonate Max Bieldelman and use 
Hannah’s picture to market the zoo 
“Those pictures can go on coffee cups, refrigerator magnets, notebooks, 
a line of greeting cards, T-shirts, sweatshirts, postcards, you name it! 
Don’t you think it’s brilliant?” 
     “You don’t think it’ll look like we’re exploiting her?” Truman asked. 
“Who?” 
“Hannah.” 
“No.” 
“Oh.” 
(86-7) 
When Harriet tries to fight Hannah’s relocation to a sanctuary she tells the mayor “Without 
that elephant, the zoo’s nothing but a collection of hoofed stock, barnyard animals, and a 
couple of ratty primates” (272). Harriet does begin to give lectures each day dressed as Max 
Biedelman in which she speaks about the history of the zoo however even these are more for 
novelty and entertainment purposes rather than education, something to bring back the 
visitors they lost to the corn maze (37). 
Just as people come to the zoo to see an idyllic, easily-accessible quasification of nature, 
visitors also want to see beautiful, benign and generic representations of the species they 
prefer. In The Great Divorce zoo vet Ellen notes that a blesbok was taken out of his exhibit 
due to a hard facial cyst which, though not dangerous, the keepers thought “looked bad” 
(Martin, 57). On the other hand the zoo’s white tiger is the main attraction for many visitors. 
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If she took a vote among the public, Ellen thought, they would all agree 
that Sonya, the white tiger, was the most beautiful animal of all. She 
embodied even a schoolchild’s ideal of beauty, strangeness, wildness, 
power. 
(110) 
By contrast Ellen has a very different view of Magda’s rareness. 
To Ellen she was cross-eyed, knock-kneed, a great disaster of inbreeding, 
impossible in the wild and pointless in the gene pool, a freak who drew 
in the crowds and pleased the investors. 
(111) 
This illustrates the tension in zoos between their conservation aspirations and the reality of 
the zoo as a business trading in spectacle. Captive white tigers are born through deliberate 
inbreeding; zoos carefully mate a white tiger with his or her own offspring to pair the 
necessary recessive genes (Croke, 220-2). As Croke points out, “Breeding these animals is 
counter to what zoos are preaching about genetic diversity” (220). While some zoos try to 
defend their display of white tigers on scientific grounds and others admit that “strange or 
novel animals mean money”, Croke notes that “this discussion gives us a glimpse around all 
the talk about zoos being scientific institutions out to save the natural world, and into the 
Victorian impulses that have survived to the present in the hearts of many zoo directors” 
(222). The image of Sonya the white tiger is one example of the need to entertain the public 
overriding a zoo’s supposed conservation mandate. 
As Croke notes, zoos recognise that genetic diversity is important in captive 
populations of nonhuman animals. This is because these isolated groups may one day be 
called on to repopulate an area from which their habitat has been destroyed and their species 
eradicated during their captivity. This concept of “reintroduction” at some point in the future 
is a cornerstone of many zoos’ conservation message. However, as discussed above, there are 
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many physical, behavioural and genetic differences between zoo animals and those in the 
wild. Furthermore the rate at which natural habitats and wild populations are disappearing 
caused Conway to comment that “[t]here is every reason to believe that the last individuals of 
growing numbers of vanishing species will live in captive collections and that future 
restoration opportunities will be as much introduction and reintroduction” (11). The larger 
and more genetically diverse the captive population, the greater “long-term viability” it has 
(11). This is made painfully clear to T. in How The Dead Dream when a biologist explains to 
him the impact of his property development on the decimated population of kangaroo rats. 
“With so few individuals in a population there would be problems of genetic drift and 
inbreeding depression. Resilience to disturbance drops. The gene pool is too small for long-
term survival” (Millet, 125). T. can do nothing but awkwardly apologise. However despite 
this, because of their need to entertain the public, few modern zoos focus on maintaining a 
large population of a few select species (Margodt, 26). Most still seem to operate on the 
“Victorian impulses” invoked by Croke and strive to display many different exotic species to 
complete their collections and attract human visitors, in what Hancocks has described as a 
“‘stamp collecting’ mentality” (A Different, 44).  
The type of visitor that zoos aim to attract is quite obvious; in each of the zoo novels 
the overwhelming majority of zoo visitors are children. Families with children, like Ellen, 
Sam and T. encounter in The Great Divorce, Hannah’s Dream and How The Dead Dream, or 
large groups of children at school or on holiday, like the ones Henry sees in Zoology make up 
almost all the zoo visitors in zoo novels examined here. This allows zoos to expound on their 
other important, self-justifying function in modern society: education. While many of the first 
modern zoos were opened by scientific societies this was often despite the public demand for 
spectacle and entertainment. Often considered the first public zoo (Rothfels, 18), the Jardin 
de Plantes in Paris was originally a laboratory for the study of plants and many resisted the 
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introduction of animals there, fearing “relegating the park to public spectacle” (Croke, 139).  
But Croke records how in 1793 the park accepted the remnants of a Versailles menagerie on 
the condition that the animals would be kept for strictly scientific purposes. “However motley 
the collection, however popular with the people of Paris and however unwilling they were 
originally, the men who ran the park insisted that it be viewed and treated as a scientific 
laboratory” (139). Sir Stamford Raffles, founder of the colony of Singapore and co-founder 
of the Zoological Society of London also drew a clear line between the noble education of 
society’s elite and the tawdry entertainment of the general public, stating the animals of the 
proposed nineteenth century London Zoological Gardens would be “brought from every part 
of the globe to be applied either to some useful purpose, or as objects of scientific research, 
not of vulgar admiration” (Mullan and Marvin, 109). However as Croke states, “[i]t 
obviously wasn’t entirely a scientific enterprise”: Queen Victoria wrote that upon visiting the 
zoo she enjoyed the sight of the trained “Orang Outang” responding to commands and 
drinking his tea (142). Despite starting as an exclusive, invitation-only scientific venue, 
within two decades the zoo was open to the public at a penny apiece.   
Following this came the period of stark cages and flamboyant architecture described 
above. It was not until the second half of the twentieth century when public awareness was 
raised regarding animal welfare that education became a leading tenet of zoos once more. 
The melding of the core entertainment function of zoos with this relatively new trend towards 
education efforts has led to what Lyles calls “conservation edu-tainment” (905). This uneasy 
blending of zoos’ various functions compromises the validity of their supposed educational 
value. None of the zoo visitors in the zoo novels seem to have come to the zoo for 
educational reasons; even the holiday group visiting the children’s zoo in Zoology are 
screaming and rowdy, apparently uninterested in learning about the inmates.  
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By claiming to provide education on conservation issues but failing to do so zoos 
actually engage in mis-education. This mis-education is inherent in zoos right from their 
conception, as Marino et al. point out. 
If we pretend that we can learn about animals by watching them in these 
human-created compounds of cement and steel, then we are saying that 
natural habitats are irrelevant. And if the animals’ natural context is 
implicitly presented as unimportant, then zoos are actually contradicting 
the message they claim to affirm, that environmental conservation is a 
pressing concern.  
(Marino et al., 27) 
Indeed, the basic element of zoos’ educational claim, that people can become more 
understanding of wildlife by seeing them in a zoo, is debatable. As discussed above, zoo 
animals are different altogether from wild animals who live their natural lives in their natural 
homes, for two main reasons. Firstly, separated from her natural biosphere the purpose or 
mode of a nonhuman animal’s life is removed and by being held captive in an artificial 
environment she is altered still further. There is an example of this in Giraffe, when the zoo 
keeper tells Amina about the first documented giraffe in the Austrian Empire who arrived in 
Vienna after crossing deserts on the back of a camel, travelling the Nile and Adriatic Sea by 
boat and then walking all the way to Austria. The giraffe was a hit with the public and high 
society alike but died within a year. “When they cut it open they found that its pelvis had 
been fractured when it was tied to the camel” (Ledgard, 225). Not only were the crowds 
oblivious to the giraffe’s suffering, but having only seen this captive, isolated, manipulated 
individual they could have no real understanding of what a giraffe is. Ironically it is the 
zookeeper, responsible for the African giraffes held captive in a Czechoslovakian barn, who 
points out, “[n]o one could have known from that animal how a giraffe galloped” (225). As 
Marino et al. explain above, by presenting altered animals in an artificial setting and claiming 
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that from this humans can learn about wildlife, zoos actually contradict the notions at the 
heart of conservation: that an animal is intrinsically connected to her context and her 
environment and that natural biodiversity is not only valuable but crucial for the survival of 
humans and all other species. 
Secondly, any human meaning or understanding gained from such a zoo animal is 
completely distorted by the human’s mode of looking: the human’s passive spectatorship of a 
constrained nonhuman animal reduces the relationship to that of empowered subject and 
powerless object. By commoditising the nonhuman animal and promoting passive 
spectatorship as a valid attitude toward other species zoos are engaging in mis-education; 
teaching “the wrong thing” (Malamud, Reading, 2).  While the zoo animal herself is not 
meaningless, in the zoo context her meaning is rendered inaccessible to the human spectator 
who relies on her domination to facilitate their encounter. As Malamud goes on to explain, 
“[t]he attitude that people are entitled to develop our awareness of animals in a way that suits 
our own habits is part of the problem, not the solution, of our limited perspective that 
threatens our future on this planet” (Reading, 9).  
Evidence of this can be seen in two compelling video clips filmed by zoo goers of their 
children interacting with captive lions. The first clip, which was uploaded to YouTube by 
Julian Walker who titled it “Sophia the Lion Tamer”, was filmed in Wellington Zoo and 
shows three-year-old Sophia Walker standing in front of the 33mm thick glass wall of the 
lion exhibit’s viewing area. In an encounter which challenges Berger’s assertion that 
“nowhere in a zoo can a stranger encounter the look of an animal”, on the other side of the 
glass sits seven-year-old male lion Malik, his face against the glass and eyes staring intently 
at the little girl, growling a little. Suddenly he begins pawing rapidly at Sophia through the 
glass window.  
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Fig. 2 Malik and Sophia 
Sophia flinches but stands with her hands against the glass as Malik continues to paw, while 
other children and adults run up and gather round, pointing. In a news article Sophia’s father 
describes her reaction: 
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Mr Walker said his curious daughter, who attends Churton Park Little 
School, was nonchalant about the ordeal. 
 
“She doesn’t seem phased [sic] by the whole thing. 
 
“We’ve got animals and pets at home so I guess she thought it was a big 
pet cat but I think he would react differently if she cuddled him.” 
(“Wellington”) 
A similar clip shows one-year-old Trent at the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo where he attracts the 
attention of lioness Angie. Both Trent and adults out of frame protest when his mother tries to 
carry him away from the lions and he is left to toddle along the glass. The clip progresses, 
accompanied by the continuous laughter and camera clicks of other zoo visitors, as Angie 
paws at Trent through the glass, follows him along its length and repeatedly opens her jaws 
as if trying to bite him. 
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Fig. 3 Angie and Trent 
In each of these clips the unnaturalness of the encounter between human child and nonhuman 
animal is obvious. For some, this is a source of amusement while others find it disturbing. 
The clip of Trent and Angie, sensationally titled “Lioness Tries to Eat Baby”, has been 
viewed almost six million times on the YouTube website and attracted comments both 
critical and in support of animal captivity and the value of taking children to the zoo, 
however most simply find the clip entertaining (for example, “[t]aunting lionesses...like a 
boss” from user 2bitgirly007) (“Lioness”). On the news website about the encounter between 
Sophia and Malik nine of the twelve reader comments express sympathy for Malik or disgust 
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at the function of the viewing area itself. Two other users argued for the value of the 
encounter, including reader Laurie-ann who commented, “[b]et this wee gorgeous girl grows 
up to be successful in an animal-care related career – what a darling and clever girl! Not 
scared at all by the giant ‘pussy cat’ – too precious!” (“Wellington”). While it cannot be 
argued that these encounters between human and nonhuman are natural, zoos still promote 
this activity as educational, a way of learning about our relationship with nonhuman species. 
The description of the Sophia and Malik clip includes an endorsement of the educational 
value of animal captivity: “Wellington Zoo is a magical place of learning and fun, leaving 
visitors with a sense of wonder and respect for nature and a belief in the need for a 
sustainable co-existence between wildlife and people” (“Sophia”). However when the very 
nature of zoo encounters leaves visitors with connotations of their toddlers as “lion tamers” 
and of adult lions as giant “pussy cats”, the wonder and respect, not to mention accuracy, of 
whatever education zoos offer must be called into question. Not only are they not learning 
about lions as they exist naturally but the unnatural power dynamics of the encounters teach 
visitors “exactly the wrong thing”: the idea that humans have the right to dominate and use all 
other species, a traditional anthropocentric attitude which will never contribute to achieving 
“a sustainable co-existence between wildlife and people.” 
For these reasons any learning that occurs by observing nonhuman animals in a zoo 
cannot be genuine. It is this realisation that finally leads Malamud to assert that he believes 
his son, Jacob, “can have a better imagination, a better appreciation of the multifaceted 
magnificence of nature and animals, by not seeing a zoo’s giraffe than by seeing one” 
(Reading, 32). This conclusion is similar to the argument from Ellen’s daughter in The Great 
Divorce. “Mom, people just don’t care about lions and tigers. They never see them, except in 
a zoo, and if they never saw them at all it just isn’t going to change anybody’s life. It’s not 
going to change my life” (Martin, 57). Although it was Ellen who originally complained 
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about the public’s indifference to species’ extinctions she is still surprised by her daughter’s 
blunt admission, which seems to affirm that she does not believe zoos serve any valuable 
function in modern society. 
As well as the contradictions inherent in institutions that present captive animals in 
order to educate about wildlife, the fact that zoos’ conservation messages cater largely for 
children can in itself be a cause of mis-education, as it implies that caring about conservation 
issues is predominantly for children, or is “a childish thing” (Baker, Picturing, 123). In a 
chapter of his book entitled “Kids and Zoos” Malamud notes that while many adults dislike 
the zoo they may feel culturally obliged to take their children to a zoo as an educational 
experience. However just as the assumption that caring about conservation is “childish” is 
misleading, the assumption that children are oblivious to those inherent aspects of zoos which 
make many adults uncomfortable may be similarly flawed, a point also made by Malamud. 
I have argued that the speciesist distinction the zoo projects (subject 
animal as other, caged for display; people regarding the spectacle as 
confirmation of empowerment) distorts our biological role as one part of 
an interrelated ecosystem, and panders to anthropocentric fantasies of 
natural supremacy. The assumption that ... young zoo visitors are 
oblivious to the dynamics of oppression and constraint – may be 
similarly erroneous. 
(Reading, 271) 
Malamud argues that children are aware of the power relationships present in the zoo context 
even if their unease cannot be articulated until they are older. In the zoo novels we see few 
real zoo visitors however the children who are present do not seem conflicted when it comes 
to the zoo context, which of course is not only marketed to children but permeates Western 
culture (in the form of zoo themed cookies, children’s clothes, books, movies, television 
shows and so on) as a natural setting for childhood fun. For the young boys Winston and 
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Reginald it is only once they start to know Hannah (through their privileged meeting with her 
outside the dynamic of zoo visitor/empowered observer and captive animal/disempowered 
object) that the zoo’s treatment of her makes them uncomfortable. 
While educating children about wildlife is important, even if they are successful aiming 
education efforts solely at children also raises questions about the seriousness of zoos 
education credentials. As Conway points out, 
[f]or the most part, we target our conservation education on children and 
other non-decision-makers in a process too slow or too far away to 
address the global extinction crisis in which we now live. Our efforts to 
inform law-makers and government authorities are usually low-key or 
non-existent. 
( 9) 
This point is also made by Lyles who concludes that while some zoos offer valuable 
programs for students, in the future zoos “may need to reach out more effectively to decision 
makers (politicians)” (911). The effects of this reticence appear starkly in How The Dead 
Dream. As T. becomes increasingly obsessed with collapse of species and ecosystems around 
the world and observes the changing of natural green, yellow and turquoise environments into 
the humanised gray he wonders why no one else seems to notice.  
But in the grey that metastasized over continents and hemispheres few 
appeared to be deterred by this extinguishing or even to speak of it, no 
one outside fringe elements and elite groups, professors and hippies, 
small populations of little general importance. The quiet mass 
disappearance, the inversion of the Ark, was passing unnoticed. 
(Millet, 139) 
While zoos have touted conservation as the reason for their existence it is not in their interest 
to educate either the public or society’s leaders on the true extent of the eco-crisis because 
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this would undermine their image of themselves as arks with the ability to somehow save 
nature. Instead zoos are forced to dilute the urgency and severity of Earth’s conservation 
problems in what Conway calls the “professional conservation conspiracy” for fear of scaring 
off their sponsors in the face of an apparently lost cause (Conway, 9). 
One of the ways zoos aim to address this conservation crisis is their much-lauded 
captive breeding programs. These rarely lead to the removal of a species’ endangered status, 
however, and in other cases can lead to boom-and-bust breeding cycles where one desirable 
species is over-bred then, due to supply exceeding demand, the population allowed to age 
beyond the point where they can successfully maintain their population (Lyles, 908). One 
seldom-publicised reality of successful captive breeding is the existence of “surplus” animals. 
Zoos have limited space and often the birth of one animal necessitates the removal of another. 
The zoo must find another zoo or private investor willing to accept the unwanted animal, or 
take the “apparently logical stance” of killing her (Lyles, 904). Croke estimates that there 
may be up to eighty thousand such surplus animals in the U.S. every year (216). So while 
breeding is supposedly a top goal of zoos many captive animals, like the (endangered) 
clouded leopard Flo in The Great Divorce, are fitted with contraception. Camille watches as 
Ellen cuts into the unconscious Flo, removes the old birth control implant and scrapes out 
tissue to make room for the new one (Martin, 159). In the human-controlled world of the zoo, 
population management strategies, husbandry techniques, demographic controls and new 
technologies must be employed to manage every aspect of the nonhuman animals’ lives, 
including surgical insertion of devices to prevent “unplanned [by humans] breeding.” (Lyles, 
904). Even with the use of all these modern strategies, indeed because of them, surplus 
animals are an inevitable by-product “inherent to breeding programs directed at maintaining 
maximal genetic variation” (Margodt, 27, emphasis added). Ellen explains this to Camille:  
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Theoretically, captive breeding could increase diversity, but, especially 
with big cats, we’re too successful. There’s no place to put the surplus 
animals. Habitats are shrinking by the minute. We can’t return them to 
the wild; there’s just no place for them to go. That’s why so many of our 
cats are on implants. If leopards are to survive, the world needs more 
leopards, but zoos don’t. 
(Martin, 287) 
Ever practical, Ellen succinctly lays out the zoo paradox for the young keeper: what is best 
for the zoo is not best for the world. In a business driven by economics what is best (for the 
planet, for human and nonhuman animals) will always have to compete with what is best for 
business.  
Similarly, if J.M. Ledgard’s Giraffe has any message about zoos it can only be a 
damning one. This is the only novel which describes for the reader the captured animals’ 
natural origin as well as their zoo confinement and the only novel which uses a nonhuman 
animal as a narrator. Emil’s last view of Sněhurka is in the rendering plant, after the massacre. 
“Sněhurka hangs enormous upside down on a metal chain, together with the remains of a 
Rothschild bull and calf. Her neck is broken, her tongue hangs out. Her eyes are open. A 
square of hide has been cut from her body” (318-9). The giraffes have all been killed in a 
marathon slaughter, a communist precaution against a fictional wartime contagion; their 
brutal deaths emphasising the senselessness of their capture, transportation and confinement. 
Their bodies disposed of in an agricultural plant, the giraffes are ultimately treated like any 
other animal put to use and consumed by humans, reminding the reader that the zoo is just 
another site of domination and utilisation of nonhuman animals by human culture. Emil sees 
how chemicals are used to render the giraffes’ blood into a clear fluid which is drained into a 
stream and he imagines it flowing through river, marsh and sea to end as Arctic ice. This one 
event, the “cosmic collapse” of the giraffes, will have wide-reaching effects but humans will 
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remain oblivious as political powers erase the giraffes’ existence and their violent end: “All 
the papers are shredded, the films exposed, the giraffes burned, so: farewell” (321). 
Of all the nonhuman animals in the novels discussed in this thesis, Diane Hammond’s 
Hannah is the one with the closest relationship with some humans and also perhaps the one 
who suffers the most at the hands of others. Some might perceive Hannah’s portrayal as 
being overly anthropomorphic but the humanising of Hannah’s feelings comes predominantly 
from Sam and Corinna, those who know her best and who believe she is their daughter reborn. 
While Neva believes in nonhuman intelligence and “person”ality, for example in relation to 
Hannah, Miles and Chip the housecat who is “a gentlemanly soul” (196), she finds Sam and 
Corinna’s open affection and devotion to Hannah “unnerving” (196). Trained in the top 
modern zoos around the country, this simple love for another animal is new and strange for 
Neva but she recognises how lucky Hannah is to have had them with her. In end it is Sam, for 
whom Hannah’s “Hannah-ness” and her “elephantness” is the same thing, who understands 
Hannah the best. Despite knowing little about elephants as a species he understands her 
deepest needs and wishes; he is the one who shares Hannah’s dream.  
At first glance Hannah’s Dream seems to reach a similar conclusion to many zoo 
critics: that the only humane, or even viable, future for wild animal captivity lies in 
sanctuaries and parks. After Hannah’s relocation is set in motion Sam receives a letter written 
by Max Biedelman before she died, in which she calls Hannah “the legacy of my last foolish 
act, for how selfish it was to bring her here to Havenside knowing she would outlive me” 
(247). The reader is encouraged to understand how egotistical it is to see animals in human 
terms and even Harriet Saul, upon learning about the extent of Hannah’s condition (and 
having no other choice), supports her relocation. Finally Harriet finds “her salvation” 
imagining the rebirth of Max Biedelman’s estate through the restoration of its “old and 
original glory”, however this vision quickly turns ominous as she imagines gradually 
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restoring the animal collection, her final happy thought “And maybe one day there could be 
elephants again” (304). It seems that even after Hannah’s long decades of suffering and final 
struggle to escape the zoo, other elephants may be fated to repeat her ordeal. 
The other animal who finally escapes from the zoo is Newman, Henry’s friend goat in 
Ben Dolnick’s Zoology. While Henry feels a connection with Newman much of this is built 
on his belief that the goat is different from other animals, somehow more human. One night 
New York is in a power blackout and, filled with resentment and hurt after being rejected by 
his love interest Margaret, Henry goes to Central Park and breaks into the zoo to visit 
Newman. “He’d never looked so simple, so plain and unconcerned and animal. This could 
have been because he’d just been sleeping, or it could have been because I’d never wanted so 
much for him to be the opposite” (255). Henry thinks a walk together in the freedom of the 
Park will make them both feel better so he takes Newman out of the zoo. When they are 
frightened by a sudden noise Newman bolts off into the darkness and Henry searches for him 
all night without success. The next day, with the zoo in crisis at their first lost mammal, he is 
forced to admit what he’s done. Fired and banned from the zoo Henry continues searching for 
Newman, first in the Park and then throughout Manhattan, to no avail.  When Margaret sends 
him a fantastical short story of how Newman has turned into a fish and is living happily in the 
ocean, Henry feels “utterly certain” that this is the wrong ending, and fixes it by describing 
how fish-Newman is caught in a net and kept in a tank until he dies. “Newman cries invisibly 
into the water, left alone there in the dark, and he loses all sense of time—but then slowly, as 
the months pass, he learns to stand it” (287). Henry cannot imagine Newman as a free and 
happy animal; although he has escaped the zoo the urban landscape has nothing to offer the 
goat. While his existence in the artificial space of the zoo was empty and hopeless, outside 
the zoo he ceases to exist entirely.  
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The final zoo novel, Lydia Millet’s How The Dead Dream, offers a similarly bleak 
view of the state of Earth’s biodiversity, one in which nonhumans and their species are 
equally doomed both within and without zoos. T. is shocked at the silence and rapidity with 
which entire “volumes in the library of being” are annihilated, seemingly without anyone 
knowing or caring, and he is increasingly obsessed and horrified at the loss. A biologist tells 
T. that ants make up “fifteen percent of the weight of all land animals and T. thinks about 
them “roiling beneath the surface” of the Earth “in untold billions” (124). After learning 
about the extinction of the kangaroo rats caused by his property development T. begins to 
question the capitalist principles by which he lives his life and he imagines the crust of the 
earth crumbling and giving way beneath the modern “battlements of convenience and utopias 
of consumption” (125).  
    He found he was barely breathing. He let out his breath and filled up 
his lungs again. 
    When he slept that night it was the ants abandoning ship. They left in 
their billions, all of them, and as they went away holes opened up in the 
earth, yawning sinkholes into which oceans and mountains poured. 
(125) 
For T. the ants are representative of all nonhuman animals to whose existence and 
termination he has always been oblivious. Now, just as he begins to understand their 
importance he also recognises the scale and certainty of their disappearance and he has no 
doubt about where the accountability lies.  
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Angry, a person might thrash and fight—even against himself, because 
he did not know who he was, or who the others were either. Later he 
would have to sit, crying crumple-faced in the pile of the dead. This was 
how it would be with the men, after they finished their work. They 
would have to be alone after that, and for so many years. On and on they 
would live, surrounded by gray. Complexity would be gone, replaced 
with dull sameness that stretched out unending… and when they had 
killed all their friends and everywhere was empty; only then would they 
see how terribly they had loved them.  
(242)  
Through the novel as T. learns more about the “final animals”, climate change and the 
conservation crisis the mood of despair, desperation and hopelessness builds alongside T.’s 
personal tragedies: Beth dies, his mother forgets him and finally a hurricane strikes his new 
development. Stranded in the Central American country T. decides to travel upriver into the 
jungle to search out a jaguar but finds himself alone and lost, days from civilisation. Like 
Henry, who finally feels happiness again one night after rescuing a dog in the middle of 
nowhere, at his lowest moment lying lost and exhausted in the jungle T. feels lucky that an 
unknown animal comes and lies down with him. He is grateful to her, but pitying, too, and 
the last words of the novel are steadfast their hopelessness: “Poor animal. It thought he was 
its mother, but its mother was gone. As, after a while, all the mothers would be” (244). The 
novel ends with T. lying in the jungle with no food or water and one anonymous nonhuman 
companion. His situation seems to echo that of wider humanity as he sees it: alive and 
gradually overcoming his fear of the other creature who accompanies him; a creature whom, 
despite his gratitude, he is still struggling to recognise. Ultimately, however, there is little 
hope of survival.  
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Near the end of his “Eighth Elegy” Rilke describes the way in which, as observers, 
humans are overwhelmed by the world and by living; in continuously trying to order the 
world as we see it we endanger not only the world but also ourselves. 
And we: Onlookers, always, everywhere,  
turned toward all that and never transcending it. 
It overwhelms us. We order it. It disintegrates. 
We order it again and disintegrate ourselves. 
(lines 66-9, trans. Llewellyn, 227) 
In several of the novels I have examined, the zoo as a site of human ordering of the natural 
world is in the process of being overwhelmed; in struggling to maintain the human ordering 
of nature by holding a few species captive the exploitative philosophies behind this “order” 
threaten to allow the disintegration of the biological networks on which humans rely. This 
chapter has explored the anthropocentric nature of zoos’ “ordering” processes such as 
“immersion exhibits” which aim to immerse the human visitor in artificial nature and the 
valuing of species that appeal aesthetically to the human spectator. These practices highlight 
the conflict that modern zoos embody between entertainment, conservation and education.  
Many of the zoo novels employ theatrical imagery when describing the zoo, suggesting the 
zoo as a site of performance constructed for the benefit of the human audience. In this 
performance the nonhuman animals embody pre-determined roles while traditional signifiers 
of captivity such as tiles and bars, no longer desirable to the human audience, are replaced 
with the token natural scenery they demand.  While many modern zoos have undergone a 
rebranding over the last century this is largely ignored by the zoo novels which instead 
predominantly show the nonhuman and human characters behind-the-scenes at the zoo where 
concrete and metal bars are still the norm. 
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The distinction between wild animals and zoo animals is either described or stated in 
most of the zoo novels, the human containment and control of the nonhuman animals 
changing them into “a different kind entirely – a hybrid kind ... A zoo kind” (Millet, 198). 
This alteration is a combination of changes in the animal herself due the processes of 
“immuration” (the physical, behavioural and psychological effects of captivity), and changes 
in the way she is viewed by humans; her change in context objectifies her and renders her as 
exposed, observable object in the mind of the human spectator. In Chapter Two of this thesis 
I found that several of the zoo novels question the authority of Science in some way; in this 
chapter I have shown the extent to which these novels also challenge the ability of zoos to 
fulfil their self-conferred role as arks. In How the Dead Dream and The Great Divorce this 
doubt is explicitly expressed by characters like Ellen and T; in Hannah’s Dream a sanctuary 
is proposed as a suitable alternative for one species, while in Zoology and Giraffe no 
alternatives are found for either Newman, who disappears after leaving the zoo, or the 
members of the giraffe herd who are destroyed. 
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Conclusion 
 
         The project of this thesis has been to explore the representation of nonhuman animal 
captivity in recent contemporary zoo novels with the understanding that such representations 
are both informed by the socio-cultural context in which they were written and are also able 
to defamiliarise cultural practices such as the captivity of animals in zoos. In this way novels 
provide a means to examine human practices and analyse the various ways in which humans 
construct meanings for nonhuman animals. Because humans can imbue nonhuman animals 
with so many meanings it is very easy for them to become anthropocentric symbols within 
human cultural discourses. Nowhere is this more evident that the zoo, where the concepts of 
“wildness” and the “natural” are marketed as commodities and human visitors come to see 
“the” tiger and “its” various appeals. These attributes such as beauty, power and wildness are 
all predetermined in the mind of the zoo visitor, all aspects of the Platonic tiger. This mode of 
looking at animals is presented explicitly and critically in zoo novels, for example in The 
Great Divorce where the public’s view of white tiger Sonya is contrasted with zoo vet Ellen’s 
zoological gaze, which disregards her aesthetic beauty and considers only her mutated genes 
and her lack of value as a scientific specimen. The zoo visitors in the novels examined here 
do not come to the zoo to meet an individual nonhuman animal but to see the supposedly 
generic “zoo animals”. In this sense the captive animals in the zoo are playing roles in a 
performance that was written long ago: the ferocious pacing tiger, the amusing apes, the regal 
lion, the “tall-man” giraffe and the “fat-man” hippopotamus (Ledgard, 191).  
The texts examined in this thesis expose this anthropocentrism and challenge its 
validity in ways which prevent nonhuman animals from functioning merely as symbols or 
literary devices; instead they are presented as characters who are shown to have their own 
agency. Chapter One of this thesis discussed how the communication of nonhuman animals is 
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often marginalised in human discourses, causing the animals themselves to be disregarded 
and rendered “silent” in human dialogues. I went on to explore ways in which the zoo novels 
attempt to overcome this marginalisation by creating meaningful nonhuman characters who 
communicate, have emotions and whose names signify that they are recognised as individual 
beings. These nonhuman characters confront the reader not only with their mysterious 
otherness but also the unexpected familiarity of their common emotions and experiences. 
Characters like Hannah in Hannah’s Dream and Sněhurka in Giraffe are shown to have 
emotions that go beyond their stereotypes, even if their manner of expressing these is 
unfamiliar to the human observer. As human characters try to understand other animals in the 
zoo novels the reader can observe the human process of assigning meaning to the nonhuman 
world and its inherent anthropocentrism. In Giraffe Amina reasons that the “blankness” of the 
giraffes’ expression must have a “purpose” (191); like Socrates, Amina believes this purpose 
is a usefulness that giraffes serve for humans. She concludes that the purpose of a giraffe 
(that is, any and all giraffes) is to serve as “a point of [human] reflection” enabling a human 
observer to better understand her own feelings (191), however a reader of the novel will 
know that Sněhurka and the other giraffes experience their own feelings and desires, ones 
which are at odds with the reasoning of Amina and the human philosophy of captivity. Of 
course the human interpretation of these emotions necessarily contains a degree of 
anthropocentrism but the recognition that nonhuman animals experience emotions and the 
ramifications of this is an element of each of the zoo novels which confronts the reader and 
challenges the traditional way of viewing all nonhuman animals and our relationships with 
them.  
The establishment of nonhuman characters’ identity and “person”ality in the zoo novels 
often involves the human discourse relating to them. In several of the novels the practice of 
objectifying nonhuman animals – literally rendering them as objects – is directly challenged, 
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for example during T.’s encounter with the dying coyote in How The Dead Dream, described 
in Chapter One of this thesis. At first T. is relieved that who he hit with his car is a coyote, far 
from being human she is an “it”; T. recognises that she is part of the teleological category 
“pest” and as such is considered much less valuable than a domestic “pet” dog (Millet, 36). 
However when T. sees her injuries the human-defined categories begin to blur and he is 
momentarily confused by the isolation and anonymity of her death, “Where was the 
ambulance?” (38) T.’s intimate encounter with the coyote in the moment of her death 
changes his attitude towards nonhuman animals forever. Throughout his life he has seen 
many dead animals on the road and the indignity of their death has always reinforced for T. 
the difference between them and himself. “You saw their insides all exposed. You thought: 
that is the difference between them and me. My insides are firmly contained.” (37) This 
reaction echoes the feelings of many zoo visitors on seeing captive nonhuman animals; the 
zoo’s rendering of the nonhuman animal as a powerless object and of the human visitor as a 
powerful observer serves to reinforce traditional ideas of human superiority over other 
species. However seeing the familiarity of the coyote’s pain makes T. realise “she” has an 
identity too, and in light of this revelation he re-examines his reasons for believing himself so 
different to other animals. “It was just a coyote … And yet he felt confused” (38). This 
encounter reflects the struggle many human characters go through in the zoo novels when 
they are made aware of the subjecthood of nonhuman animals and the suffering they 
experience due to human practices.  
In Chapter Two of this thesis I described the emphasis humans place on vision and 
visual experiences and the subsequent importance of eyes as literary symbols, even in relation 
to nonhuman animals who may actually experience the world primarily through senses other 
than vision. Often the zoo novels provide descriptions of zoo animals’ eyes as a means to 
convey the dual aspects of a nonhuman animal’s challenge to the human viewer: wholly other 
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and unknowable, yet also familiar. This is the case in How The Dead Dream when T. 
encounters another canine, this time an endangered zoo animal. The eyes of the Mexican gray 
wolf flash and shine in the darkness in a way that no human eyes could and although T. is 
surprised to detect the wolf’s returned gaze he realises that it is so direct as to be “unlike the 
directness of men” (137). Each time a human character encounters the gaze of a nonhuman 
animal she (and with her, the reader) is presented with the subjecthood of that animal and the 
reality that, like her, the other animal also looks in order to see. In a novel which centres on 
the zoo, a site where humans keep other animals in permanent captivity simply for the 
purpose of looking at them, this realisation that our gaze is not unique and that nonhuman 
animals have the ability to gaze back at us from a place of awareness and emotion is very 
confronting. The unequal power dynamic inherent in the relationship between humans and 
captive zoo animals was further examined in Chapter Two through a discussion of the various 
forms of the empowered human zoological, recreational and scientific gaze in relation to a 
disempowered captive nonhuman animal. The chapter went on to contextualise the position 
of modern Western zoos as institutions which control the nature of humans’ access to wild 
nonhuman animals by using the work of Philip Armstrong to explore the authoritative status 
of Science in contemporary Western societies. I concluded the second chapter with a 
discussion of the ways in which the zoo novels undermine the validity of Science’s authority 
and challenge the value of the zoological gaze. 
Historically, humans’ ability to recognise individual animals’ identities has been 
restricted by the instrumentalist categories created for this purpose, separating other animals 
by their use to humans. In this system nonhuman animals used for human food and 
experimentation are seen as generic and anonymous, domestic pets are seen as having 
individual but benign personal traits, and wild animals, while remaining predominantly 
interchangeable, are also endowed with various meanings associated with nature, purity, 
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mystery and exoticism. While the concept of our superiority over other species shapes 
Western culture and continues to support our utilisation of nonhuman species for 
experimentation, marketing, as food and as raw materials, the zoo remains a site where 
human domination over other animals is most visible. In Chapter Three of this thesis I briefly 
described the evolution of Western zoos over the past century and explored the ways in 
which zoos continue to be driven by anthropocentric philosophies. I found that animal 
collections and menageries have existed for thousands of years and far from being essential 
for human survival they have been places of entertainment, sites where the wealthy 
demonstrate their power and influence and the general public go to be entertained and 
diverted. Zoos today conscript scientific rhetoric to promote themselves as conservation arks, 
however using the work of Randy Malamud, Vicki Croke, David Hancocks and others I have 
argued that the philosophy of modern animal collections has remained practically unchanged 
over the past centuries. In each of the zoo novels the anthropocentric nature of the zoo is 
revealed to the reader even as it is disguised for the zoo visitor. Zoo employees like Camille 
in The Great Divorce and Henry in Zoology work hard to maintain “the illusion [the public] 
paid to see” (Martin, 269), an illusion dictated by the need to amuse and entertain the paying 
human visitors to ensure their continuing patronage. In this respect zoos are no different from 
the menageries of the past and so “conservation” is a useful concept employed by zoos to 
distance themselves from their history. However the greatest investment by zoos is not in 
their conservation efforts but rather in the illusion which is the true purpose of a modern 
animal collection. This illusion functions in two key ways. First, for education reasons the 
zoo must endeavour to convey generic information about a nonhuman species to the zoo 
visitor; however the illusion also requires adherence to the “conservation conspiracy” 
(Conway, 9). This means that the true extent of the conservation crisis, and the inability of 
zoos to oppose it, should not be allowed to influence a zoo visitor’s enjoyment. Second, the 
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very nature of the zoo and its participation in many of the attitudes and practices which 
perpetuate the conservation crisis, such as the valorisation of human domination over other 
species, the commoditisation of nature and the valuing of those species which are attractive to 
humans, should be kept hidden from the zoo visitor. In The Great Divorce Ellen calls this 
aspect of the illusion “the lie the public requires these days” (Martin, 56), and in some of the 
zoo novels it is maintained through the use of “immersion” exhibits which hide the realities 
of captivity from zoo visitors.  
However as my analysis has shown, while illusion is the central element of the zoo visit, 
in the zoo novels it is rendered marginal; since the novels’ interest does not lie in convincing 
the reader of the validity of nonhuman animal captivity the illusion is reduced to mere tokens. 
By focusing on the nonhuman animals who live their lives at the zoo rather than the humans 
who visit them for only a short time, the mechanical reality of the zoo is revealed not just in 
outdated collections like the small Czechoslovakian Zoo in Giraffe but also in modern 
institutions like the anonymous New Orleans zoo in The Great Divorce. The effect of this is 
that the physical and moral realities of keeping nonhuman species in captivity is very much 
part of the texts. 
While none of the zoo novels seems in favour of zoos as institutions none of them 
directly condemns the concept of captivity either. Instead the novels each describe the 
realities of life at the zoo – behind the illusion – and it is the human characters and the 
readers who are left to question the ethics of animal captivity. In Giraffe this reality is 
particularly shocking as the entire herd of giraffe is slaughtered on the whim of a faceless 
political authority. In Zoology Henry comes to understand the magnitude of Newman’s 
lifelong captivity in the zoo but no alternative is offered as when he leaves the zoo the goat 
disappears into the city. In Hannah’s Dream hope is proffered in the form of a pachyderm 
sanctuary to which Hannah is finally taken but even this is a respite for just one animal and 
149 
 
 
her rescue only serves to highlight the speciesism that sees the public rally around a single 
“charismatic megafauna” while continuing to support zoos. In both How The Dead Dream 
and The Great Divorce the imminent collapse of vast numbers of nonhuman species weighs 
on the mind of characters like T. and Ellen. Both of these characters have researched 
ecological and conservation issues and both remain thoroughly unconvinced in the ability of 
zoos to do anything about the disaster. The final message in each novel is of human isolation: 
Ellen struggles to save just one more animal on an ark which she knows is sinking and T. 
finds himself lost, starving and confused in a jungle with only a single anonymous animal for 
company.    
In writing about zoos these novels examine human-animal relationships by 
defamiliarising a site which most people seem to find unproblematic. In this thesis I have 
argued that despite our conquest of them nonhuman animals remain other; eluding our 
attempts at conceptualisation they are recognised yet remain outside our understanding. The 
defamiliarisation achieved by the novels then is not of nonhuman animals, who are already 
other, but of ourselves. Using works from Human-Animal Studies and other fields my 
analysis has shown that by concentrating their portrayal of zoos on the experience of the 
subjective captive nonhuman characters who are imprisoned there rather than on the human 
visitors who visit only briefly the novels interrogate the ideological foundations on which 
modern zoos are built; thus the anthropocentrism which pervades every aspect of our 
relationships with nonhuman animals is revealed and implicated in our continuing 
(mis)treatment of them. This process of defamiliarisation destablises human assumptions not 
just about other animals but also about nature, subjectivity and what it means to be human. 
Therefore in exploring literary constructions of zoos and captive animals it is human 
practices and ideologies that are ultimately revealed. 
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Appendix 
[From Rainer Maria Rilke’s Duino Elegies; Translated by Terry Llewellyn in  
Rilke’s Duino Elegies: Cambridge Readings,  
ed. Roger Paulin and Peter Hutchinson, 223-227] 
 
The Eighth Elegy 
                   Dedicated to Rudolf Kassner 
     WITH both its eyes the creature-world sees 
     the open. But our eyes are 
     as though reversed and set around it 
     like snares, all around its path to freedom. 
     What is outside, we know from the animal’s 
     countenance alone. For we already turn the small child 
     around and compel it to look backwards 
     and see formed nature, not the open that 
     is so deep in the animal’s face. Free from death; 
10  we only see that, the free animal 
     has its decline always behind itself 
     and before it God, and when it moves, it moves  
     in eternity, just as springs flow. 
        We have never, not for a single day, 
     pure space before us, into which the flowers 
     open up infinitely. It is always world 
     and never the nowhere without no: the pure, 
     the unguarded realm which one breathes and  
     infinitely knows and does not desire. As a child 
20  one loses oneself in silence to this and is 
     jolted out of it. Or someone dies and is it. 
     For near to death one no longer sees death 
     and stares out, perhaps with the creature’s wide eye. 
     Lovers, were not the other there, 
     blocking out the light, are close to this and marvel… 
     As if in error they have opened to them 
     what is behind the other… But no-one can 
     elude him, and the world crowds in again. 
     Constantly turned towards creation, 
30   we see on it only a mirroring of what is free, 
     obscured by us. Or that an animal, 
     a mute create, looks up calmly right through us. 
     This is fate: being opposite 
     and nothing but that and always being opposite. 
     If there were consciousness, such as we have, 
     in the secure animal that moves towards us 
     in another direction —, it would drag around us 
     with it in its progress. But its being is  
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     Unending, not fixed, and without a look  
40  on its state, pure, like its look forward. 
     And where we see future, it sees there all things 
     And itself in all things and healed forever. 
     And yet there is in the warm, alert animal 
     the heaviness and care of a great sorrow. 
     For something always clings to it, which  
     often overwhelms us —, memory, 
     as though what we urge towards was 
     once nearer, truer and its connection 
     with us infinitely tender. Here it is all separation 
50  and there it was breath. After the first home 
     the second seems not one thing or the other and doubtful. 
        O bliss of the tiny creature 
     that always remains inside the womb that brought it forth. 
     O happiness of the gnat that still leaps within 
     even when it procreates; for womb is all. 
     And look at the half security of the bird, 
     almost aware of both from its origin, 
     as though it were the soul of an Etruscan, 
     of a dead man, enclosed within a space 
 60  yet with the figure in repose as a lid. 
     And how dismayed is the womb-born thing 
     that has to fly. As though afraid of itself, 
     it zig-zags the air like when a crack 
     goes through a cup. So the trace 
     of the bat flaws the porcelain of the evening sky. 
     And we: Onlookers, always, everywhere, 
     turned toward all that and never transcending it. 
     It overwhelms us. We order it. It disintegrates. 
     We order it again and disintegrate ourselves. 
70  Who has turned us around like this, so that, 
     do what we may, we are in the stance 
     of someone who is leaving? Like him, who  
     on the last hill that shows him all of his valley 
     once more, turns, halts, tarries —, 
     so we live, forever taking our leave. 
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